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Section A 
Introduction 
This thesis is comprised of four sections, each of which 
seeks to elucidate the nature of shame and its role in 
psychopathology. Section A provides an introduction to 
the overall thesis. Section B contains the main research 
component. Section C is a case-study. Section D consists 
of a critical literature review. 
These four sections are conceptually linked by the theme 
of shame. This is an area of interest which personally 
evolved whilst working as a research psychologist, 
collecting clinical data, in a major MRC-funded 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) on unipolar depression 
in patients with a partner, and known as the London 
Depression Intervention Trial (Leff et al., in press). 
Participants were required to take part in two in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews, carried out by the author, 
and covering extensive aspects of their childhood and 
upbringing. The interviews also explored current self- 
concept and interpersonal functioning in a range of 
domains such as relational, occupational, domestic and 
parental roles. As this was a clinical research trial, 
interviews were required to be audio-recorded and 
participants' informed consent was obtained. It soon 
emerged that certain areas of participants' lives 
elicited shame in the course of the research interviews. 
Such areas included experiences of physical and sexual 
abuse, bullying, shame about behaviour or appearance, and 
concerns about overcompliance and passivity in past and 
current relationships. These areas also included 
experiences which exacerbated a pre-existing 
vulnerability to low self-concept, such as being made 
redundant. Evidence of shame was demonstrated by 
shrinking body posture, increased eye avoidance with 
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the interviewer, state shifts, digressions, under- 
reporting or minimisation of material, and abrupt changes 
of topic. At times, participants requested that recording 
equipment be switched off, both for reasons of 
"confidentiality" and, I began to suspect, shame. 
Participants would become less articulate and more 
hesitant when describing shaming events, or when 
constructing their personal narratives, often 
experiencing strong emotions such as anger or resentment, 
of which they had been unaware at a conscious level. 
Participants were often surprised at the strength of 
their feelings relating to material that was seen as 
irrelevant or "all in the past" 
- 
this being an example 
of "bypassed" or unconscious shame (Lewis, 1971), which 
would often take the form of other more acceptable 
emotions. Participants in the trial were also required to 
fill in a self-report measure to assess shame- and guilt- 
proneness, along with an extensive battery of other 
measures (both self-report and observer-rated) to assess 
shame-related phenomena such as guilt, social anxiety, 
submissive behaviour, internalised anger, negative 
automatic thoughts and attributional style. A diagnostic 
interview was also carried out by the author, the Present 
State Examination (PSE), to assess current clinical 
status. The Shame and Guilt Scale (Gilbert et al., 1989) 
was used to explore shame- and guilt-proneness, in 
addition to current self-functioning and childhood 
adversity factors, which had been assessed in the two 
research interviews. 
The resulting research project (Section B) utilises three 
different paradigms to investigate the role of shame in 
adult psychopathology. Firstly, an extensive empirical 
methodology is used to look at participants' scores on 
shame and their inter-relationships with other 
depression-related variables. Secondly, a more 
qualitative paradigm is used which involves a content 
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analysis of interview data, and this explores in depth 
those childhood adversity factors which have contributed 
to, and maintained, the development of a shame-prone 
self. From this, childhood maternal indifference emerges 
as being highly significantly correlated with adult 
shame-proneness. And thirdly, a single case-study design 
is used to look at shame in one of the author's long-term 
psychotherapy patients, where there had been high 
childhood maternal indifference, and presenting within 
the context of a narcissistic personality organisation. 
The next component of the project (Section C) describes 
a patient, seen by the author whilst working as a GP 
counsellor in the NHS, presenting with high internalised 
shame originating in childhood and resulting from an 
indifferent and rejecting parental style. The therapy 
uses a cognitive-analytic approach within a time- 
limited therapy (in this case, 12 sessions) to elicit the 
patient's underlying cognitions and beliefs and shows how 
these impact on, and shape, current behaviour. Being 
time-limited, it focuses less on the psychodynamics of 
unexplored feelings and minimises the transference in Ws. 
contradistinction to the case-study in Section B (Chapter 
6) where the patient was in long-term regular 
psychotherapy for two years and the transference was 
actively explored and analysed. The case-study in 
Section C serves to illustrate how linking early parental 
rearing styles with current maladaptive self-beliefs and 
repetitive, and unproductive, cycles of behaviour can be 
explored and resolved within a predetermined and time- 
limited therapeutic framework. 
The final component (Section D) reviews the usefulness of 
working with dreams in therapeutic practice and draws 
attention to the concept of "bypassed shame" (Section B, 
Chapter 2) where shame is often denied, disowned, 
unrecognised or reformulated by the patient. It is argued 
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that dreams provide useful clinical insights into 
patients' shame-generative material and can be used 
constructively, regardless of practitioner orientation. 
An analytic approach to working with dreams is postulated 
to be most relevant where there is unconscious, or 
bypassed, shame as this helps guide the therapist in 
eliciting material which may often be denied, minimised 
or unconsciously distorted. 
Taken together, it is anticipated that these four 
components provide an interwoven and thematically-linked 
framework for exploring the role of shame in 
psychopathology and its implications for therapeutic 
practice. The composite thesis highlights the range of 
diverse yet overlapping approaches that can be taken by 
the practitioner in recognising, responding to and 
working through shame in the therapeutic encounter. It 
hopefully goes some way in extending our theoretical and 
clinical knowledge about this important affect. 
Throughout the development of this study, my co-existing 
roles as research psychologist and counselling 
psychologist have converged and been mutually enriching. 
Although research interviewing does not share the same 
therapeutic focus, it does require the necessary 
practitioner skills of authenticity, warmth and accurate 
empathy in order to elicit and clarify important and 
sensitive information. 
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Abstract 
Using a cross-sectional design, a self-report measure of 
proneness to shame and guilt was administered to 86 
patients with moderate to severe depression, with the 
prediction that there would be a positive correlation of 
shame with severity of depression. Contrary to other, 
non-clinical studies, it was found that guilt but not 
shame was associated with levels of depression. Shame- 
proneness demonstrated a unique association with a stable 
attributional style for negative outcomes, general 
negative self-evaluation, submissive behaviour, negative 
automatic thoughts, social anxiety and internalised 
anger. Shame-proneness and guilt-proneness were both 
associated with dichotomous thinking or 'splitting'. A 
range of childhood adversity factors was also 
investigated derived from ratings on the Childhood 
Experience of Care & Abuse interview (the CECA) including 
childhood sexual and physical abuse. Contrary to 
prediction, no relationship was found between shame- or 
guilt-proneness and a reported history of childhood 
sexual or physical abuse. From the other childhood 
adversity factors, only childhood maternal indifference 
demonstrated a positive association with adult shame- 
proneness. Empirical findings are discussed including 
limitations of the measure used in this study to assess 
shame- and guilt-proneness. A content analysis of the 
CECA interview data showed that maternal indifference, as 
characterised by maternal emotional unavailability, was 
the most significant component. These results give 
empirical support to the psychoanalytic concept of the 
role of mirroring in childhood, and a clinical case-study 
is presented to illustrate the role of childhood maternal 
indifference and adult shame-proneness, presenting within 
a narcissistic personality organisation. Finally, overall 
findings are summarised and implications for working with 
the shame-prone patient in therapeutic practice are 
discussed. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
"Shame, I do believe, is the most powerful emotion known to man; most 
discoveries and journeys of importance have been accomplished because 
of the ignominy that would be the result if the attempt was abandoned" 
(Iain Pears, 1997, An Instance of the Fingerpost) 
Overview 
The current study developed from part of a larger 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) known as the London 
Depression Intervention Trial (LDIT) which was set up to 
compare three treatment interventions for primary 
unipolar depression, and to assess differential relapse 
rates, in participants who had been in a heterosexual 
relationship of at least one year's duration. The three 
interventions were antidepressants plus education about 
depression (psycho-education), cognitive therapy, and 
systemically-based couple therapy for participant and 
partner. Assessments were made at three time points 
- 
at 
initial intake, at post-treatment (9-12 months after 
start of intervention), and at 2-year follow-up from 
treatment start date. All data in the current study were 
taken at initial assessment before randomisation into the 
trial and are therefore cross-sectional. 
My personal interest in shame developed from my 
theoretical interest in its relative neglect 
psychodynamically as, from Freud on, far less attention 
had been paid to shame's clinical or theoretical 
relevance compared to guilt. Also, from a clinical or 
therapeutic perspective, it soon became clear that whilst 
discussing certain "shame-evoking" areas in their lives, 
participants would request that the audiotape be switched 
of f while they talked about certain experiences during 
the research interviews. The taping of interviews was 
necessary as these formed an important part of the 
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research study and had to be rated. Participants' 
experiences often included distressing incidents in 
childhood (such as being bullied, mistreated, neglected 
or abused), as well as current issues relating to 
sexuality, sexual identity, domestic violence, rape and 
assault, or addictive behaviour, where these were 
perceived by the participant as undesirable and outside 
their control. 
Such "fears of disclosure" were inevitably accompanied by 
physiological manifestations such as blushing, loss of 
eye-contact, self-consciousness, manifestations of 
powerlessness (sighing, shrugging etc. ) and the wish to 
conceal information. There were also verbal signs such as 
"state shifts" 
- 
abrupt changes of topic, digressions, 
trivialisation, under-reporting or denial, particularly 
about material which was clearly still sensitive 
although often described as "all in the past" and 
therefore no longer seen to be relevant. Such behaviour 
served to highlight the pervasiveness of the shame 
feelings themselves, compounded by the shame of feeling 
ashamed (a form of shame about shame or "meta-shame"), 
which increased, psychological unease. Sometimes 
participants revealed strong feelings of anger or 
resentment directed towards themselves, as well as 
perceived perpetrators, about incidents or behaviour 
which they would rather have left "forgotten". There 
was also a tendency for increased eye avoidance with 
myself as researcher, and more frequent and longer 
hesitations before answering questions or elaborating 
shame-generating material. 
In the current study, three methodologies have been used 
to explore the role of shame in adult psychopathology 
within a moderate-to-severe depressed sample. Firstly, a 
quantitative paradigm was used to explore the association 
of shame with various symptoms and correlates of 
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depression, as assessed by standardised clinical measures 
(described in Chapter 4). Secondly, a content analysis of 
transcribed interview data was carried out, derived from 
participants' comments in an in-depth childhood adversity 
interview, to explore the association of shame with 
aspects of early parental rearing style (described in 
Chapter 5). The findings are then examined within the 
context of two major psychoanalytic theorists, Winnicott 
and Kohut, and focus on the concept of "maternal 
emotional unavailability". Thirdly, a single case-study 
is presented (Chapter 6) which highlights those aspects 
of adult shame-proneness which derive from the original 
dyadic relationship with the mother and manifested here 
within a narcissistic personality organisation. The 
final chapter (Chapter 7) summarises the overall findings 
and assesses their implications for psychotherapeutic 
practice with the shame-prone patient. 
Introduction 
It is generally accepted that shame is one of the most 
powerful, painful"'and potentially destructive experiences 
known to humans (Kaufman, 1989; Nathanson, 1994). Even 
the first story of the Bible, of Adam and Eve, is a story 
of shame. It recounts how they broke the social rules of 
the Garden of Eden, became aware of themselves as objects 
for the observations and judgements of each other and of 
God, and became fearful of those judgements and their 
consequences. This is the essence of shame 
- 
the fear of 
negative evaluations by others, via exposure of 
undesirable qualities about the self or one's actions (M. 
Lewis, 1992). 
Indeed, the Indo-European root of our English word 
"shame" is from "skem", which is a word for cover, with 
connotations of wishes to hide and fears of exposure. 
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Many languages are richer than English in the basic shame 
vocabulary. Thus, French has both "honte" and "pudeur"; 
German has "scham" and "schande". These words 
differentiate disgrace as social (ie. scandal, 
criminality) from the inner personal experience of shame 
that has its roots in bodily experience. Noah's shame was 
that, in a drunken state, his genitals were exposed; Adam 
and Eve's shame was their nakedness in the sight of God 
and of each other. 
Historically, shame has been regarded as the "Cinderella" 
of the unpleasant emotions, having received much less 
attention than anxiety, guilt or depression. Freud (1896) 
interpreted it as a fear of ridicule (ie. of social 
origin) whereas Piers (Piers, 1953) interpreted it as a 
response to failure to live up to one's ego-ideal (ie. of 
personal origin). Guilt is seen to occur if one 
transgresses an injunction derived from outside but 
represented in the superego, such as incest. It is 
conceptualised as a consequence of deeds, intentions or 
thoughts about others and is essentially linked with the 
idea of "bad conscience". 
In short, shame occurs if one fails to achieve an ideal 
of behaviour set by society or oneself, whereas guilt 
embraces the notion of harming or seeking to harm others, 
and has been referred to as a form of "moral shame" 
(Kaufman, 1989). Kaufman has also referred to shame as 
the "affect of inferiority", while Scheff (Scheff, 1988) 
called shame the "emotion of deference". More recently, 
Susan Miller (1996) has argued that shame is now so 
often seen as "the bedrock of psychopathology" and "the 
gold to be mined psychotherapeutically" (p. 151) that 
there has been neglect of other emotions and their 
interface with shame. 
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There are still many differences of conceptualisation 
concerning the affect of shame, despite some evidence of 
a growing consensus, and as yet we still do not possess 
sufficient methodologies to explore these differences 
empirically. This study aims to investigate those unique 
concomitants of shame (in contradistinction to guilt) 
which contribute to psychopathology and the implications 
for therapeutic practice. 
As Adler expressed in 1918 (q. Pines 1995, p. 350) "Shame 
is a product of a feeling of relatedness and as such is 
impossible to exclude from the life of the human soul. 
Human society would be impossible without this affect". 
According to Pines (1990) our bourgeois post- 
enlightenment society has tended to emphasise the affect 
of guilt over shame, and inevitably psychoanalysis has 
reflected this. Also, many of the roots of such theories 
were laid down in times of self-analysis, when it was 
more difficult to "keep one's eyes open" to one's more 
shameful aspects. 
Distinguishing Shame and Guilt 
Guilt is less enduring than shame, as it relates more to 
actions than to identity; one can pay the price demanded 
by conscience, or society, and thereby be redeemed. The 
word "guilt" itself is related to "geld" (money), and 
represents debts that are to be paid 
- 
thus it provides 
a powerful motive for reparation. The re-emergence of 
shame in our literature accompanies the attention now 
given to identity and the concept of "self", in 
contradistinction to the narrower Freudian notion of a 
fixed and mechanical "ego", which was a product of his 
structural dynamic theory. This may be problematic for 
classical psychoanalytic theory, but according to Wurmser 
(1987), when the affect of shame is included into our 
vocabulary, and with it the language of self, it 
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broadens and deepens our vision theoretically and 
therapeutically. The point has now been reached where 
the role of shame is being increasingly recognised for 
the vital affect it is, and the role it plays in 
contributing to adult psychopathology. 
According to Freud, shame was largely a reaction 
formation against sexually exhibitionistic impulses or 
wishes (Freud, 1905/1953); it was, he believed, 
developmentally prior to guilt and resulted in self- 
disgust and the wish to hide oneself. Freud argued that 
guilt emerged around the time of the Oedipus Complex, and 
was therefore more susceptible to the negative 
cognitions and self-rumination which characterise 
disorders of affect 
- 
melancholia (or depression) in 
particular. It is questionable however, given the 
historical evidence, whether Oedipus himself suffered 
from shame or guilt (the act of tearing out one's eyes 
could be seen as one of deep self-loathing or an act of 
atonement to the angry gods). Dodds (1951) argued that 
amongst the Ancient Greeks, guilt was linked with notions 
of sin and transgression against the gods whilst shame 
was seen as a response to fate. Oedipus contains elements 
of both, portraying the tragic hero as both initiator, 
and victim, of his actions. 
There is undoubtedly a complex relationship between shame 
and guilt, and the likelihood is that many situations 
have the potential to elicit either emotion, or both 
(Tangney, 1992). Studies comparing structural and 
phenomenological dimensions of shame and guilt have 
confirmed that there are more similarities than 
differences in people's accounts of their experiences of 
the two emotions (Tangney, Miller et al, 1996; Wicker et 
al, 1983). In both studies, more similarities than 
differences between shame and guilt were reported, but 
the conclusion was that shame was the more intense, 
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incapacitating emotion and more likely to involve 
physiological accompaniments and feelings of self- 
disgust. In Wicker et al's study shame more often 
involved feeling inhibited and passive, while in Tangney 
et al's study shame was uniquely associated with feelings 
of isolation and regret. Levin (1967) believed some 
patients use guilt as a defence against shame; guilt can 
be less painful than shame because it carries a sense of 
power, whereas shame is characterised by powerlessness. 
The traditional approach to the distinction between shame 
and guilt was that shame was conceptualised as a 
developmental precursor to guilt 
- 
an emotion that exists 
before one has internalised standards of good and bad 
behaviour which are socially-derived. Shame was viewed 
as the tendency to feel bad about misdeeds when caught by 
someone; guilt was seen as the tendency to feel bad about 
misdeeds because they violated one's own internalised 
standards (eg. Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 1945; Erikson, 
1950). In fact, this public-private distinction is still 
evident in some current theories (Buss, 1980; Hogan & 
Cheek, 1983). Buss (1980) presents this position as 
follows: = 
"In brief, guilt involves self-hatred; shame 
involves social anxiety 
... 
The best test of guilt 
is whether anyone else knows of the transgression. 
In true guilt, no one need know 
... 
Shame is 
essentially public; if no one else knows, there is 
no basis for shame" (p. 159; emphasis in original). 
This idea is expressed in the following excerpt from The 
Scarlet Letter (Hawthorne, 1970): "There can be no 
outrage, methinks, against our common nature 
- 
whatever 
be the delinquencies of the individual 
- 
no outrage more 
flagrant than to forbid the culprit to hide his face for 
shame" (p. 83). (Original published 1850). 
But this traditional approach to the distinction between 
shame and guilt is too simplistic, and it has been argued 
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that shame may be experienced even when no one else is 
physically present (see Barrett & Campos, 1987; 
Creighton, 1990; Lewis, 1971,1987; Stipek, 1983; Wurmser 
1987). Tangney et al. (1994) in their study on children 
and adults, found that "solitary" shame was about as 
prevalent as "solitary" guilt. Neither did the degree to 
which others were aware of the respondents' behaviour 
vary as a function of shame and guilt for either children 
or adults. In fact, most current theorists who 
distinguish shame from guilt do so on a different basis. 
Lewis (1971,1987) has presented the most comprehensive 
position on the distinction between shame and guilt, and 
one that has had a strong influence on contemporary 
writings. According to her, shame and guilt differ in 
several ways, including the following: shame concerns 
moral transgressions or defeats (such as failure 
experiences), whereas guilt concerns moral transgressions 
only. Shame involves a focus on the self's deficiencies, 
whereas guilt involves a focus on negative events or acts 
for which one feels responsible. Shame involves a passive 
or "helpless" self, whereas guilt involves an active 
self, which often seeks to' make amends. 
Lewis argues that, in shame, the self is split into two 
functions 
- 
the self as an observing, disapproving 
entity, and the self as the object of such disapproval. 
This characterisation of the difference between shame and 
guilt has been highly influential, and major ideas from 
it are evident in most current theories of the 
difference between them (eg. Barrett & Campos, 1987; M. 
Lewis, 1991; Nathanson, 1987a). Therefore Lewis's (1971, 
1987) conceptualisation of shame and guilt de-emphasised 
the objective content of eliciting events and instead 
highlighted differences in the individual's 
- 
or 
society's 
- 
interpretation of the role of the self, 
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particularly the manner in which self-relevant negative 
events are construed. 
This shame-guilt 
, 
distinction is succinctly portrayed in 
the following extract from The Scarlet Letter: "This 
child of its father's guilt and its mother's shame hath 
come from the hand of God" (Hawthorne 1970, p. 137) and 
highlights the social construction of gender-related 
distinctions in the appraisal of these two affects. This 
point is made by Tangney and her colleagues (1994) when 
they refer to shame and guilt as self-relevant and other- 
relevant emotions 
- 
uniquely and inextricably embedded in 
interpersonal contexts. Shame and guilt are seen to be 
determined less by the objective structure and content of 
an eliciting situation and more by the manner in which 
the situation is construed, with reference to both 
interpersonal and self-related dimensions. 
Such a distinction, however, does not explore the 
possible aetiology of shame and guilt or why shame (more 
often than guilt) is associated with adult 
psychopathology. There is a lack in the literature on 
this issue, and the current study aims to investigate 
those childhood adversity factors and parental rearing 
styles which may contribute to shame-proneness in the 
adult. 
Tangney and her colleagues also showed that, contrary to 
received opinion, a surprisingly high proportion of 
shame experiences involved private events (Tangney et al, 
1994) questioning the assumption that it is necessarily 
socially-derived and publicly-contextualised. It seems 
possible that these private events may involve 
ruminations about personal shortcomings in the face of a 
real or imagined other. This reflects Nolen-Hoeksema's 
(1991) findings on the differential role of "ruminative" 
vs. "distractive" thinking in relapse prevention in 
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depression where "ruminative" could be defined as 
action-avoidant (shame) and "distractive" could be 
defined as action-facilitative (guilt). 
Accordingly, issues of definition and operationalisation 
of shame and guilt measures have become central areas of 
concern to researchers in this field. There is evidence 
from other studies that respondents express more 
difficulties in talking about shame experiences than 
about guilt experiences when interviewed, although this 
does not appear to prevent them from doing so, and often 
at length, although the content is less specific 
(Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney, 1992). A related problem 
inherent in all assessments of dispositional (or trait) 
shame is the possibility that shame may, invariably, not 
be experienced at a conscious level (so-called "bypassed 
shame", Lewis, 1971). This may be the process observed 
when talking to participants about shame-eliciting 
experiences in their lives, where their strength of 
feeling genuinely surprised them, often after many 
years, and verbal and non-verbal signs of discomfort 
were manifested when alluding to these events. 
Furthermore, the concept of dispositional or trait shame 
may be misguided, as recent research evidence suggests 
that shame may not generalise to a person's character or 
behaviour and may be mediated via specific markers such 
as "bodily shame" (Andrews, 1995; Andrews, 1997; Andrews 
& Hunter, 1997). 
The Shame Experience 
Lynd (1958) argued that the experience of shame has a 
close connection with identity and self-insight, and is 
provoked by experiences which call into question one's 
preconceptions about oneself which compel one to see 
oneself through the eyes of others. In other words, 
10 
recognising the discrepancy between others' perceptions, 
and one's own oversimplified and egotistical self- 
conceptions, is conducive to shame. Sartre (1956) 
redefined the essence of shame as the awareness of one's 
"Being-for-Others" and notes: "It is my body as it is 
for the Other which may embarrass me" (q. Mollon 1984, 
p. 212). It is thus closely linked with ridicule, 
denigration, fear of negative evaluation, exposure or 
the sense of a "defective self". Lynd argued that shame, 
if faced up to, can increase insight and self-awareness; 
if denied, it can provoke the development of a defensive 
self, as found in the narcissistic personality. Thus, in 
Lynd's view, shame concerns the entire self, mutual 
social involvement, and alienation. Rycroft (1968) argued 
that shame is a persistent neurotic symptom which occurs 
in schizoid individuals who both over-value themselves 
but possess insight that their self-evaluation is not 
shared by others. 
On a physiological level, shame is associated with the 
physical concomitants of blushing, eye gaze avoidance, 
head down movements, shrinking away, signalling the wish 
to hide or escape, and 'v, signs of self-consciousness 
(Gilbert 1998a; Tangney, Miller et al, 1996; Wicker et al, 
1983). It is often characterised by one's awareness of 
the discrepancy between one's self-perceptions and those 
of others, whether real or imagined (Lynd, 1958; Mollon, 
1984; Sartre, 1956). This is in contrast to guilt, which 
derives from transgressions against moral laws or codes 
of behaviour and does not have the physical 
manifestations that are associated with shame (Lewis, 
1971). 
From an evolutionary perspective, shame is seen to 
originate from a desire for conflict-avoidance or 
submission, thus signalling acceptance of a subordinate 
position in the existing hierarchy; guilt has no such 
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clear evolutionary origin or function. When hiding is not 
possible, the nonverbal communication of shame, or 
"freezing", seems to act as a form of appeasement. Such 
behaviours include a hunched posture and eye gaze 
avoidance and serve the function of damage limitation 
(Gilbert & McGuire, 1998) and in mild cases may arouse 
sympathy and forgiveness (Keltner & Harker, 1998). 
Tangney and Fischer (1995: p. 10) extended the 
evolutionary focus of shame by making reference to its 
antecedents, responses and "self-control procedures" 
(Figure 1 refers). 
Figure 1: Proposed Prototypical Script for Adult Shame 
Antecedents: Flaw or deplorable action, statement, or 
characteristic of a person 
A person acts in a dishonourable way, says something 
deplorable, or evidences a characteristic that is 
disgraceful or flawed. 
Someone (other or self) witnesses this action, 
statement, or characteristic and judges the person 
(self or other) negatively. 
Responses: Hiding, escaping, sense of shrinking, feeling 
worthless 
The person tries to hide or escape from observation 
or judgment; he or she feels small, exposed, 
worthless, powerless. 
The person lowers his or her head, covers the face 
or eyes, or turns away from other people. Sometimes 
he or she strikes out at the person observing the 
flaw. 
The person is preoccupied with the negative action, 
statement, or characteristic, as well as with 
negative evaluation of self more generally. 
Self-control procedures: Undoing and redefinition 
The person may try to change the negative action, 
statement, or characteristic; disguise it; deny its 
existence; or blame someone or something else for 
it. 
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In addition to the notion of shame being grounded in a 
characteristic pattern of response or behaviour, as in 
Tangney & Fischer's model, it can also be grounded in 
one's identity and take the form of acquired or inherited 
shame. 
Society and Shame 
We may feel ashamed of what we are as well as what we do 
and this is inherent in Goffman's work on stigma 
(Goffman, 1963). It is also possible that one could be 
ashamed of other people's behaviour over which the 
individual has little or no control (an example would be 
being ashamed of "a family secret" that gets out). This 
is captured in the following quote from The Scarlet 
Letter (Hawthorne, 1970): 
"I know not whether these ancestors of mine 
bethought themselves to repent, and ask pardon of 
Heaven for their cruelties; or whether they are now 
groaning under the heavy consequences of them, in 
another state of being. At all events, I, the 
present writer, as their representative, hereby take 
shame upon myself for their sakes, and pray that any 
curse incurred by them 
... 
may be now and 
henceforward removed" (p. 9; emphasis not in 
original). 
According to Andrews (1998) those of us who do not 
"measure up" to society's norms may experience a sense of 
"shameful differentness" (p. 44) and the gap is likely to 
be filled by feelings of personal inadequacy and 
alienation. This reflects a genuine dislocation of the 
person from the community and the values enshrined in it. 
13 
The following quote from Janet Frame's (1984) 
autobiography, An Angel at My Table, captures Frame's 
childhood sense of "shameful differentness": 
"When I was a child, I was always excited by the 
adventure of a first time, and eager to share it 
with others. Now, I had missed so many experiences 
in ordinary living that my "firsts", out of step 
with the "firsts" of others, were felt to be a cause 
of shame" (p. 124). 
Conclusion 
Therefore, my role as research psychologist in a major 
RCT on depression, where participants' recorded 
interviews covered sensitive and self-revealing aspects 
of their past and current lives, contributed to my 
existing theoretical interest in shame. In the current 
study it was decided to use three methodologies to 
investigate shame's aetiology and its role in the genesis 
of adult psychopathology. 
There exist a range of models of shame and their 
diversity contributes to the complexity of shame's 
conceptualisation and measurement. However, there is a 
consensus that shame is experienced as a diminution of 
the self, in which one is exposed as flawed or deficient 
in some way. Wharton (1990) states that the focus of 
attention in shame is on the "self"; for guilt it is the 
"other". It is through the unique physiological 
concomitants of shame, such as blushing or gaze 
avoidance, that the attention of the other focuses upon 
the individual and makes them central in awareness. 
One of the major challenges for research in this field is 
the differentiation of shame from guilt. This raises the 
issue of the notion of the self versus the notion of the 
ego. From Freud's case-studies it is seriously arguable 
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that Lewis (1971) was correct in believing Freud had 
misattributed his patients' shame feelings to guilt - 
ostensibly to fit in with his structural model of the 
mind which involved the concept of the internal superego 
or "conscience". Recent studies have established some 
commonality between shame and guilt. However, there is 
general agreement that it is the intense, enduring and 
incapacitating nature of shame which uniquely 
distinguishes it. 
The traditional public-private approach to the 
distinction between shame and guilt has now been 
challenged and their differentiation has been established 
on another basis. Typically, shame is seen to focus on 
the self's deficiencies, whereas guilt concerns 
transgressions and a wish to make amends. Lewis (1971) 
focused less on the objective content of eliciting 
events, and stressed the importance of the individual's 
self-evaluations and self-appraisals in shaping cognitive 
and emotional responses as shame or guilt. 
One serious deficit in the research literature is 
evidence concerning the aetiology of shame and guilt, and 
why shame (more than guilt) is associated with adult 
psychopathology. In order to address this more fully, the 
current study aims to investigate those childhood 
adversity factors which may be implicated in shame's 
early development and its maintenance into adulthood. 
The distinction between "ruminative" versus "distractive" 
thinking in relapse prevention in depression (Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1991) parallels the ruminative quality found in 
shame, where events are often dwelt upon, or replayed, in 
a way which impedes constructive or restorative action. 
Therefore, issues of defining and measuring shame and 
guilt, and the way they shape emotions, cognitions, 
behaviour and beliefs, have become central concerns of 
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shame researchers and clinicians alike. The affect of 
shame poses particular difficulties in that it may not 
often be conscious (cf. Lewis' "bypassed" shame) or may 
not generalise to all aspects of a person's life 
(Andrews, 1995; Andrews, 1997; Andrews & Hunter, 1997). 
The phenomenological experience of shame (unlike guilt) 
is associated with fear of ridicule or denigration linked 
with the sense of a core defective self. In narcissistic 
personality disorder, such fears are denied and can 
promote the growth of a false or grandiose self, to 
overcompensate for deep feelings of inadequacy. 
Physiologically, shame has more physical concomitants 
than guilt, such as blushing or head down movements, 
which signal self-consciousness and the desire to hide. 
From an evolutionary perspective, this originates from 
the wish for appeasement and serves the function of 
damage limitation (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keltner & 
Harker, 1998). Tangney and Fischer (1995) have extended 
shame's evolutionary focus by noting its characteristic 
antecedents and responses, and the psychological 
mechanisms by which it operates. 
Ift 
And finally, shame can also be inherited or experienced 
vicariously. Goffman's key work on stigma (1963) drew 
attention to the truth that people may feel ashamed of 
what they are, or what they represent, as well as what 
they do. And according to Andrews (1998) there is a sense 
in which deviation from the social "norm" can induce a 
sense of "shameful differentness" leading to feelings of 
isolation and dislocation. 
It is anticipated that the findings from the current 
study may be used to inform and develop clinical practice 
with clients identified as being shame-prone or 
particularly sensitive to shame. In Chapter 2, a general 
overview of the literature is carried out which provides 
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an up-to-date account of the role of shame in adult 
psychopathology. This is followed by a discussion of the 
current methodological issues in shame research in 
Chapter 3. The studies which follow, Chapters 4,5 and 6, 
provide three paradigms for studying shame. The final 
chapter, Chapter 7, summarises the overall findings and 
develops a therapeutic model of recognising and working 
with shame. 
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Chapter 2: A General Overview of the Literature 
"At the moment you hate me because I've been instrumental in getting you 
something you're ashamed of wanting. I can't do much about the hatred, 
but I do think you should look at the shame. Because it's not really 
anything to be ashamed of, is it? Wanting to stay alive? You'd be a very 
strange sort of animal if you didn't 
... 
Everybody who survives feels 
guilty. Don't let it spoil everything" (Pat Barker, 1991, Regeneration, 
Part I of the Regeneration Trilogy). 
Shame and guilt are universal affective phenomena and are 
often used interchangeably, as the above quotation 
implies. But numerous empirical studies (Ferguson et al, 
1991; Lindsay-Hartz 1984; Tangney 1989,1992,1993) 
demonstrate that shame and guilt differ significantly 
along affective, cognitive and motivational dimensions. 
In shame, the focus of the negative evaluation is on the 
entire self. Guilt, on the other hand, generally arises 
from a negative evaluation of a specific behaviour or act 
involving harm (or wishing harm) to others, and the 
global self remains intact. In the literature, this is 
distinguished from maladaptive guilt, which is 
characterised by chronic self-blame and obsessive 
rumination. It is Tangney's view that guilt becomes 
maladaptive (or pathological) when it becomes fused with 
shame, and that it is the shame component that triggers 
a pathogenic sequence of affect and cognitions (Tangney 
et al., 1995). 
There has been recent interest in the emotion of shame 
and its differentiation from guilt (Tangney & Fischer, 
1995) and attention is now being paid to its clinical as 
well as theoretical relevance. As noted in Chapter 1, 
Freud viewed shame largely as a reaction formation 
against sexually exhibitionistic impulses (Freud 
1905/1953). His main focus was on guilt, but Lewis (1971) 
argued that, in developing a primarily guilt-based theory 
(incorporated in his structural model) Freud mislabelled 
his patients' shame experiences as guilt. Significant 
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contributions to the study of shame have come from the 
exploration of the superego (Wurmser, 1987), affect 
theory (Nathanson, 1987) and identity (Lewis, 1971; Lynd 
1958). More recently, shame has been highlighted as a 
key component in narcissism (Kohut, 1971; Morrison 1984, 
1989), domestic violence (Lansky, 1987), schizophrenia 
(Morrison, 1987), depression (Nathanson, 1987ab), bi- 
polar illness (Goldberg, 1991) and eating disorders 
(Andrews, 1997). It has also been implicated in childhood 
sexual and physical abuse (Andrews, 1995; Andrews & 
Hunter, 1997; Andrews, 1998). 
Lewis (1971) is one of the few theorists who has 
presented an integrated conceptualisation of the 
differential roles of shame and guilt in psychopathology. 
She suggested that the less-differentiated self of the 
field-dependent individual is vulnerable to the global 
experience of shame 
- 
and ultimately to disorders of 
affect (particularly depression). In contrast, the more 
clearly differentiated self of the field-independent 
individual is susceptible to guilt (by distinguishing 
self from behaviour) and to obsessive and paranoid 
symptoms involving vigilance directed towards "the 
field". This idea is captured in the concept of the 
"extended frame of reference of responsibility" in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, 1996). Lewis's 
views on shame are in line with current cognitive- 
attributional models of depression (Abramson et al, 1978; 
Beck, 1983) and Hoblitzelle (1987) has remarked on the 
conceptual parallels between Lewis's view and current 
cognitive views of depression. 
Teasdale has made an interesting distinction between 
implicational and propositional cognitive systems ("hot" 
vs. "cold" cognition (Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale, 
1993; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). As Teasdale (1997b) 
notes, thoughts such as "I am worthless" are simple 
19 
statements of belief or propositions about the self. 
However, at the deeper implicational level, such a 
statement represents a rich activation of affect and 
memories associated with experiences of being shamed - 
similar to Bower's (1970) "associative network". 
Clearly, shame theorists and researchers are implicitly 
concerned with the richer, implicational, not 
propositional, level of reasoning. One problem, however, 
is that this form of processing may be difficult to 
verbalise or even have conscious access to (cf. Lewis' 
(1971) concept of "bypassed shame" where the shame is 
not consciously experienced and may take the form of 
another emotion, such as anger or rage). This may well 
limit the value of self-report measures in their attempt 
to capture largely non-conscious processes. 
Among studies carried out with clinical populations, 
Andrews and Hunter (1997) found that shame directed at 
both one's character and one's behaviour was higher in 
patients whose depression had taken a recurrent or 
chronic course than in patients with a single short 
episode of depression. A study by Smith (1972) reported 
that severely depressed patients produced more shame than 
guilt themes, using a qualitative analysis of patients' 
descriptions of their earliest memories. But a study by 
Crouppen (1977) failed to replicate Smith's findings, and 
Hoblitzelle (1987) raised concerns regarding the validity 
of the Early Memories Test as an index of shame-proneness 
and guilt-proneness. 
The current study is distinctive in that it is the first 
time the contributions of shame and guilt have been 
separately investigated in a moderate-to-severe depressed 
sample and its empirical findings have been reported 
elsewhere (Alexander et al. 1999). It uses a measure of 
shame- and guilt-proneness derived from evolutionary 
theory in an attempt to replicate the association between 
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shame-proneness and depression and to investigate its 
other correlates. The Shame and Guilt Scale was 
factorially validated on a non-clinical sample of 
undergraduates (N=96, mean BDI=7.5, SD 5.8) by Gilbert, 
Allan and Pehl in 1989, and was based on the work of 
Lewis (1986,1987) and Hoblitzelle (1987). Preliminary 
analysis suggested a good separation of shame from guilt 
(Gilbert et al. 1989) although the actual correlation of 
shame with guilt was not reported. Their factor structure 
revealed one strong shame factor and two guilt factors 
(harming others and secretly cheating). 
In a second study by the same authors (1989) the 
relationship was investigated between depression, 
submissive behaviour and shame in a small sample of 
depressed students (N=20, mean BDI=23.1, SD 13.5). It was 
found that shame but not guilt was strongly associated 
with levels of depression in both samples. In the non- 
clinical sample, BDI score correlated with shame 0.28 
(p<. 0l); in the clinical sample, BDI score correlated 
with shame 0.55 (p<. 01). The scale had a Cronbach alpha 
of 0.74 for shame and 0.75 for guilt; test-retest 
reliability was given as r=0.75. 
The literature, however, is inconsistent regarding the 
relative importance of shame versus guilt in specific 
psychological disorders. Much of the inconsistency can be 
attributed to the fact that most theoretical perspectives 
have failed to make a clear distinction between them, and 
this has been mirrored by problems of measurement and 
differentiation. The importance of current methodological 
issues in the measurement of shame and guilt within a 
clinical context is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The relationship between shame and guilt and various 
theoretical concepts is presented as a rationale for the 
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use of particular measures in the current study. 
Specific hypotheses that are to be investigated are 
outlined. 
Shame and Depression 
Shame has been seen as a major contributory factor in 
adult depression (Allan et al, 1994; Andrews, 1995; Brown 
et al, 1994; Gilbert et al, 1994; Tangney, 1993; Tangney 
et al, 1992). Gilbert 1997a and Gilbert et al, 1995 link 
shame directly with depression by emphasising their 
commonality, such as the emotional consequences of direct 
attacks on a person's self-esteem, events undermining a 
person's sense of rank, social attractiveness and value, 
and the effects of involuntary subordination. Shame and 
depression both relate to negative affective experiences 
involving self-relevant negative evaluations. 
Gilbert (1989) outlined a number of depressogenic 
situations that resemble those drawn from life-events 
research (Brown & Harris 1978; Brown et al, 1987; Brown 
et al, 1994). Gilbert (1989) also refers to the concept 
of "blocked escape" and notes that one consequence of 
"fresh start" events that have been shown to relate to 
recovery from depression (Brown et al, 1988,1992) is a 
reduced feeling of being trapped in a punishing 
situation. 
Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow (1992) focused on exploring 
dispositions to shame- and guilt-proneness using the 
Self-Conscious Affect & Attribution Inventory (SCAAI) and 
replicated an association between shame-proneness and 
depression. However, their studies were conducted on 
university undergraduates and it is probable that a 
different pattern of results may have emerged if studying 
the shame and guilt correlates of depression in a 
clinical population. In fact, the guilt reported in much 
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of the clinical literature is an "insoluble" type of 
guilt 
- 
typically a "neurotic" or exaggerated guilt that 
is fused with shame (Angyal, 1965; May & Yallom, 1984; 
Menninger, 1938). It is this "shame-fused guilt" which, 
according to Tangney, Burggraf and Wagner (1995), is most 
likely to be linked with depressive symptomatology. 
Tangney et al. (1995) argue that proneness to shame, not 
guilt, is a potentially maladaptive affective style with 
negative implications for psychological adjustment - 
depression in particular. Bibring's (1953) key 
psychoanalytic paper was the first to give an unequivocal 
role to the lowering of self-regarding feelings following 
an event involving loss, and the importance of loss in 
depression is now widely accepted. Those experiences 
involving a sense of defeat and powerlessness (derived 
from an act of submission in evolutionary terms) have 
been well established as a central component in 
depression (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Price & Sloman, 1987). 
According to Beck (1974) the origins of negative schema 
provide a pivotal point in the early learning history of 
the individual. Beck comments: 
"In the course of his development, the depression- 
prone person may become sensitized by certain 
unfavourable types of life situations such as the 
loss of a parent or chronic rejection by his peers. 
Other unfavourable conditions of a more insidious 
nature may similarly produce vulnerability to 
depression. These traumatic experiences predispose 
the individual to overreact to analogous conditions 
later in life. He has a tendency to make extreme, 
absolute judgments when such situations occur" (p. 7). 
Gilbert (1998a) argues that such a description could 
equally well apply to the shame-prone individual. In 
cognitive theory, shame-proneness would be regarded as 
the result of the formation of early negative schema of 
the self, others and the world. It is important however 
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to note that Beck is not describing self-esteem as such, 
but a vulnerability to an affective disturbance. 
Shame and Attributional Style 
Because shame (unlike guilt) focuses on the global self 
which is relatively enduring, it is likely to involve 
internal, stable and global attributions or, in Janoff- 
Bulman's (1979) terms, "characterological self-blame", 
described in her research into depression and rape. An 
extensive empirical literature has shown a link between 
depression and a tendency to make internal, stable and 
global attributions for negative outcomes (Robins, 1988). 
To the extent that guilt involves a focus on some 
specific behaviour, the guilt experience is likely to 
involve internal, unstable and specific attributions for 
negative outcomes. According to Tangney et al. (1995) 
there is little theoretical or empirical support for a 
link between depression and a tendency to make internal, 
unstable and specific attributions for negative outcomes. 
The attributional literature is consistent with the view 
upheld by Lewis (1971) and Tangney et al. (1995) that 
there may be a special link between depression and shame, 
but not guilt, because guilt would be associated with a 
less stable and global (ie. more flexible) cognitive 
style. Tangney, Wagner and Gramzow (1992) found a 
significant correlation between shame and internal stable 
attributions. However, it is possible to have a sense of 
a "bad self" without attributions of personal (or 
internal) causality 
- 
for example, one can feel shamed by 
a birth defect or a "family skeleton". Tangney and 
Fischer (1995) provide a comprehensive overview of the 
role of shame and guilt within various contexts. 
24 
Shame and Negative Self-Evaluation 
Given the global negative self-focus of shame, it would 
be predicted that shame (unlike guilt) would be 
associated with general negative self-evaluation and low 
self-acceptance. Because shame also involves a real or 
imagined disapproving other (Lewis, 1971; Mollon, 1984) 
and general negative self-evaluations in response to 
negative events (Lewis 1986,1987), it would be predicted 
that shame would be associated with self-consciousness, 
fear of negative evaluation and social anxiety (Gilbert 
et al, 1994). Mollon (1984) captures the essence of how 
shame involves an awareness of living negatively in the 
minds of others with a quote from the existential writer 
Sartre: 
"To feel oneself blushing, to feel oneself sweating 
etc. are inaccurate expressions which the shy person 
uses to describe his state; what he really means is 
that he is physically and constantly conscious of 
his body, not as it is for him but as it is for the 
Other" (p. 212). 
According to Pines (1990) the mother's refusal to accept 
and value the uniqueness and autonomy of the child 
produces shame. In the adult, depression may be viewed 
partly as a narcissistic disturbance, the disruption in 
the sense of self being central (Mollon & Parry, 1984). 
Tangney (1991) differentiates shame-proneness and guilt- 
proneness as two moral affective styles, where the 
former relates to "global, painful and devastating 
experience in which the self, not just behaviour, is 
painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated" (p. 599). 
Although empirical findings indicate shame can be 
experienced when a person is alone (Tangney et al. 1994) 
shame typically involves an awareness of how the 
defective self may appear to others, and is often 
associated with feelings of wanting to hide, disappear or 
shrink. Wurmser (1981) states that the basic aim of 
25 
"shame anxiety" is to hide. Because in shame the focus 
of the negative evaluation is on the entire self, it was 
decided to look at the self-evaluation and self-efficacy 
ratings from the Self-Evaluation and Social Support 
Interview developed by Brown and Andrews (Brown et al, 
1990; Andrews & Brown, 1993) to see how these compared 
with scores on the Shame and Guilt Scale. 
In 1902 Cooley coined the term "the looking glass self" 
in referring to the way we judge and feel about ourselves 
according to how we think others judge and feel about us. 
The "looking glass self" has three cognitive aspects: 
the imagination of one's appearance to the other person; 
the imagination of their judgement of that appearance; 
and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or 
mortification. Theories of shame have followed a similar 
configuration and generally shame is seen to focus either 
on the social world (beliefs about how others see the 
self ie. social beliefs), the internal world (how one 
sees oneself ie. personal beliefs), or an interaction of 
both. 
This passage from Dostoyevsky `(The Double, 1864) 
illustrates the core of the shame experience: 
"Mr. Golyadkin wanted not only to run away from himself but even to annihilate himself, to cease 
to be, to return to the dust. At the present moment he was not taking in his surroundings, understood 
nothing of what was going on around him, and looked 
as though in truth none of the discomforts of the 
wintry night, not the long journey, nor the rain, 
the snow, the wind or any other ingredient of the bad weather, existed for him 
... 
He was so bemused 
that several times, completely preoccupied, in spite 
of his surroundings, with the idea of his recent 
terrible disgrace, he stopped dead in the middle of 
the pavement and stood there motionless as though 
turned to stone; in these moments he died and disappeared off the face of the earth... " (p. 166) 
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Grotstein's (1985) comment on the nature of projective 
identification could similarly apply to shame: 
"it... involves the desire of the infant 
- 
or the 
suffering adult 
- 
to become invisible, to disappear, or 
generally speaking, to negate his own existence" (p. 
130). 
Shame and Social Anxiety 
Shame-proneness is recognised to be a major vulnerability 
factor for psychopathology (Dutton et al, 1995; Gilbert, 
1992,1997ab; Kaufman, 1989; Lewis, 1986,1987; Mollon, 
1984; Mollon & Parry, 1984; Schore, 1994). Tangney, 
Wagner & Gramzow (1992) found that shame (but not 
guilt) was significantly related to depression and 
anxiety in a student population. 
Belsky, Steinberg and Draper (1991) and Belsky (1993), 
using an evolutionary model, suggested a direct link 
between early rearing environments and subsequent adult 
interpersonal behaviour and psychopathology (Gilbert & 
Gerlsma, in press). They argue that early environments 
act to select which social and reproductive strategies 
become activated within a personality. According to the 
authors, two basic strategies can be identified: type 1- 
high alliance formation, affiliative, reasonably stable 
pair-bonding, and high care of offspring; type 2- low 
alliance formation, relatively non-affiliative, unstable 
pair bonding and low investment in offspring. 
In a sample of university students, Gilbert et al. (1996) 
found that recall of mother shaming, favouritism and 
feeling inadequate compared to a sibling, were 
significantly correlated with adult interpersonal 
problems of coldness, sub-assertiveness and introversion. 
These problems reflect similar difficulties in 
affiliative and co-operative relating, that is, in using 
27 
type 1 strategies, noted above. Therefore, early 
experiences of shame may become pathogenic because they 
affect interpersonal behaviour, and individuals who were 
chronically shamed in the past may adopt similar 
interpersonal behaviours in the present, such as being 
quick to respond aggressively, be submissive, avoidant, 
or feel chronically anxious (Nathanson, 1994). Such 
behaviours serve to increase vulnerability to 
psychopathology and maintain negative cognitive schema 
of self, others and the world. 
Therefore, it would appear that anxiety is a central 
affect in shame experience and it is difficult to 
consider shame without it. As Leary and Kowalski (1995) 
note: "The defining characteristic of social anxiety is 
that unlike other anxieties, social anxiety arises from 
the prospect or presence of interpersonal evaluations in 
real or imagined social settings 
... 
" (p. 6). 
In fact, according to Gilbert (1998a), social anxiety 
could be redefined as evaluation anxiety which, as the 
author notes, is precisely what Beck et al. (1985) did: 
"The experience of shame is important in discussions of 
social anxiety because the socially anxious person is 
fearful of being shamed in many situations" (p. 156). 
The link between fear of negative evaluation by others, 
inferiority and self-consciousness is of particular 
interest, as it is these feelings which are intrinsic to 
social anxiety. As noted elsewhere by Gilbert (1992, 
1997a) the central aspect of shame inferiority is that it 
is involuntary. According to Gilbert, if one voluntarily 
accepts a perceived inferior position and believes one's 
superiors will help, this will not elicit shame. To be 
defined as such, there must be some notion of a place or 
position one does not want to be in, or an image one does 
not wish to create and secondly, that this place or 
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image is associated with negative attributes from which 
one wishes to escape. 
From a developmental perspective, parental shaming has 
been suggested as one source of social anxiety, for it 
sensitises the individual to the judgements of others and 
to the possibility of negative consequences (Gilbert & 
Trower, 1990; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). In Gilbert and 
Gerlsma's study (in press) recall of parental shaming is 
highly associated with social anxiety both before and 
after therapeutic intervention. The content analysis in 
the current study aims to explore the role of early 
adverse environmental factors in more depth. 
Shame and Dichotomous Thinking 
It would be predicted that shame, unlike guilt, would be 
positively related to the defence of "splitting" or 
dichotomous thinking, which involves a separation of good 
and bad images or thoughts about the self or others. The 
shame experience can be viewed as tapping into the "all- 
bad" aspects of the self. In contrast, the experience of 
guilt involves an implicit differentiation of self from 
behaviour whereby the self is not viewed in such global 
and dichotomised terms. Wharton (1990) explores the links 
between the Jungian concept of the "shadow" and shame, 
which is characterised by the use of early defences such 
as splitting, omnipotence and illusion, together with 
problems of separation. The frustration felt by the young 
child can be made more tolerable by omnipotent fantasies 
of self-fulfilment, and by splitting the frustrating 
object into a good one and a bad one, the infant can 
retain the good and push the bad away. 
Many of the key cognitive-behavioural interventions for 
depression described by Beck (1983), Ellis (1971), and 
Ellis and Abrahams (1978) provide an effective means of 
29 
addressing shame-inducing cognitions (eg. Ellis' "shame- 
attacking exercises"). Shame, too, is associated with 
irrational beliefs and dysfunctional thoughts that are 
amenable to cognitive restructuring. Dutton (1994) found 
that shame-proneness was related to anger arousal in men 
who physically abused their wives, as well as to the use 
of "primitive defences" such as splitting and projection 
(Dutton et al, 1995). 
Shame and Negative Automatic Thoughts 
Given the association of shame with social anxiety and 
general negative self-evaluation, as well as fear of 
negative evaluation by others, it is not surprising that 
Richter et al. (1994) found moderate associations between 
recall of negative early rearing experiences and 
dysfunctional attitudes. Because internal experiences of 
badness, inadequacy and worthlessness are commonly 
associated with shame (Barrett, 1995; Nathanson, 1994) it 
would reasonably follow that such internalisation of 
"self as bad object" would lead to shame-proneness and 
an individual's vulnerability to generalised negative 
automatic thoughts about their self, the world and the 
future. Gilbert and Gerlsma contend that "via 
affectionate approval, non-shaming and non-favouritism, 
a parent enables a child to internalise a model of 
themselves as a person of value with status in 
relationships" (Gilbert & Gerlsma, in press; Gilbert 
1992; Kohut 1977; Rohner 1986). 
In contrast, early shaming relationships direct the 
child's attention to the difficulties of social relating, 
leading to various negative self and social cognitions 
related to internalised shame (cf. Cook's Internalized 
Shame Scale, 1996), unfavourable social comparisons and 
interpersonal problems (Gilbert et al., 1996). To explore 
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this further, it was decided to investigate whether 
there was a positive association between participants' 
negative automatic thoughts and their shame and guilt 
scores. 
Shame and Submissive Behaviour 
According to Harder (1995) shame is associated with a 
sense of helplessness or passivity in correcting a 
perceived fault. Guilt, conversely, involves criticism of 
a specific act (ie. the focus is not on the entire self), 
combined with intent to remedy or alleviate the problem. 
Therefore, in shame, global self-criticism is associated 
with a passive coping style, whereas guilt is associated 
with an adaptive (or non-pathological) response style. 
This idea is supported by the finding that shame is 
positively associated with submissive behaviour (Allan & 
Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Gilbert et al, 
1995). Tangney and Fischer (1995) argue that feelings of 
shame tend to motivate behaviours that impede 
constructive action in social situations (eg. avoidance), 
thus supporting further the association between shame and 
passivity reported in the literature. 
Gilbert et al. (1994) demonstrated that, as predicted by 
ranking theory, fear of negative evaluation (ie. 
helplessness, anger at self and others, inferiority and 
self-consciousness arising in shaming situations) is 
significantly correlated with submissive behaviour. As 
predicted in their study, inferiority experiences share 
an important relationship with submissive behaviour. 
Further research by Gilbert (in press) shows that, 
although a variety of submissive behaviours exists, there 
is increasing evidence that their function is mostly 
self-protective and used in contexts of perceived threat 
(Sapolsky, 1989,1990ab). It is thought that shame-prone 
individuals utilise self-protective (rather than self- 
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enhancing) strategies to avoid their "flaws" from being 
revealed. There is also evidence that shame often 
presents as submissive behaviour in the context of social 
anxiety (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Harker, 1998). 
Research on the non-verbal behaviour of shame shows that 
shame involves submissive displays (eg. gaze avoidance, 
slumped posture and inhibitions on speech). This serves 
to appease others and limit possible attacks or threats. 
Shame displays, like submissive displays, are therefore 
"damage limitation" strategies (see Keltner & Harker, 
1998 for a review). 
Shame and Anger 
Erikson (1950) was the first theorist to put forward the 
view that shame actually expresses anger or rage - 
although that rage is turned against the self and 
incorporates self-directed affects, such as feelings of 
self-disgust. Someone filled with shame would like to 
force the world to look away in order to keep their 
shameful situation from being seen. If possible, the 
shamed person would "put out the eyes" of the world, but 
failing that, can only wish to become invisible: 
symbolised in evolutionary terms by the "freeze" or 
"hide" response. According to Erikson (1959) the core 
essence of shame is that one is visible and not ready to 
be visible. Thus Oedipus' tragedy reflects a kind of 
projected shame, whereby in putting out his own eyes, 
Oedipus can experience himself as invisible in the eyes 
of the world and so vicariously escape unbearable 
feelings of shame. 
Certain degradations or shameful experiences in childhood 
can lead to "narcissistic rage" (Jacoby 1994; Kohut 1972, 
1977) whereby sadistic fantasies become a defensive form 
of reaction to shame. In psychoanalytic terms, this is 
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similar to the concept of "identification with the 
aggressor" where the shamed victim, in fantasy, 
identifies with their angry and aggressive persecutor, 
(eg. Jewish children in concentration camps impersonating 
their German captors). 
Miller (1985) and others (eg. Lewis 1987; M. Lewis 1992; 
Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1987; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & 
Gramzow 1992; Tomkins 1987; Wurmser 1981) have commented 
on the relationship of shame to anger or rage, which 
Scheff (1987) calls "the shame-rage spiral". In general, 
these analyses derive from Lewis's description of 
"humiliated fury" (Lewis, 1971). Tangney, Wagner, 
Fletcher and Gramzow (1992) found significant 
correlations between the TOSCA shame-proneness scale, and 
hostility, anger arousal, and tendencies to blame others 
for negative events. Novaco (1976) described anger as 
serving the function of overriding less acceptable 
emotions, such as shame and guilt. Scheff (1987) 
highlighted the clinical significance of "shame-rage 
spirals" and reviewed the role of such spirals in 
therapy. Rage originating in shame and humiliation can be 
longlasting and have serious effects on the ability of 
people to form affectionate relationships (Lansky 1992; 
Nathanson 1994). 
Research evidence also indicates that shame can engender 
a hostile, resentful, defensive type of anger (Tangney et 
al., 1992; Tangney et al., 1996) aimed at a real or 
imagined disapproving other. There appears to be a 
special link between shame and anger: once angered, 
shamed individuals are likely to manage their anger in an 
unconstructive fashion, according to Tangney and Fischer 
(1995). In contrast, guilt is less likely to foster 
feelings of anger, but when angered, guilt-prone 
individuals tend to handle interpersonal conflict 
constructively eg. by attempting to discuss things in a 
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non-hostile fashion. Dutton et al. (1995) found a 
stronger association of internal anger with shame than 
with guilt by using the MAI (Multidimensional Anger 
Inventory: Siegel 1986) and shame subscale of the EMBU 
(Early Memories of My Upbringing Inventory: Perris et al. 
1980). 
Retzinger (1991) and others believe that "shame-anger" 
arises from threats to a social bond 
- 
in particular 
attachment bonds. Lewis (1987) also seems to have held 
this view as she focused on the anger arising from 
separation (following Bowlby 1973) referring to it as 
"humiliated fury". On this view, it is possible to argue 
that shame-related anger, or "humiliated fury", is 
related to bond-breaking and loss of control of 
attachment objects. Gilbert (in Gilbert, 1998a) argues 
against this position, asserting that the infant who 
angrily protests is neither necessarily humiliated, 
shamed nor outraged. 
Kaufman (1989) argues that shame ruptures the 
"interpersonal bridge" and causes disconnections between 
'ft people: this is exemplified in the following quotation 
from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter (1970): "But the 
point which drew all eyes and, as it were, transfigured 
the wearer 
... 
was that scarlet letter, so fantastically 
embroidered and illuminated upon her bosom. It had the 
effect of a spell, taking her out of the ordinary 
relations with humanity, and enclosing her in a sphere by 
herself" (p. 81). 
The self-psychologists (Kohut, 1977; Miller, 1996) argue 
that it is not proximity that is the domain of shame and 
rage but lack of mirroring ie. the absence of positive 
responding or approval-giving, withholding, indifference 
or lack of validation (see Gilbert 1992 for a comparison 
of Bowlby and Kohut). This is in accord with the 
34 
conclusions reached by Sidoli (1988) who places shame 
within a developmental context using information gathered 
from infant observation. Developmentally, it is argued 
that shame cannot really appear until the self has a 
sense of self and others as social agents who can approve 
or disapprove (Gilbert 1998a; Lewis, 1992,1995; Stipek, 
1995). Stipek offers evidence that lack of internalised 
positive mirroring experience might sensitise a child to 
later shame and affect social confidence. It would follow 
from this that maternal indifference in childhood, being 
the ultimate form of "non-mirroring", is likely to be 
significantly associated with adult shame-proneness. A 
child who experiences their mother as proud of them 
holds positive emotions of themself about themself (in 
self-psychological terms, a good self-object experience; 
Kohut, 1977). Thus, lack of recognition and dismissal of 
the self when the self tries to display something 
attractive and positive to others, can elicit shame 
affect. 
Shame and Childhood Sexual and Physical Abuse 
-, a There is research evidence that childhood sexual or 
physical abuse is associated with feelings of shame or 
guilt in both sexes (Dutton et al., 1995; Gilgun & 
Reiser, 1990; Hunter, 1990; Tsai & Wagner, 1978) and with 
feeling shame of the body in adulthood (Andrews, 1995; 
Andrews, 1997; Andrews & Hunter, 1997). Therefore it was 
decided to explore shame- and guilt-proneness and the 
incidence of childhood sexual and physical abuse where 
the participant had experienced at least one significant 
episode of sexual or physical abuse, as measured by 
ratings on the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse 
Interview (the CECA) developed by Bifulco et al., 1994. 
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Shame and Childhood Maternal Indifference 
The relation between lack of parental warmth and 
subsequent psychopathology is well documented (Gerisma et 
al., 1990; Onstad et al., 1993; Parker, 1979,1989; 
Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1992; Parker et al., 1979; 
Perris et al., 1980). Bowlby (1969,1973,1980,1988) 
argued that children have innate needs for secure and 
available "attachment objects". The negative 
consequences of failures and disruptions in early 
attachment relationships are believed to express 
themselves in negative internal models of self, and views 
of others as unreliable, unavailable or harmful (Bowlby 
1988; Safran & Segal, 1990; Schore, 1994). 
Kohut (1977) stressed the importance of mirroring 
(responding, valuing and praising the child) and Rohner 
(1986) stressed the warmth and acceptance of caregivers 
as important to the development of a good and robust 
sense of self. A lack of mirroring and acceptance, and 
withholding of praise by parent(s), can lead to the 
internalisation of a sense of self as unattractive, 
worthless and with little personal value (Gilbert, 1997a; 
Gilbert & Gerlsma, in press). These internal experiences 
of worthlessness, badness, inadequacy etc. are commonly 
associated with shame (Barrett, 1995; Gilbert, 1992; M. 
Lewis, 1992; Nathanson 1994). Therefore, individuals who 
have suffered from a lack of mirroring in childhood are 
more likely to suffer problems of alienation, feeling 
low in status, inferior to others and sensitive to status 
attacks. 
There is further research evidence drawn from 
psychoanalytic theory that lack of mirroring in childhood 
as measured by maternal indifference, as opposed to 
maternal antipathy, could lead to shame-proneness and 
pathological self-blame in adulthood (Jacoby, 1994; Kohut 
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1971,1977,1984; Pines, 1990,1995; Winnicott 1967). It 
was Winnicott's contribution to psychoanalytic theory 
that emphasised the importance of what mothers did for 
their infants. Winnicott (1967) suggests that "the 
precursor of the mirror is the mother's face" and that 
"the mother's role [is] of giving back to the baby the 
baby's own self" (p. 137). When the infant looks at the 
mother's face it can see itself reflected back in her 
expression. If mother is preoccupied, it will only see 
how she feels. The infant will not be able to get 
"something of [itself] back from the environment" 
(p. 137). The infant can only discover what it feels by 
seeing itself reflected back. If the infant is seen in a 
way that confirms it's reality and existence it is free 
to go on looking without feeling shame. Success in this 
area of "perceptual and expressive interaction" (Wurmser, 
1981) assures the infant that he is lovable and can make 
things happen: important ingredients in the development 
of identity. Failure may induce a sense of profound 
helplessness and unlovability, the basic elements in 
shame, and lead to withdrawal. 
It is this sense of maternal unresponsiveness or 
emotional indifference, in contradistinction to active 
antipathy towards the child, that so fundamentally 
violates and annihilates the child's developing self: 
antipathy being, at least, a form of response. From this 
theoretical framework, it was predicted that, from the 
range of childhood adversity factors, childhood maternal 
indifference would most likely be associated with adult 
shame-proneness. 
Conclusion 
The above literature overview shows that shame is 
associated with various correlates of depression: namely, 
a fixed attributional style for negative outcomes, 
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general negative self-evaluation, social anxiety, 
dichotomous thinking, negative automatic thoughts, 
submissive behaviour, internalised anger, childhood 
sexual and physical abuse, and childhood maternal 
indifference. 
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Chapter 3: Current Methodological Issues in Shame 
Research 
"Long-famous glories, immemorial shames" (Wilfred Owen, 
Spring offensive) 
Research evidence shows that shaming experiences are more 
intense, more chronic and harder to assimilate than 
guilt-eliciting ones, and prove more difficult to recall 
in detail. In a study by Tangney (1992) college students 
were less articulate when describing shame- than guilt- 
eliciting situations; however, the shame descriptions 
were generally longer, although less specific in content. 
There is also evidence that shame is more linked to 
memories than guilt (Macdonald, 1999). These are 
interesting findings in that they draw attention to the 
ubiquity and complexity of shame experiences in everyday 
life. 
There are numerous ways of disguising the shame 
experience. Lewis (1971) observed that certain words 
continually recurred in contexts of shame and were 
accompanied by the use of certain gestures. Some 
descriptions included feeling uncomfortable, insecure, 
uneasy, confused, worthless, inadequate, stupid, foolish, 
silly, weird, helpless, paralysed, impotent, 
disempowered, frozen, and so on. 
These words all belong to the common experience of the 
self in relation to another (real or imagined). If the 
shame vocabulary is compared to that of guilt, fear, 
anger or grief, the shame repertoire is larger than those 
describing any other emotional experience. This indicates 
the prevalence of the shame experience. 
Both shame and guilt are products of self-reflection by 
which the individual appraises, evaluates negatively or 
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reproaches his or her self because of a perceived 
shortfall, or transgression against, a personally 
important social norm or standard, yet their 
differentiation and measurement remain complex. There has 
been little detailed analysis of shame experiences in 
current research on shame and psychopathology and the 
measures that exist can be criticised either for failing 
to tap into important dimensions of clinically relevant 
shame, or confounding the operationalisation of shame 
with the pathologies under investigation (see Andrews, 
1998). 
There are currently four different ways in which shame is 
measured; self-report measures of shame-proneness (such 
as the scale used in this study); measures that assess 
generalised or global shame; semi-structured interviews 
that assess shame of personal characteristics and 
behaviour; and diary with interview measures of shame. 
The first group of measures assesses shame-proneness in 
potentially shame-eliciting situations, such as the Shame 
and Guilt Scale used in this study. Similar measures most 
commonly used are the Dimensiöns of Conscience 
Questionnaire (DCQ: Johnson et al., 1987), the Test of 
Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA: Tangney et al., 1989), and 
its predecessor, the Self-Conscious Affect and 
Attribution Inventory (SCAAI: Tangney et al., 1988). 
These questionnaires present a series of hypothetical, 
potentially shame-inducing, situations and try to 
identify individuals who are especially sensitive to 
feeling shame. 
The second group of measures attempts to assess 
generalised or global feelings of shame, the assumption 
being that they assess dispositional or "trait" shame, 
which involves the endorsement of various negatively 
toned views of the self. Scales most commonly used 
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include the Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS: 
Hoblitzelle, 1987), the Internalized Shame Scale (ISS: 
Cook, 1988), the Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2: 
Harder & Zalma, 1990) and scales which measure views of 
how others see the self or "Other as Shamer" scales (OAS: 
Allan et al., 1994; Goss et al., 1994). 
A third type of measure has been pioneered by Andrews 
(1995,1997), who has developed a semi-structured 
interview with investigator-based ratings to assess 
chronic shame of personal characteristics or behaviour 
and this was originally developed to assess bodily shame. 
The measure was later developed to probe for additional 
sources of shame (Andrews & Hunter, 1997) drawing on 
Janoff-Bulman's distinction between negative judgements 
directed at one's behaviour, and negative judgements 
directed at one's character (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). 
Finally, there are a range of diary with interview 
approaches to the measurement of shame, for example, the 
study of Macdonald et al., 1997 which is based on the 
structured diary method of Oatley & Duncan, 1992. 
W 
Measures of Shame-Proneness 
In the Dimensions of Conscience Questionnaire, 
respondents are asked to imagine themselves in shame- and 
guilt-inducing situations and to say how badly they would 
feel on a 7-point scale. A shame example is "Your home is 
very messy and you get unexpected guests", and a guilt 
example is "Allowing someone else to be blamed for 
something that you have done". The SCAAI and TOSCA 
respondents are given hypothetical scenarios followed by 
four common responses to each (including researcher- 
defined shame- and guilt- proneness). Respondents 
indicate on a 5-point scale how likely they would be to 
react in each of the ways described. Some TOSCA examples 
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are "You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker 
is blamed for the error" and "While out with a group of 
friends you make fun of a friend who's not there". In 
both cases, scores are added to assess shame, guilt and 
other emotions of externalization (or blaming others), 
detachment and two types of pride. 
Although situations and responses in the DCQ and TOSCA 
were drawn from real-life shame and guilt experiences 
generated by participants during the development phase, 
the problem of their validity remains. Responses may not 
accurately reflect what individuals actually do or feel 
in real life situations (Brewin & Andrews, 1992; Coyne, 
1992; Segal & Dobson, 1992). The shame measure of the 
TOSCA focuses primarily on self-labelling (such as 
feeling inadequate, stupid, a rat etc. ). It lacks any 
measure of emotion and has few behavioural items. It 
should be noted, however, that various measures such as 
the TOSCA were designed to tap everyday experiences of 
shame so that people could identify with them. 
More recently there has been criticism of measures like 
the DCQ which are based on researcher-defined shame- or 
guilt-eliciting situations (see Tangney, 1996). The 
assumption that feeling bad about shame-eliciting 
situations reflects shame-proneness (and for guilt- 
eliciting ones, guilt-proneness) is questionable, and 
does not take into account the complex relationship 
between the two. It is possible that many situations 
have the potential to elicit either emotion (Tangney, 
1992) and that shame and guilt can be experienced 
sequentially, even simultaneously, by many people. There 
is evidence that self-reported emotional episodes 
involve complexes of different emotions experienced 
either in close proximity or even at the same time 
(Frijda et al., 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Duncan, 
1992). 
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Shame-proneness rests on the notion that shame often 
occurs in the context of evaluating personal behaviour in 
specific situations. This overlooks the fact that 
personal behaviour may not be the only focus for shame. 
It is likely that enduring shame about particular 
personal characteristics might be independent of shame 
felt as a consequence of personal behaviour. In a recent 
study involving depressed patients, Andrews and Hunter 
(1997) found that correlations between interview measures 
of behavioural, bodily and characterological shame did 
not exceed 
. 
40. Interestingly, an earlier study by 
Tangney et al. (1996) on the structural and 
phenomenological dimensions of shame, guilt and 
embarrassment in a student sample, showed that an 
unexpectedly high proportion of shame experiences 
involved private events. It would seem possible that 
these private events may involve ruminations about 
perceived personal shortcomings and may explain the 
ruminative quality of the thinking that shame shares with 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema 1991). This challenges the 
role of observability in the shame experience and focuses 
more on the internalised "self-as-bads as opposed to the 
external "public-self". 
Generalised or Global Shame 
Scales that most commonly measure global shame are the 
Adapted Shame and Guilt Scale (ASGS: Hoblitzelle, 1987), 
the Internalized Shame Scale (ISS: Cook, 1988), and the 
Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2: Harder & Zalma, 
1990). The ASGS and the PFQ2 both contain shame and 
guilt items whereas the ISS contains only items defined 
as reflecting shame, and consists of brief, self-defining 
statements or adjectives. 
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In the ASGS, shame adjectives are "reproached" and 
"ashamed" and guilt adjectives are "unethical" and 
"unscrupulous". Respondents are instructed to indicate 
how accurately a list of such self-defining adjectives 
describes them on a 7-point scale. 
In the PFQ2, examples of shame feelings include "self- 
consciousness" and "feeling stupid", and examples of 
guilt feelings are "regret" and "remorse". Respondents 
are asked how often these listed feelings are experienced 
on a 5-point scale ranging from "never" to 
"continuously". 
The ISS consists of self-defining statements such as "I 
think that people look down on me" and "I think others 
are able to see my defects". Respondents indicate the 
frequency of these feelings, from "never" to "almost 
always" on a 5-point scale, which are assumed to reflect 
dispositional or trait shame (see Harder et al., 1992). 
But there is evidence that global, negative self-defining 
questionnaires tend to be highly mood-dependent (Andrews 
& Brown, 1993; Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; Brewin, 1985). It 
is not clear whether such measures are, in fact, 
assessing enduring characteristics present in the 
absence of negative affective states such as depression. 
As Andrews (1998) notes, scales such as these do not 
assess the duration over time of such feelings and, 
although the test-retest reliabilities of such scales are 
high, they have not been carried out over periods more 
than two months. This presents problems of validity and 
reliability relating to the use of such measures. 
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Chronic Shame of Personal Attributes and Behaviour 
Andrews (1995) and Andrews and Hunter (1997) have 
developed a semi-structured interview with investigator- 
based ratings to assess shame of personal characteristics 
and behaviour, which draws attention to the body as often 
being the central focus in shame (Gilbert, 1989; Mollon, 
1984; Sartre, 1956). 
The original measure was developed to assess bodily shame 
alone (Andrews, 1995; Andrews, 1997) but was later 
developed to probe for additional sources of shame 
(Andrews & Hunter, 1997). Its development was influenced 
by Janoff-Bulman's distinction between negative 
judgements directed at one's behaviour and those directed 
at one's character (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). An example of 
the initial question on bodily shame is: "Have you felt 
ashamed about your body or any part of it? ". This is 
followed by probes, if necessary, for respondents to 
describe their feelings in greater detail. There are 
three aspects to the interview, consisting of bodily 
shame, characterological shame and behavioural shame, and 
responses are rated on a 4-point scale (from "little or 
none" to "marked"). Reference is made to a series of 
examples and scored according to the frequency, intensity 
and focus of respondents' comments. 
The three shame-components in the interview measure are 
independent and do not rest on the assumption that high- 
shame individuals will experience generalised shame. For 
example, a subject may report feeling intensely ashamed 
about his or her body, but not about his or her behaviour 
or character-related aspects of their self. This means 
the measure should be less vulnerable to mood state 
effects than those questionnaire measures which rely on 
more global or generalised self-definitions or self- 
statements. Although Andrews and Hunter's (1997) study 
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makes no underlying assumption that dispositional shame 
is being measured, the authors have found that such 
feelings, where they exist, are usually of long duration 
and often go back many years (see Andrews, 1995). 
Diary with Interview Measures of Shame 
Finally, there are a range of other diary with interview 
approaches to the measurement of shame. For example, 
Macdonald (1999) carried out a qualitative study asking 
psychotherapy patients to record weekly experiences of 
shame, guilt, hatred and disgust, followed by a research 
interview to provide an outline of the social context of 
each example, involving disclosure or non-disclosure of 
these recorded emotions. According to the author, the 
diary method minimises retrospective bias, which is 
greater for incidental as opposed to intentional 
remembering (Nickerson & Adams 1979, cited Oatley & 
Duncan, 1992). Oatley and Duncan (1992) used this 
technique to gather information about the incidence of 
emotion types in particular populations and to test 
predictions from Oatley and Johnson-Laird's (1987) 
cognitive theory of emotion. More recently, Rime et al. 
(in press) have used structured diaries in a number of 
studies examining the extent to which emotional 
experiences are "socially-shared" with other people. 
The advantages of this method are that it provides a 
structured, prospective method of gathering data which is 
grounded in recent affective experience (the time-scale 
is usually the previous week). It is argued that detailed 
questions about affective experience yield considerable 
information about naturally-occurring events with minimum 
distortion due to memory bias. In Macdonald (1999) and 
Macdonald et al's (1997) study, psychotherapy patients 
were asked to record their experiences of shame, guilt, 
hatred and disgust in a basic "fixed response" box format 
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followed by a semi-structured research interview to 
clarify the context and outcome of these emotional 
experiences. 
However, the process of filling in diaries, or other 
documentary accounts, has the disadvantage that they are 
intrusive techniques. The fact that a person is filling 
in a diary for the purpose of a research study may in 
some way alter behaviour, as well as the individual's 
experiencing and construing of emotions such as shame: in 
other words, there may be a reactive effect. Oatley and 
Duncan (1992) acknowledge that the diary method only 
captures a part of the emotional spectrum and that 
emotional experiences remain which are not amenable to 
valid self-report, and may not even be identified by the 
respondent. 
In summary, the above evidence suggests that 
dispositional (or trait) shame may not be completely 
captured by existing measures. Situationally-assessed 
measures assume that dispositional shame reflects a 
tendency to feel shame in response to behaviour in 
certain situations. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that dispositional shame can be shown in other ways, 
involving a specific focus on physical or non-physical 
personal characteristics, that may or may not be 
reflected in everyday behaviour. Future strategies for 
measuring shame may involve using a variety of 
approaches: affect shame measures like Harder's Personal 
Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ2); a self-evaluative 
measure like the TOSCA; and possibly some measure of 
respondents' beliefs about how others see them (eg. OAS 
scale). Since shame is a multi-faceted experience, and 
its expression is complex, it needs to be measured in a 
multi-faceted and sophisticated way. 
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Critique of Existing Measures of Shame 
Although global shame measures do not focus exclusively 
on behaviour or shame-eliciting situations, the problem 
remains that they may only be reflecting negative 
affective mood states, such as depression. It is possible 
that high-shame individuals may concentrate on different 
aspects of their self or behaviour at different times in 
their lives, depending on their circumstances. 
Distinguishing between different aspects may therefore be 
arbitrary and research-led, but this issue can only be 
resolved by further investigation and the development of 
more sophisticated measures. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, manifestations of shame are numerous and 
complex and not all are represented in this range of 
approaches. Additionally, there is the problem of 
discriminating shame from guilt items in existing scales 
(PFQ2: Harder & Zalma, 1990). Given the problems of 
definition and operationalisation of shame, one solution 
may be to develop new questionnaire measures which ask 
direct questions about self-focused and behaviour-focused 
feelings of shame, rather than rely on researchers' 
predetermined definitions. 
Particular objections to self-report scales, such as the 
one used in the current study, focus on their validation 
on non-clinical student samples and the use of 
dimensional measures of psychopathology to investigate 
complex clinical phenomena. Gotlib (1984) and Coyne 
(1994) argue that, in student samples, such scales are 
likely to be measuring no more than mild and transient 
negative affectivity and not actual clinical phenomena. 
Although existing measures of shame are often associated 
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with measures of psychopathology (Tangney et al., 1992), 
far more specialised measures for assessing pathological 
shame are required, such as shame affect rooted in trauma 
(see Gilbert, 1998a). 
A further problem with scenario-based self-report scales 
is that they measure expressions of expectations of how 
respondents believe they would feel in certain 
situations. Such hypothetical measures cannot represent 
individuals' lived experience which may constitute an 
important clinical disadvantage of this type of scale. 
rIM 
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Chapter 4: An Empirical Study of Shame and Shame-Related 
Phenomena in a Depressed Group 
"Well" said Owl, "the customary procedure in such cases is as follows. " 
"What does Crustimoney Proseedcake mean? " said Pooh. "For I am a Bear 
of Very Little Brain, and long words Bother me. " 
"It means the Thing to Do. " 
"As long as it means that, I don't mind, " said Pooh humbly. 
(A. A. Milne, Winnie-the-Pooh) 
Aims: Given the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, this 
research sets out to explore shame in relation to various 
phenomena associated with depression such as 
attributional style, negative self-evaluation, social 
anxiety, dichotomous thinking, negative automatic 
thoughts, submissive behaviour, internalised anger, 
childhood sexual and physical abuse and childhood 
maternal indifference. 
The aim of the current study is to investigate data 
collected by the author on a total of 86 subjects (57 
female, 29 male) with a primary research diagnosis of 
moderate to severe major unipolar depression. As 
research psychologist in the trial,, my role was to 
collect a wide range of clinical, cognitive and 
psychosocial data from the depressed patient sample. This 
included conducting an initial diagnostic psychiatric 
interview (the Present State Examination, an instrument 
in which I had trained) to assess current clinical 
status. All measures were taken at three time-points (see 
Chapter 1). Partners of the depressed patients were 
assessed by another research psychologist member of the 
team. The sample in the current study (N=86) is a subset 
of the participants who were randomised into The London 
Depression Intervention Trial (N=107), a major MRC-funded 
randomised controlled trial set up to compare the 
efficacy of three treatment interventions for depression. 
Further data on participants had been collected by the 
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author in two in-depth clinical interviews carried out at 
initial assessment and covering far-ranging aspects of 
childhood experience and current relationship and self- 
concept: the Childhood Experience of Care & Abuse (the 
CECA) and the Self-Evaluation & Social Support (the SESS) 
semi-structured interviews. All participants in the 
current study had completed a self-report measure of 
shame and guilt (Gilbert et al, 1989), along with a 
range of other clinical and cognitive measures, as part 
of their baseline assessment before randomisation into 
the trial. 
The objective was to explore whether there were 
consistent aspects of childhood experience, derived from 
the childhood adversity ratings from the CECA (see 
Appendix 5) which contributed to shame-proneness in 
adulthood. A further aim was to explore how this related 
to current self-concept, cognitions and beliefs, derived 
from ratings from the SESS and the range of clinical and 
cognitive measures. Scores on the Shame and Guilt Scale 
provided a measure of current shame- and guilt-proneness. 
Specific Hypotheses (Empirical): The major predictions 
were that in this clinical group shame (but not guilt) 
would be: 1. Positively associated with the severity of 
depression. 2. Positively associated with an internal, 
stable and global attributional style for negative 
outcomes. 3. Positively associated with general negative 
self-evaluation. 4. Positively associated with social 
anxiety. 5. Positively associated with dichotomous 
thinking. 6. Positively associated with negative 
automatic thoughts. 7. Positively associated with 
submissive behaviour. 8. Positively associated with 
internalised anger. 9. Positively associated with a 
reported history of childhood sexual and physical abuse. 
10. Positively associated with childhood maternal 
indifference. 
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Method 
Participants 
In the current study, the sample consisted of 86 patients 
(57 female, 29 male), minimum age 21 years, who had been 
recruited into a major MRC-funded randomised controlled 
trial (RCT) of three interventions for the treatment of 
depression. The design of the study is cross-sectional 
(see Chapter 1) as all data were collected at initial 
assessment. There were standard clinical guidelines in 
place relating to the recruitment, screening, assessment 
and treatment of participants whereby patients were 
assessed using standardised assessments as discussed in 
the following sections. This reflected current good 
practice as laid down by MRC policy for the carrying out 
of randomised controlled trials. Participants were 
recruited in London from a variety of sources including 
GP practices, newspaper advertisements, the Maudsley 
Hospital Emergency Clinic and from other health care 
professionals. Ethical approval for the study had been 
obtained in 1990 from the ethical committees of the 
Maudsley and King's College Hospitals-at its pilot stage. 
All participants were required to be in a heterosexual 
relationship of at least one year's duration. The 
requirement for heterosexuality was to provide 
homogeneity with earlier work by Vaughn and Leff (1976a) 
on the influence of family and social factors on the 
course of psychiatric illness (a comparison of 
schizophrenic and depressed neurotic patients). 
In the London Depression Intervention Trial (LDIT: Leff 
et al, in press) those participants meeting initial 
entry criteria were randomised into one of three 
treatment conditions: antidepressant medication with 
psycho-education, cognitive therapy, or couple therapy 
(which actively involved the depressed patient's partner 
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in treatment). Treatment interventions lasted for 12-20 
sessions, over 9-12 months. Depressed patients and their 
partners were followed up at two time-points: within a 
month of treatment completion, and at two years from 
start of treatment, to monitor outcome and establish 
clinical status, using repeat measures of the assessments 
completed at baseline. Six-weekly Beck Depression 
Inventories (BDIs) were given to plot the course of mood 
during the treatment phase and at the post-treatment and 
follow-up assessments, and at three-monthly intervals 
between post-treatment and follow-up. 
All participants were required to have a primary research 
diagnosis of major unipolar depression at intake (Present 
State Examination (PSE): Wing et al., 1974) scoring 
Catego Index of Definition 5 or above, and to score at 
least 14 on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(HRSD: Hamilton, 1960). Fifty-five percent of patients 
had experienced at least one previous depressive episode 
(mean=2.13, SD 1.63, range 0-10). All ratings on the 
following listed measures were made as part of an initial 
baseline assessment of depressed patients before 
randomisation into the trial. 
Depressed patients and their partners were interviewed 
separately to assess their suitability for the study. 
Partners were screened with the Camberwell Family 
Interview (CFI: Vaughn & Leff, 1976b) by another member 
of the research team and were required to register at 
least two critical comments during the interview. 
Partners' critical comments per se were not a necessary 
indicator of a conflictual relationship although 
referrers' misunderstanding of the study's rationale, and 
participants' preference for couple therapy, may have 
resulted in a higher proportion of discordant couples 
being recruited. Participants were excluded if they had 
any psychotic features, bipolar illness, organic brain 
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damage, suicidal tendencies, substance misuse, learning 
difficulties or contraindications for antidepressant 
medication (such as pregnancy). They were also excluded 
if they had experienced an adequate trial of any of the 
treatment interventions within the previous three months. 
Participants were not screened for personality disorders 
as the only clinical requirement was a primary research 
diagnosis of major unipolar depression. 
Randomisation 
Participants were stratified according to whether or not 
they had a significant history of depression. A 
significant history was defined as a current episode of 
not less than six months' duration or a previous treated 
episode in the last three years. As 76.4 of the sample 
were defined as having a significant history, it is 
reasonable to assume that personality disorders may have 
been highly represented in this group. Finally, depressed 
patients and their partners had to agree to assessment 
and randomisation into the trial and informed written 
consent was obtained from patients, their partners, and 
patients' GPs. Participants were then randomly assigned 
into one of the three treatment groups by an independent 
administrator who was blind to treatment modality, as 
were the research team. 
All data relating to the trial, including rated 
transcripts of participants' interviews, are held at the 
Medical Research Council, Social Psychiatry Unit, 
Institute of Psychiatry, London, in accordance with 
standard MRC criteria relating to the conduct of 
randomised controlled trials. 
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As can be seen from Table 1, a typical participant in 
this study was a white, early middle-aged, married woman, 
working part-time in skilled manual employment, with a 
significant history of depression. 
Table 1: Participant Characteristics and Demographic 
Profile of Sample (N=86) 
Gender: Male 34.1%; Female 65.9% 
Average age of subjects=38.99 years (SD 11.09, range 21- 
72) 
Average educational level=2.25 (SD 1.35, range 1-5) (where 2=School Leaving Certificate or CSEs) 
Average occupational class=4.14 (SD 1.52, range 2-8) (where 4=IIIm skilled manual according to Registrar- 
General's definition, OPCS, 1995) 
Employment= mean 3.42 (SD 1.84, range 1-7) (where 3=<10 
hours p/t employment, and 4=>10 hours p/t employment) 
Average BDI-at intake=27.07 (SD 7.37, range 8-45) 
Average HRSD at intake=18.78 (SD 3.93, range 14-34) 
Average length of relationship=10.43 years (SD 9.76, 
range 1-47) 
Average duration of current depressive episode=19.91 
months (SD 35.53, range 1-240) 
Significant vs. nonsignificant history= mean 1.24 (SD 
0.43, range 1-2, where 1=significant history) 
Significant history: 76.4s; non-significant-history: 
23.6, - 
Average number of depressive episodes, including current 
=2.13 (SD 1.63, range 0-10) 
Ethnicity breakdown=85.3% white; 9.1t black; 5.7% other 
Marital status: 60.2% married; 39.8s living with partner 
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Measures 
Shame and Guilt Scale. At the development stage of the 
above study (1990), very few measures of shame and guilt 
were available. Gilbert et al. 's (1989) 10-item scale 
included two 5-item subscales measuring each dimension 
(Appendix 1 and Table 3 refer). Shame was conceptualised 
in terms of dominant-subordinate relationships (sense of 
inferiority, being scrutinised, criticised and/or seen 
negatively by others). Guilt was conceptualised as 
arising from co-operative and caring behaviour, and most 
likely to be activated in situations of harming others, 
eg. exploiting or cheating (Crook, 1980; Gilbert, 1989). 
Respondents are asked to circle the number on a 5-point 
Likert scale that best describes the degree of upset they 
would experience in each of a number of shame- and guilt- 
related situations. Therefore, it provides a measure of 
shame- and guilt-proneness, by providing respondents with 
hypothetical situations to which they had to respond, as 
opposed to a measure of state or trait shame. On the 
shame subscale, the mean score of this sample was 17.8, 
SD 4.8, range 5-25, possible range 5-25, internal 
reliability 0.84; on the guilt subscale, the mean score 
of this sample was 18.1, SD 4.6, range 8-25, possible 
range 5-25, internal reliability 0.84 (see Table 2). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). This is the most widely 
used self-report instrument for assessing severity of 
depression (BDI: Beck et al., 1961; Beck et al., 1979; 
Beck et al., 1988) and is regarded as a robust measure of 
the severity of depression in a clinical population 
(Gotlib & Hammen, 1992). Based on 21 symptom-oriented 
items, a total score is calculated reflecting the number 
of symptoms and their severity. It measures both presence 
and severity of affective, cognitive, motivational, 
psychomotor and vegetative manifestations of depression. 
High reliability and validity have been obtained in 
56 
numerous studies (eg. Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Kovacs et 
al., 1975; Kovacs & Beck, 1978) and it has a satisfactory 
correlation with the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression 
(HRSD) and other clinical ratings. Kendall et al. (1987) 
have outlined various recommendations and guidelines 
regarding the use of the BDI. The mean score of this 
sample was 27.07, SD 7.37, range 8-45, possible range 0- 
63, which is indicative of moderate to severe depressive 
symptomatology (see Table 2). 
Present State Examination (PSE). The Present State 
Examination was developed by Wing et al., 1974. It is a 
standardised semi-structured interview designed to elicit 
the whole range of psychiatric signs and symptoms. There 
are obligatory questions and cut-offs. It is linked with 
a computerised program, Catego, which assigns 
respondents to a diagnostic classification. The Index of 
Definition (ID level) assigns a probability of the 
individual's being defined as a psychiatric case. An ID 
level of 6 or above indicates a severity level similar to 
that of a hospital inpatient. The mean score of this 
sample was 6.26, SD 0.69, range 5-8, possible range 1-8, 
internal reliability 0.8 (see Table 2). 
Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ). This 
questionnaire (Peterson & Villanova, 1988) has the same 
instructions and format as the original ASQ (Peterson et 
al., 1982) but has improved reliability. Respondents are 
presented with 24 hypothetical bad events involving 
themselves. In each case, respondents are asked to 
imagine the event happening to them. They then write down 
"the one major cause of the event" and rate it in terms 
of internality (7) versus externality (1), stability (7) 
versus instability (1), and globality (7) versus 
specificity (1). All three dimensions of explanatory 
style were correlated with depressive symptoms as 
measured by the BDI. The mean score of this sample for 
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internality was: 37.91, SD 7.79, range 19-54, possible 
range 10-70, internal reliability 0.7; for stability: 
36.85, SD 7.39, range 22-55, possible range 10-70, 
internal reliability 0.78; and for globality: 46.48, SD 
10.66, range 19-70, possible range 10-70, internal 
reliability 0.79 (see Table 2). 
Self-Evaluation and Social Support Interview (SESS). This 
is a semi-structured interview (see Appendix 6) carried 
out by a trained researcher (Andrews & Brown, 1993). 
Separate and independent ratings of positive and negative 
self-evaluation are derived from scales measuring self- 
acceptance, evaluation of personal attributes, and 
competence in interpersonal, occupational and domestic 
roles. Negative evaluation of the self (NES) is comprised 
of low self-acceptance, negative evaluation of personal 
attributes, and negative evaluation of role performance 
in a range of roles. Self-acceptance is defined as the 
extent to which a person accepts her/himself and feels 
happy or unhappy with the kind of person they are. 
General negative evaluation of personal attributes 
consists of statements (positive or negative) about the 
kind of person the individual thinks they are in terms of 
physical attributes (eg. pretty), emotional and 
intellectual attributes (eg. moody, brainy), personality 
attributes (such as affectionate), and moral attributes 
(such as trustworthy). All the relevant scales covering 
these areas are explicitly concerned with self- 
evaluation, rather than with self-concept in general. In 
the current study, inter-rater reliability ranged from 
0.7 to 1.00 on the various dimensions. 
All ratings are investigator-based; and depend on 
accounts of actual episodes elicited from respondents 
during the interview. Coders met for an initial training 
period that included a discussion and refinement of 
definitions associated with each dimension. The author 
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then independently coded all situations on a given 
dimension, meeting periodically for reliability checks 
with other coders. Discrepancies were discussed and 
resolved unanimously. Self-evaluations were graded on a 
4-point scale reflecting the severity of the 
participant's report, with the highest point , "marked", 
for the worst account followed by "moderate", then "mild" 
and finally "little/none" where none was judged to be 
present. The range in this sample was 1-4, possible 
range 1-4. 
The Separation and Social Anxiety Scale. This is a short 
self-report questionnaire with five items in each 
dimension of separation and social anxiety (Gilbert et 
al., 1995). The separation items are: being at home by 
myself; being separated from people I love; doing new 
things on my own; thinking that somebody I love might 
die; having no-one to share experiences with. The items 
of social anxiety include those which distinguish it from 
agoraphobia (Amies et al., 1983). These items are: 
meeting new people; going to an interview; being watched 
doing something; being teased; meeting people in 
authority. Respondents are asked to rate how they would 
feel in each situation on a Likert scale of 1 (not 
anxious at all) to 5 (very anxious). Results suggest an 
acceptable factor structure and reliability. The 
association of social anxiety with depression has been 
shown to be particularly robust in a depressed sample. 
The mean score for this sample for separation anxiety 
was: 17.83, SD 4.19, range 7-25, possible range 5-25, 
internal reliability 0.69. The mean score for this sample 
for social anxiety was: 16.99, SD 5.30, range 5-25, 
possible range 5-25, internal reliability 0.83 (see Table 
2). 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
- 
Form A (DAS-A). This is 
a self-report measure composed of items to assess 
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typical, relatively stable, depressogenic attitudes or 
assumptions, developed by Weissman & Beck (1978) and 
which, according to Beck's theory of depression, form the 
basis of depressive symptoms. It was designed initially 
as a 100-item scale from which two parallel forms (40 
items each) were developed. The possible range of scores 
on the overall DAS-A is 40-280. The items are answered on 
a 7-point Likert-type scale. High internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability have been demonstrated 
(Blackburn et al., 1986). The "dichotomous thinking" 
subscale of the DAS-A was used in the current study as a 
measure to identify polarised thinking or "splitting". 
The mean score of this sample was 53.81, SD 16.52, range 
16-88, possible range 13-91, internal reliability 0.88 
(see Table 2). 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-30). This is a 30- 
item questionnaire devised to measure the frequency of 
negative automatic thoughts (negative self-statements) 
associated with depression (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). 
Thirty items discriminated between criterion groups of 
depressed and non-depressed respondents. The resultant 
30-item automatic thoughts questionnaire (ATQ-30) was 
cross-validated and found to significantly discriminate 
psychometrically depressed and non-depressed groups. It 
uses a 5-point Likert scale and scores-range from 30 to 
150. No differences were found between males and females 
on the measure. Factor analysis indicated a 4-factor 
solution, with a large first factor reflecting personal 
maladjustment, a second factor indicative of negative 
self-concept/negative expectations, and two lesser 
factors. The ATQ-30 provides a means of testing basic 
theory relating cognitive content to behavioural and 
affective processes, and in assessing changes in 
cognitions associated with experimental manipulation or 
with therapeutic intervention. The mean score for this 
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sample was 90.88, SD 23.73, range 44-141, possible range 
30-150, internal reliability = 0.88 (see Table 2). 
The Submissive Behaviour Scale. This scale was developed 
by Gilbert and Allan (1994) and Allan and Gilbert (1997) 
from the work of Buss and Craik (1986) who asked 
respondents to identify typical submissive behaviours. 
This generated a large number of examples of submissive 
behaviour. These were then given to a large group of 
raters who were asked how good each item was as an 
example of submissive behaviour. From this the most 
highly agreed upon items (16 items) were chosen to 
construct the Submissive Behaviour Scale (Gilbert & 
Allan, 1994). It includes items such as: "I agreed I was 
wrong even though I knew I wasn't". Respondents reply by 
giving their estimated frequency of these behaviours on 
a 5-point scale, from 1 to 5. This scale has satisfactory 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability; the 
reported cronbach alpha was 0.85 in both a student and 
depressed group (Allan & Gilbert, 1997). It has been used 
in a number of studies concerned with assertive behaviour 
(Gilbert & Allan, 1994), depression (Gilbert et al., 
1995; Gilbert & Allan, 1998) and was found to be highly 
correlated (r=0.73) with the sub-assertive measure of the 
inventory of interpersonal problems (Gilbert, Allan & 
Goss, 1996). The mean score of this sample was 45.99, SD 
9.92, range 23-73, possible range 16-80, internal 
reliability 0.84 (see Table 2). 
State-Trait Anger Inventory (STAXI). This inventory 
(Spielberger, 1988) consists of 44 items which form six 
scales and two subscales. The subscale relevant to the 
hypothesis is Anger-in (AX/In), an 8-item anger 
expression scale measuring the frequency with which angry 
feelings are suppressed. The mean score of this sample 
was 20.25, SD 4.89, range 12-32, possible range 8-32, 
internal reliability 0.81 (see Table 2). 
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Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Interview (the 
CECA). This is a semi-structured interview (see Appendix 
5) carried out by a trained researcher (Bifulco et al., 
1994). It yields a variety of childhood adversity 
measures including sexual and physical abuse as defined 
according to standard criteria, making the results 
comparable with other work in the UK and USA. In the 
current study, inter-rater reliability was 1.00 for 
sexual abuse and 0.9 for physical abuse. Sexual abuse 
was rated as absent or present and, where applicable, was 
categorised into six domains, ranging from two lesser 
domains eg. verbal only (rated 6); required to watch 
sexual activity (rated 5) ie. non-contact category, to 
touching of breasts, genitals (rated 4); oral sex (rated 
3); violation involving an implement (rated 2); and 
penetrative intercourse (rated 1) ie. contact category. 
Physical abuse was rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 
1 ("marked" eg. beaten up or threatened with a knife); 2 
("moderate" eg. kicked, bit, hit with fist or other item, 
slapped around face); 3 ("some" eg. object thrown, 
pushed, shoved or slapped 
- 
not face), to 4 ("little or 
none"). In the current study, 32% of participants had 
experienced at least one episode of sexual abuse before 
the age of 17 and 60t of participants had experienced 
some degree of physical abuse before the age of 17 
according to these criteria. 
In addition to childhood sexual and physical abuse, the 
CECA yields other measures of childhood adversity (such 
as antipathy, control and material neglect by parents). 
However, maternal indifference was selected as the 
dimension of special relevance for this study (see 
Chapter 2). Inter-rater reliability ranged from 0.65- 
1.00 on the various adversity dimensions (0.8 for 
maternal indifference). This scale reflects the amount of 
emotional neglect shown by the parent, as opposed to 
material neglect, which was rated separately. Hard 
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indicators of such indifference would be lack of interest 
in friends or schoolwork, and ignoring the child's 
emotional needs for comfort and reassurance when upset, 
or when needing to talk about problems. Maternal and 
paternal indifference were rated separately. This scale 
is distinguished from antipathy, also rated separately 
for both parents, which reflects dislike, denigration or 
active hostility towards the child, rather than non- 
responsiveness or emotional distance. In the current 
study, 6896 of participants experienced maternal 
indifference according to these criteria. 
All ratings are investigator-based, and depend on 
accounts of actual episodes elicited from respondents 
during the interview. Coders met for an initial training 
period that included a discussion and refinement of 
definitions associated with each dimension. The author 
then independently coded all situations on a given 
dimension, meeting periodically for reliability checks 
with other coders. Discrepancies were discussed and 
resolved unanimously. Accounts were graded on a 4-point 
scale reflecting the severity of the respondent's 
experience with the highest point "marked", for the worst 
experience of childhood adversity, followed by 
"moderate", then "mild" and finally "little/none" where 
none was judged to be present. The range in the current 
study was 1-4, possible range 1-4. 
A previous review of the literature indicates that 
retrospective accounts obtained in this way are likely to 
be valid and are unlikely to be affected by depressed 
mood (Brewin et al., 1993). In addition, the reliability 
studies by Parker (1981) on the Parental Bonding 
Instrument (PBI) also support the feasibility of 
retrospective assessment of parental rearing. Results 
indicate a high agreement between PBI-scores and sibling 
ratings concerning the relations of the index person and 
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the parents. More recently, Bifulco and Moran (1998) have 
confirmed the reliability and validity of retrospective 
accounts of childhood obtained in this way. 
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Conclusion of Methodology Section 
In summary, this randomised controlled trial has observed 
strict ethical and clinical guidelines concerning the 
recruitment, screening and treatment of participants and 
a range of standardised clinical assessments has been 
used, incorporating both self-report and observer-rated 
measures, to ensure validity and reliability. 
Note: Appendix 2 contains further details of the London 
Depression Intervention Trial (LDIT) in relation to 
individual therapists and therapists' adherence to their 
respective treatment models. 
Results 
All statistics were performed using the SPSS package for 
PCs. The mean scores, standard deviations and ranges of 
all variables under investigation, and internal 
reliabilities of measures used, were 
reported in Chapter 
2 (Table 2). Current analyses are cross-sectional as all 
data were collected as part of participants' baseline 
assessment before randomisation into the trial. 
Psychometric Investigation of the Shame and Guilt Scale 
The distribution of scores for each of the ten items was 
inspected for skewness and found to be satisfactory. A 
principal components analysis with varimax rotation was 
carried out with a threshold of 0.5 for the inclusion of 
a variable in the interpretation of a factor. This 
analysis produced a solution with two factors having 
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eigenvalues greater than 1 and these two factors 
accounted for 61.5% of the variance in the factor space. 
All 10 items loaded above the cut off on one of the two 
factors with no item loading on more than one factor (see 
Table 3). Factors clearly corresponded to the original 
distinction between shame and guilt items. The internal 
reliability (Cronbach alpha) for both shame and guilt in 
the current study was 0.84 compared with Gilbert et al's 
(1989) study which reported 0.74 for shame and 0.75 for 
guilt. 
110 
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TABLE 3: Factor Loadings for the Shame and Guilt Scale 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
1. To do something embarrassing in public (S) 0.75 0.15 
2. Secretly cheating on something you know will not be 0.30 0.57 
found out (G) 
3. To hurt someone's feelings (G) 0.11 0.88 
4. To be the centre of attention (S) 0.71 0.11 
5. To appear inadequate to other people (S) 0.76 0.32 
6. To behave in an uncaring way to others (G) 0.12 0.87 
7. To have something unfavourable revealed about you 0.71 0.11 (S) 
8. To feel self-conscious in front of others. (S) 0.82 0.21 
9. To behave unkindly (G) lu, 0.20 0.88 
10. Not saying anything when a shop assistant gives you 0.15 0.56 
too much change (G) 
Variance (%) 43.9 17.5 
(S) 
= shame items 
(G) = guilt items 
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Scores on shame and guilt were computed by adding the 
individual item scores. In this study, shame and guilt 
were moderately correlated (r=0.44, p<. 001). In the 
current study, the mean shame score was 17.8, SD 4.8, 
range 5-25, and the mean guilt score was 18.1, SD 4.6, 
range 8-25 (see Table 2). Compared to males, females 
experienced significantly more shame, t=2.32, p<. 05, and 
more guilt, t=2.68, p<. 01. They also reported more 
depression on the BDI, t=2.98, p<. 01. 
Partial Correlational Findings 
Table 4 reports six sets of correlations between shame, 
guilt, and the other variables under investigation. The 
first column reports the first-order correlation with 
shame. The second column reports the corresponding 
partial correlation controlling for BDI score, to test 
whether any association with shame is a function of 
severity of depression. The third, -, column reports the 
corresponding partial correlation controlling for guilt, 
to test whether any association is unique to shame. The 
fourth column reports the first-order correlation with 
guilt. The fifth column reports the corresponding partial 
correlation controlling for BDI score, to test whether 
any association with guilt is a function of severity of 
depression. The sixth column reports the corresponding 
partial correlation controlling for shame, to test 
whether any association is unique to guilt. 
69 
C 
u 
E ýa 
.a h 
C 
Y 
"r 
w 
Y^ý 
1Mý1 
1ý1 
I. 
V 
DO 
C 
E 
0 
O 
06 
co 
.. 
y 
p. 
u E 
00 
c 
ö 
C 
v 
N 
. 
Lot 
of 
r 
C 
0 U 
ýt 
V 
H 
A 
*tMOO <f 0# c v1 M v1 OOMO (D CO OO "--ý . -ý O On c> ý-+ c> O -+ ON-OýO 
ý. i 
w° 
v ý ;, oo"-1 OOooCD 000CD 00 -. OOO -ý 
O * ýO nN v1 O** oo *MN \G O% hO% 00 O"" 00 C> CD C, 4 
-4 c> -4 * -4 -1 CD c> (D C> CD Q 
Öm 00 ^.. * * .. co 
**.. 
_. 
* 
.. ý. ^.. ^ 
_ 
%Ö ý ýo ÖÖ Ö- 00 
v O "--ý rr .r oý 
--ý 
S 
i0 
. v N O 't -0000 
%. i %-i mM' 
%0 N en (, - 
'.. 
i 
-> 
N 
-> %. i .;, ý> -. y vv.. >Uv:, %. i 
1- 1 
vý 
0 
b 
QÖÖ 
ýMy M iF e! ' iF 
*N 'ý it ýO M CO M 
NM MOO Ný OOO "-+ 
. 
 
N ýp ý ý N Vl h 
iz 
I- 
m 
Q ý 
f AZb t12 zu2ZZv iýÜÜÜÜ ÜÜÜ 
70 
ÜÜ 
C's 
"iý °ý ä 
R 
w& 
gyn. 
ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ 
w 
tn. UUUUUUU 
faL 
ö9 
-. 
ZJ 
zj2 
H2 
oo ^' of Ma cö o 
Nw0 Ctf 
py ~O 
. 
ý. O '" Ü 00 
0 ö 
V 
Unexpectedly, shame was not significantly related to 
severity of depression as measured by the BDI. Also 
contrary to prediction, guilt was positively correlated 
with BDI scores. Table 4 shows that this correlation was 
still significant when controlling for shame. There was 
no association of shame or guilt with course of 
depression in terms of number of previous episodes. 
Data were also analysed from female participants only, 
but still failed to find a significant association with 
shame. 
Turning to the other variables, shame (but not guilt) had 
a first-order association with a stable attributional 
style for negative outcomes. This association could not 
be accounted for either by severity of depression or by 
guilt. In contrast, the other attributional dimensions 
were unrelated to either shame or guilt. 
Shame (but not guilt) also had a first order association 
with general negative self-evaluation as measured on the 
SESS and as defined in Chapter 2. This relationship 
remained robust when severity of depression and guilt 
were controlled. 
Both shame and guilt were correlated with social anxiety 
even after controlling for severity of depression. The 
partial correlations indicated however, that social 
anxiety had a unique association with shame, but not with 
guilt. 
Both shame and guilt were correlated with dichotomous 
thinking (or "splitting") even when severity of 
depression was partialled out. The partial correlations 
showed that dichotomous thinking had a unique 
relationship with guilt, but not with shame. 
71 
Shame (but not guilt) was positively associated with 
negative automatic thoughts as measured on the ATQ-30, 
and this relationship remained robust when severity of 
depression was partialled out. Negative automatic 
thoughts were unrelated to guilt. 
Shame and guilt were both correlated with submissive 
behaviour, even after controlling for severity of 
depression. The partial correlations indicated however, 
that submissive behaviour had a unique association with 
shame, but not with guilt. 
In contrast, only shame had a first-order association 
with internalised anger, and this relationship remained 
robust when severity of depression and guilt were 
partialled out. 
Against prediction, childhood sexual and physical abuse 
did not appear to be related to either shame or guilt in 
this sample and this finding was still upheld when the 
data were analysed by gender. In the predicted direction, 
shame had a first-order association with childhood 
maternal indifference, and this relationship remained 
constant when both severity of depression and guilt were 
controlled. Neither shame nor guilt had a positive 
relationship with any of the other childhood adversity 
variables (ie. parental antipathy, control and neglect) 
as predicted. 
The partial correlations reported in Table 4 show that 
these associations between shame and other variables were 
not an artefact of depression severity. 
72 
6 
°P 
cz. 
0 I- co 
10 
u N 
H 
u 
ON 
u 
u 
rr 
it 
". n 
u 
cc 
Yfit 
L 
r 
fit 
E 
c 
0 
0 U 
in 
u 
ea Ef 
N 
C 
! 
O 
fV 
" 
g ý, 
O 
00 
. -+ O O %O MOO 
OOM 
OO 
ýO s 
. -ý O"" Otteý CD MO 
"" 
00 %D vl 
"!! 
~ 000hbeý 0'00' 
r; V; lON'V NO 
"! 
M 
. -+ 00 M-N %0 
ti NtnN"! 
,O 
N !" 0 
. -4 00 MNN'O%OMNN 
. ter 
"'ý 
" ÖM 
00 
ý' 
0% v1 MN IN NM OCD NOOOOM- 
"! " 
ry !"! ""! C) v1 
ttOONNOONOVIM 
"!! 
O ý+ 00 e 0% N 00 ON M ýzt 00 
,.. 
ttý-i NN0000N-: 
!" 
p! 
"!!! 
" " O 0% eý 
NON- 
fV v1 In fV %0 
00 
O% 
N 
!! 
O! """"! "" * 
O 0% 
-M-NONO 00 'O '. 0 '0 - 
-4-! c:! Ilý 
ýp " """ 
- V1 0NMON 0% N 
. -+ 00 . -+ MO OM 
. -+ NOOOOOOOO . -+ N 
" 
S 
00 ýt O 0 0 N 0% Oý et V1 V1 0% 
.+M . --ý M V1 HOC V NM 000000. 
-- . -ý 
"!!! 
et O" !wwwww 0000" NineiONet %meý v1N'00'ON 
11 l 
^' 
v 
,.. ý ; ^; N : OO. - OO-OOc e 
!4! O 
8OMM 
ýt v1 
! 
v1 O* M 00 O (- I- M %D O l- d 
N S 
00 ýO O ýD 0 Ö ' " N 
ry 
%m %' 
ry 
nO( '. C of ".. " 00 '. O %0 
-i 00 ý-- -: 
. 
Oý-! 0000000 
r-1 !!!! "! "!! " a Q 
mt OO %m "O N a' 
. -ý \D 00 00 O ýh OMMNMN 00 ßv1 V rq 
..; 1 N(4 "gri 
.. 
-. 
NNýO SOON a 
a °' 9o 
Ihd 
ý 
ÜU 
CJ a 
%0 r- 00 CY, CD 
-e f") le v1 '0 N 00 0% -- 
--ý 
.----NN 
a 
73 
Exploration of the responses of the shame subscale 
suggest that the distribution is skewed to the top range 
of responses. This suggests that there is a ceiling 
effect with insufficient variance in this short scale for 
it to give a valid measure of shame. Future research 
would therefore need to explore the variables in Table 5 
with a more valid scale for this clinical population. 
However, there are other measures which relate to shame 
and may be taken as indirect indicators of shame. These 
include submissive behaviour, social anxiety and 
internalised anger. 
Submissive behaviour 
As noted in Chapter 2, there is increasing evidence that 
shame-proneness is related to increased disposition to 
submissive behaviour (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keitner & 
Harker, 1998). Table 5 shows the correlation with shame 
is highly significant at 0.53 (p<. 001). 
Social anxiety 
Similarly, the linkage of shame with social anxiety has 
been well documented (Gilbert, 1998a; Gilbert, Allan & 
Goss, 1996) and discussed in Chapter 2. Table 5 shows 
the correlation with shame is highly significant at 0.56 
(P<. 001). 
Internalised anger 
Tangney and her colleagues have researched the 
association of shame with internalised anger (Tangney et 
al, 1996; Tangney & Fischer, 1995, reviewed in Chapter 2) 
and this has also been upheld by the findings reported 
here. Table 5 shows the correlation with internalised 
anger is 0.32 (p<. 01). 
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Table 5 gives the product moment correlations for all 
variables investigated in this study. Their inter- 
relationships are not discussed however, as the focus 
of this research is on the role of shame and its 
contribution to psychopathology. 
Despite the Shame and Guilt Scale's limitations, these 
results suggest consistently high positive correlations 
of shame with other established shame-related phenomena 
and provide indirect indicators of shame-proneness within 
this group, thus enhancing its concurrent validity. 
Multiple Regression 
In order to explore these inter-relationships in more 
detail a series of multiple regressions was carried out 
for the pathological (dependent) variables of shame and 
depression. It was then possible to explore how the other 
shame-related variables in Table 5 might add to the 
explained variance in shame and depression. 
The only significant variable to emerge from the 
regression analysis for shame was submissive behaviour 
(p <. 01) accounting for 15t of the variance. 
Table 6a Multiple regression analysis on shame scores (Ns 86) 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
SubBeh 
. 
16 
. 
06 
. 
39 2.75 
. 
0086 (Constant) 10.86 2.80 3.87 
. 
0004 
R R2 (Adj. R2) SE df F Sig F 
. 
39 
. 
15 
. 
13 3.84 1 7.57 
. 
0086 
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As the analyses carried out on the data are cross- 
sectional no inference of causality can be made from 
these findings. However, Table 6a shows that, in the 
current study, only submissive behaviour had a positive 
relationship with shame and none of the other shame- 
related variables added to the explained variance. 
The only significant variable to emerge from the 
regression analysis for depression was an internal 
attributional style for negative outcomes (p <. 001) 
accounting for 41%ý of the variance. 
Table 6b Multiple regression analysis on BDI scores 
(N=86) 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
Internal 
. 
60 
. 
11 
. 
64 (Constant) 4.44 4.22 
R R2 (Adj. R2) SE 
. 
64 
. 
41 
. 
39 5.90 
5.44 
. 
0000 
1.05 
. 
2991 
df F Sig F 
1 29.61 
. 
0000 
Because the analyses carried out on. the data are cross- 
sectional no inference of causality can be made from 
these findings. However, Table 6b shows that, in the 
current study, only an internal attributional style for 
negative outcomes had a positive association with 
depression and no other shame-related variable added 
independent significant effects. 
Conclusion of Results Section 
Together these data show that shame, as measured by 
Gilbert's Shame and Guilt Scale, is reflecting a more 
general trait of submissive behaviour. This demonstrates 
that the phenomenology of shame contains aspects of a 
submissive strategy of defence (Gilbert, 1989,1998a; 
Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keltner & Harker, 1998). The 
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data. also confirm the importance of an internal 
attributional style for negative outcomes in depression, 
in line with Beck's cognitive theory of depression (Beck 
et al., 1979; Peterson et al., 1982; Peterson & 
Villanova, 1988). 
Discussion of Quantitative Findings 
Factor Analysis of the Shame and Guilt Scale 
A factor analysis of the Shame and Guilt Scale produced 
a clear solution corresponding to the original subscales. 
In their 1989 study, Gilbert et al's scale loaded onto 
three factors 
- 
one of shame and two of guilt (hurting 
others and secretly cheating). This may be because they 
used a non-depressed student sample whereas the current 
study used a clinical sample of moderate-to-severe 
depressed participants. The data show a "ceiling effect" 
with this scale, with data skewed towards the top end of 
the scale for shame but not for guilt, which may make it 
unsuitable to measure shame in clinical populations. The 
correlation between the shame and guilt subscales is 
small enough to infer substantial independence, while 
indicating some degree of covariation, reflecting the 
fact that both emotions involve negative affect and 
internal attributions of some kind. Tangney, Wagner & 
Gramzow's (1992) study, using the TOSCA (Test of Self- 
Conscious Affect), found a correlation of 0.45 between 
its shame and guilt subscales whereas the current study 
reports a correlation between subscales of 0.44. 
Discussion of Correlational Findings 
As all analyses are cross-sectional no inference of 
prediction or direction of causality can be made. 
However, in contrast to previous studies, shame was found 
to be unrelated to the severity of depression. Since 
Gilbert et al's (1989) findings were based on a primarily 
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female sample, the data were re-analysed from the female 
participants only, but still failed to find a significant 
association. One possible explanation for these findings 
may be that the items in the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) are more reflective of pathological guilt or self- 
blame than they are of shame per se, thus generating this 
particular pattern of correlations (eg. two BDI items 
relate to feeling guilty and feelings of being punished). 
As noted above, given that there are only five shame 
items in Gilbert et al's measure, there is not enough 
variance at the top of the scale, accounting for the 
loss of correlation with the BDI which has a large 
variance (Shame & Guilt Scale = 5-25; BDI = 0-63). Harder 
(1995) and Tangney, Burggraf and Wagner (1995) refer to 
the role of pathological or "shame-fused guilt" in 
depression, which would clearly relate to feelings of 
being punished reflected in the BDI. 
Another explanation may be the greater symptom severity 
of the participants in the current study, other 
investigators having used non-clinical, or mildly 
depressed, samples. A non-clinical, or mildly depressed, 
sample may show similar levels of shame, suggesting shame 
may have a more complex role in the aetiology of 
depression than had previously been thought. A visual 
inspection of the data, which confirms the ceiling effect 
with the shame subscale of Gilbert et al's measure, 
suggests it may not be useful for very depressed 
populations with high shame scores. Thus, shame-proneness 
may be linked to mild depressive reactions, or even to 
vulnerability to depression, but not influence severity 
once a person has become clinically depressed. In this 
case, guilt may play a more significant role. 
Harder (1995) argues that the best way to assess as much 
unconscious emotion as possible may be self-report scales 
that try to capture the subjective experience of 
emotions, so that the full "shame meaning" of the 
feelings can be left unstated, as they are partly 
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unconscious. Participant self-reports that describe 
behavioural responses to situations may be more 
vulnerable to confounding by social desirability and 
repression. Harder argues that careful in-depth clinical 
study of participants could verify whether the measure 
used did or did not tap into unconscious emotional 
states. Guilt, being at a more conscious level and 
involving self-monitoring and self-judging cognitions, 
may lend itself more easily to situationally-assessed 
self-report measures such as the guilt subscale of 
Gilbert et al's Shame and Guilt Scale. However, this 
measure may not be the best instrument to tap global, 
possibly unconscious, feelings of shame, which may 
account for the failure to replicate the association of 
shame with depression in this particular clinical group. 
Unlike other recent research (Andrews & Hunter, 1997) the 
findings in the current study did not reveal any 
association of shame with the course of depression. It 
should be noted however, that both the measure of shame 
and the way in which the course of depression were 
operationalised were very different in the two studies. 
In the current study, a measure of shame-proneness was 
used in hypothetical situations, whereas Andrews and 
Hunter measured the actual phenomenological experience of 
behavioural and characterological shame. 
The hypothesis that shame (but not guilt) would show an 
association with an internal, stable and global 
attributional style for negative outcomes was partly 
supported for the stability dimension. This is consistent 
with Weiner's (1985) view that controllability is the 
crucial dimension differentiating shame (a response 
attributing failure to an internal and uncontrollable 
cause) from guilt (a response attributing failure to an 
internal and controllable cause). Empirically, 
uncontrollable causes tend also to be perceived as stable 
causes (Weiner, 1985). The failure to confirm the 
hypotheses concerning the internality and globality 
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dimension may again be accounted for by the Shame and 
Guilt Scale reflecting hypothetical situational 
responses, and not adequately tapping into the 
phenomenological experience of internalised shame. Guilt 
shows no such association with attributional style, as 
predicted. 
The results confirm the views of Lewis (1971,1976,1986, 
1987) in that shame seems to involve a generalised 
concept of a negative self (Chapter 2 refers) and 
involves general negative self-evaluation, as derived 
from the SESS scores. Guilt on the other hand, involves 
self-judgements about specific acts or behaviour, such as 
cheating or harming others, and incorporates an element 
of moral responsibility and wish for reparation. This 
differential focus on self versus behaviour received 
strong empirical support in a series of studies on 
counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal et al., 1994). For 
example, when asked to "counterfactualize" personal shame 
or guilt experiences (eg. list factors that might have 
caused the event to end differently), people were 
observed to more often "undo" aspects of the self in 
connection with shame, and more often "undo" aspects of 
their behaviour in connection with guilt. In the current 
study, guilt was not correlated with general negative 
self-evaluation, derived from the SESS scores, which was 
in the predicted direction. 
The prediction that shame (but not guilt) would be 
associated with social anxiety was not fully supported. 
Both shame and guilt were related to social anxiety after 
controlling for the severity of depression, but only 
shame had a unique association with social anxiety. This 
adds support to Gilbert and Gerlsma's findings (in 
press) that parental shaming in childhood can sensitise 
individuals in the social sphere, and so generalise into 
adulthood as social anxiety. 
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The prediction that shame (but not guilt) would be 
associated with the process of dichotomous thinking 
('splitting') was not upheld by the findings in this 
study. Both shame and guilt were positively correlated 
with the dichotomous thinking subscale of the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS-A), guilt showing a 
unique association after controlling for shame. It is 
possible however, that this subscale simply reflects 
errors in thinking in line with Beck's model of 
"cognitive errors" in depression (Beck et al., 1979) and 
does not represent an adequate operationalisation of the 
concept of splitting which, in analytic terms, embraces 
more fundamental differences in the way that emotionally 
salient information is processed. 
The prediction that shame (but not guilt) would be 
positively associated with negative automatic thoughts 
was upheld by these findings. This supports and develops 
the role of negative schema or negative self-statements 
in shame-proneness and provides evidence of how 
cognitive content may mediate and influence affect and 
behaviour. It is of interest that the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (the ATQ-30) factor-analyses primarily into 
a large first factor reflecting personal maladjustment, 
and a second factor indicative of negative self- 
concept/negative expectations of outcome. Because both 
dimensions may reflect enduring and characterological 
cognitive styles, a unique association with shame- 
proneness is consistent with this. 
The results showed a significant correlation of shame 
with submissive behaviour, thereby replicating Gilbert et 
al's findings (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert et al., 
1995; Gilbert, in press). Although submissive behaviour 
was also associated with guilt, the data show that, 
consistent with evolutionary theory, it had a unique 
association with shame. 
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There also appeared to be a first-order association 
between shame and internalised anger, giving support to 
the concept of "shame-rage" spirals (Lewis 1971, reviewed 
in Scheff 1987). 
There are now three studies demonstrating a positive 
association between shame, specifically "bodily shame" 
and childhood abuse (Andrews 1995; Andrews 1997; Andrews 
& Hunter 1997). Dutton et al. (1995) looked at the role 
of shame and guilt in the intergenerational transmission 
of domestic abusiveness in men. The current findings, 
that neither shame nor guilt is associated with childhood 
abuse, again suggests that the Shame and Guilt Scale may 
not be detecting more internalised aspects of shame. It 
is of interest that Andrews and Hunter (1997) also found 
no association between a reported history of childhood 
abuse and general shame directed at the person's 
character or behaviour, supporting the idea that it is 
bodily shame which may act as a particular marker of 
childhood trauma. 
The prediction that shame would be positively associated 
with childhood maternal indifference was strongly upheld 
by the current findings which showed a first-order 
association. Unlike other studies (Gilbert et al, 1996; 
Gilbert & Gerlsma, in press; Richter et al, 1994) there 
was no association of adult shame with other childhood 
adversity factors, such as parental antipathy, control or 
neglect, which was in the predicted direction. This gives 
support to the psychoanalytic view that it is the role of 
positive mirroring in childhood which contributes to the 
development of a healthy and well-functioning self 
(Jacoby, 1994; Kohut 1971,1977; Winnicott 1967). When 
parental indifference and antipathy are clearly 
differentiated and rated separately, as in the current 
study, it is the lack of an emotional response towards 
the child which appears to be particularly pathogenic. It 
could be argued that there is likely to be a different 
threshold for mothers and fathers since the latter 
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usually have less responsibility (even now) for the early 
emotional needs of their children, and this would explain 
the non-significant finding for shame and paternal 
indifference. Therefore, it would appear to be the 
absence of an "affirming object" that can seriously 
impede the child's emotional development and lead to 
crises of identity and subsequent shame pathology. 
Although psychoanalytic theory has long offered a rich 
source of ideas about such processes, only comparatively 
recently have these notions been translated into 
empirical questions to address current clinical issues 
(see Alexander 1992 on the role of attachment theory in 
sexual abuse). 
Therefore, the positive association between childhood 
maternal indifference and adult shame-proneness may be 
understood in terms of this particular pattern of 
maternal interpersonal behaviour, potentiating the 
development of a "shame-laden self" which becomes 
incorporated into an enduring self-image in adulthood. 
Discussion of Multiple Regression Findings 
The multiple regression findings on shame support other 
research which shows that shame often presents as 
submissive behaviour, especially in situations of social 
anxiety (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Harker, 1998). This may 
imply that the pathogenic effects of shame are due to its 
operation through submissive strategies. The other shame- 
related variables showed no such significant association 
with shame. It has been argued that the concepts of 
submissive behaviour and subordination provide important 
pathways from other psychological concepts, such as 
negative self-evaluation, negative automatic thoughts and 
social anxiety, to possible biological mediators (see 
Gilbert & McGuire, 1998 for a review). A parental rearing 
style which obliterates a child's emerging sense of self 
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may contribute to a submissive style of behaviour in 
adulthood. 
The multiple regression findings on depression support 
other research which shows that depression is often 
associated with an internal attributional style for 
negative outcomes (Beck et al., 1979; Peterson et al., 
1982; Peterson & Villanova, 1988). The other shame- 
related variables showed no such significant association 
with depression. Because submissive behaviour is not 
adaptive (ie. it can lead to a lack of control over 
social outcomes, rejection or marginalisation) it may 
confirm existing negative beliefs about the self which 
often characterise shame. This spiral can lead to further 
submissiveness and may constitute a vulnerability factor 
in depression. 
In conclusion, the multiple regression findings reported 
in this study demonstrate the significant independent 
effects of submissive behaviour in shame, and an internal 
attributional style in depression, within this clinical 
group. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, these findings generate interesting 
questions about the conceptualisation, measurement and 
influence of shame and guilt and the part they play in 
adult symptomatology. In the current study, guilt (unlike 
shame) is associated with depression. However, items in 
the depression measure used (the BDI) are more reflective 
of pathological guilt than shame per se which may account 
for this pattern of results. It is also likely that the 
shame measure used, Gilbert et al's (1989) Shame and 
Guilt Scale, may not be tapping into the more 
phenomenological experience of shame. And finally, in 
this clinical group, comprising couples where one partner 
was moderately-to-severely depressed, guilt rather than 
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shame may have been more salient (ie. the issue of 
hurting others or being a burden in the relationship). 
It is also clear that conclusions regarding the role of 
these two affects in psychological distress must be 
tentative until the outstanding conceptual and 
measurement issues have been more fully addressed 
(Chapter 3 refers). Considerable progress has now been 
made in constructing theoretically meaningful, 
psychometrically sound measures of shame and guilt 
- 
and 
the body of systematic empirical research on these 
important emotions has grown accordingly. Future shame 
researchers can anticipate the construction of more 
sophisticated assessment strategies as our understanding 
of these two emotions continues to evolve. No doubt, the 
coming years are likely to see interesting research 
developments that will clarify the nature and function of 
the measurement of shame and guilt and their differential 
contributions to psychopathology. 
Qý 
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Chapter 5: A Content Analysis Study of the CECA Interview 
Data in a Depressed Group 
Aims: Another way of investigating shame and its 
relation to childhood maternal indifference is by 
carrying out a content analysis on transcribed interview 
data from the CECA. 
Research Question 
The research question is to explore in depth the 
experience of childhood maternal indifference for each 
high-shame and high-indifference scoring participant, in 
an attempt to identify the mechanisms by which such 
experience may contribute to shame-proneness in 
adulthood. Where parents have jointly shown indifference 
this has been included in the interview data, when there 
is evidence that the mother's indifference is implicit in 
participants' responses. The research question to be 
addressed is, "Why, and by what mechanisms, does 
childhood maternal indifference make adults vulnerable to 
shame? " 
Introduction to the Content Analysis Method 
Almost every study reviewed in the introductory chapters 
used a quantitative method of analysis. Whilst research 
of this kind 
, 
is important, and may be necessary to 
explore and test competing accounts of psychological 
phenomena, in some cases an over-reliance on quantitative 
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research methods alone may lead to a premature "narrowing 
of focus" and a corresponding neglect of the more human 
context of the phenomena under investigation. 
While it may be possible to investigate neglected facets 
of the experience of shame using purely quantitative 
methods, the use of an in-depth content analysis from 
participants' verbatim interview comments, offers a 
number of advantages over a purely quantitative strategy. 
Firstly, such a method can be a useful means of examining 
"naturally occurring" phenomena in their ordinary 
settings. Secondly, it can offer a means of understanding 
phenomena in a holistic way which includes variables not 
pre-selected by the interviewer. Accordingly, such 
methods are well suited to the inductive stages of theory 
development. Finally, as Miles and Huberman (1994) note, 
"... [such] data, with their emphasis on people's lived 
experience, are well suited for locating the meanings 
people place on the events, processes and structures of 
their lives 
... 
and for connecting those meanings to the 
social world around them" (p. 10). This is particularly 
relevant to a "self-conscious" emotion such as shame 
which is often experienced within an interpersonal or 
social context, and is often dependent on an individual's 
appraisal or "meaning-making" of the experience in 
question. 
Although content analysis itself comes within the 
category of quantitative methodology, it is seriously 
arguable that its flexibility places it at the interface 
with more qualitative research methods. In the words of 
Barker et al. (1996) "Content analysis provides a useful 
means of bridging quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, in that it applies quantitative analysis to 
verbal (qualitative) descriptions" (p. 123). There has 
been an increase of interest in the use of such methods 
in psychological research in recent years (Hayes, 1997; 
Richardson, 1996; Robson, 1993; Stiles, 1993). This 
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appears to have developed partly as a result of a more 
critical view of the development of scientific knowledge 
(Henwood, 1996; Woolgar, 1996) and partly as a result of 
psychologists' interests in developing psychological 
knowledge in applied settings (Hayes, 1997). According to 
Miles and Huberman (1994): "... social phenomena exist not 
only in the mind but also in the objective world - and 
... 
there are some lawful and reasonably stable 
relationships to be found among them" (p. 4). 
As Miles and Huberman point out, "no study conforms 
exactly to a standard methodology; each one calls for the 
researcher to bend the methodology to the peculiarities 
of the setting" (p. 5). However, a key concern in the 
current content analysis has been to establish the 
reliability and validity of the conclusions drawn from 
the data. To do this, use has been made of inter-rater 
reliability and triangulation of data from other 
sources, as well as the presentation of data in display 
matrices (Miles & Huberman, 1994), negative case analysis 
and alternative explanations (Yin, 1989). 
Inx 
The method chosen in the current study, of content 
analysis using transcripts of recorded interviews, 
differs from the quantitative measures considered so far 
in that it often involves indirect rather than direct 
measurement and inference. It has been defined in 
various ways. Krippendorff's (1980) definition, that 
"content analysis is a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their 
context" (p. 21) has the virtue of stressing the 
relationship between content and context. This "context" 
includes the purpose of the document or transcript as 
well as institutional, social and cultural aspects. It 
also emphasises that reliability and validity are central 
concerns in content analysis. 
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The semi-structured interview schedule used in the 
current study (the CECA: see Appendix 5) is aimed at 
eliciting participants' accounts of adverse experiences 
in childhood, with that of maternal indifference 
predicted as the most likely to be associated with adult 
shame-proneness. A distinction is sometimes made in 
content analysis between "witting" and "unwitting" 
evidence. Witting evidence is that which the participant 
intended to impart, whereas unwitting evidence is 
everything else that can be gleaned from the document or 
interview material. 
The checklist of criteria suggested by Gottschalk et al. 
(1986) in relation to the use of personal documents in 
history, covers important concerns relevant to the 
accuracy of all documents and interview transcripts: 
1. Was the ultimate source of the detail (the primary 
witness) able to tell the truth? 
2. Was the primary witness willing to tell the truth? 
3. Is the primary witness accurately reported with 
regard to the detail under investigation? 
4. Is there any external corroboration of the detail 
under examination? 
In order to satisfy these criteria the following points 
should be noted. Firstly, the participants in the current 
study were a depressed non-psychotic subsample who had 
given informed consent to this major research outcome 
study and understood its purpose. This means the first 
question can be reasonably confidently answered in the 
affirmative. Secondly, a previous review of the 
literature indicates that retrospective accounts obtained 
in this way are likely to be valid and are unlikely to be 
affected by depressed mood (Brewin et al., 1993). 
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Thirdly, inter-rater reliability on the CECA (ranging 
from 0.8 to 1.0 on the maternal indifference and abuse 
dimensions respectively) suggests a high level of inter- 
rater agreement. Fourthly, although there was no 
external corroboratory evidence in this study, 
reliability studies by Parker (1981) on the Parental 
Bonding Instrument (PBI), and Bifulco and Moran (1998), 
using the same interview (the CECA), support the 
feasibility of retrospective assessments of parental 
rearing. Parker's (1981) results indicate high agreement 
between PBI-scores and sibling ratings concerning the 
relations of the index person and the parents, and 
Bifulco and Moran (1998) have reported similar findings 
regarding the validity and reliability of participants' 
and siblings' retrospective accounts of parental 
rearing. 
To summarise, the evidence suggests that memories of 
childhood are less sensitive to mood or time distortions 
than is often thought, and do provide reliable, useful 
and accurate sources of data. 
"Im 
Participants 
While the empirical findings drawn from the clinical 
measures (Chapter 4) help elucidate the role of shame in 
adult psychopathology, it was hoped that an in-depth 
study of participants' childhoods would identify in finer 
detail those factors which may contribute to its 
aetiology. It was anticipated that participants' 
verbatim accounts of their childhood experiences would 
supply the richest source of the data of interest, and 
the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Interview 
(the CECA) was therefore selected for in-depth content 
analysis. A median split was carried out on the scores of 
the maternal indifference dimension of the CECA, and the 
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scores of the Shame and Guilt Scale, to allocate 
participants into high and low maternal indifference, and 
high and low shame and guilt. In this way a subsample of 
high shame/high indifference participants was identified 
(N=24) and this subsample was used in the subsequent 
analysis. 
Measures 
The Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse interview 
schedule (the CECA) was used to elicit participants' 
accounts of adverse experiences in childhood, with that 
of maternal indifference predicted as the most likely to 
be associated with adult shame. 
Procedure 
The aim of the content analysis was to extract units of, 
meaning from the transcribed verbal data in a manner 
which permitted the quantification of the material in 
terms of frequency of occurrence of categories. There 
were two steps: firstly, the transcribed verbal material 
was divided into "units of meaning" (unitization) in a 
systematic manner, resulting in "themes" or "objects". 
The second step was to form mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories according to which the content of 
the transcripts could be sorted and quantified. 
In the current study, some of the categories so formed 
were new, emergent categories, being directly derived 
from the transcribed verbal data rather than determined 
on an "a priori" basis by the researcher. Whilst 
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obviously reflecting pre-existing categories (or 
questions) from the CECA on childhood adversity factors 
such as parental antipathy, indifference, neglect and 
control, this method also lead to the emergence of new 
categories which were spontaneously elicited by 
participants and were not in response to directly-asked 
questions (such as themes of isolation, maternal jealousy 
etc. ). Themes or objects were then assigned to their most 
appropriate categories. Quantification was derived by 
counting the number of objects assigned to each category 
(ie. a frequency count was performed) and statistical 
analysis carried out (a chi-square "goodness-of-fit" 
test) to ascertain the level of significance of 
occurrence. 
One advantage of using a structured systematic approach 
such as content analysis is the possibility of assessing 
the reliability and validity of the analysis beyond the 
subjectivity of the author. Thus the identification of 
units of meaning, and the assignment of objects to their 
various categories, was independently performed by 
another researcher. In this case, inter-rater 
reliability was carried out with a post-doctoral 
clinical psychologist and Cohen's Kappa was computed 
(Howell, 1992). This showed an inter-rater agreement of 
0.9 taking into account chance agreement, suggesting a 
high level of inter-rater reliability. Although some 
natural overlap between categories exists, each item was 
treated as mutually exclusive and assigned to one 
category only, to avoid confounding of variables in the 
final statistical analysis in line with good research 
practice (Robson, 1993, p. 277). 
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Analytic Strategy 
Validity of the analysis derived largely from the 
validity of the categories employed in addressing the 
research question, and the extent to which the data were 
actually captured by the categories created ie. the 
"operational isation11 of category construction (Robson, 
1993, p. 277). Triangulation of data, in this case use of 
empirical data from other sources (see Chapter 4) 
provided an external reference-point for investigating 
those aspects of childhood maternal indifference which 
may predispose to shame-proneness in adulthood, such as 
the childhood construction of an enduring negative or 
"bad" self, with stable dysfunctional self- and other- 
beliefs. 
Im 
All statistical calculations were carried out using the 
SPSS package for PCs in Windows '95. 
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Results of Content Analysis 
A total of fifteen categories emerged from the 
transcribed verbal data of the high-shame/high- 
indifference subsample, a third of which (N=5) were 
emergent (or new) categories and did not reflect 
responses to directly-asked questions from the interview 
schedule. Examples of each category are listed below. 
Academic Attitude: My Mum didn't help when I was having 
problems with a teacher. (Existing category) 
Acceptance & Need to Please: I was always trying to 
please her. (New category) 
Child as Reminder of Parent: Mother said I reminded her 
of my father. I felt unloved,, cos Mum hated Dad. I got 
the hate. (New category) 
Emotional Availability: I couldn't go to Mother because 
it was like a brick wall. (Existing category) 
Favouritism: I felt she favoured my sister because she 
was a very quiet child 
-'I was outgoing and energetic. (Existing category) 
Interest: Mother didn't take much interest in my life 
- 
father was often at sea. (Existing category) 
Isolation: I was 'little fat Jackie', the ugly one. I 
always felt very alone. I sorted problems out myself. (New category) 
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Love & Approval: Mother was neutral in every way. She 
wasn't positive 
- 
but not negative either. (Existing 
category) 
Material Affirmation & Celebration: Mother didn't always 
remember my birthday. (Existing category) 
Maternal Jealousy: Mum was terribly jealous 'cos I went 
to grammar school. She was deeply resentful of spending 
money on school uniform for the school. She would say, 
'If you'd gone to secondary school we wouldn't have had 
to spend so much'. (New category) 
Maternal Loss: I can't remember what she was like 
-I lost contact after she left. (Existing category) 
Physical Affection: I don't think Mother could show 
affection 
- 
she was very distant. (Existing category) 
Psychological Control: I could never ask Mother about my 
natural father as she disapproved and would say, 'How do 
you think your stepfather would feel? ' (ie. if subject 
were to make contact). (New category) 
Rejection & Denigration: I'd hear things like my Mother 
saying she didn't want to get pregnant. She did things to 
try and get rid of me. (Existing category) 
Social Attitude: Mother was very cold towards my friends. 
They had to wait on the doorstep and weren't invited in. 
Other families seemed warmer. (Existing category) 
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Chi-square Goodness-of-fit Test 
A frequency count showed a statistical significance in 
occurrence of the various categories at the p=. 005 level 
(chi-square 
= 
83.5, df 14, p<. 005). This means that if 
each category contributed equally there is only a 
. 
005% 
chance (confidence level >99.5%) that a chi-square value 
greater than 31.31 would have been achieved. Since the 
obtained chi-square value is 83.5, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected and it can be concluded that there is a 
significant difference between categories. 
(Howell, 1992, pp. 284-287). 
11% 
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As can be seen from Tables 7 and 8, a very significant 
finding is that the category of Emotional Availability 
(n=27) is one and a half times that of the next two 
highest, Favouritism, and Rejection & Denigration (both 
n=18). This cannot be accounted for by the number of 
questions relating to these categories in the interview 
schedule, as there are three questions on antipathy and 
only two on indifference (Appendix 5 refers). 
Furthermore, there would appear to be no primacy effect, 
as two of the antipathy questions precede those relating 
to indifference. The significance of this finding will be 
discussed and explored within a psychoanalytic 
framework, because this has most conceptual relevance for 
the child's early inner experience of a "failing maternal 
environment" (Winnicott, 1958) and "lack of mirroring" in 
childhood (Kohut, 1971). 
The category of Emotional Availability (79's) is 
characterised by such items as: 
list 
Mum was always working 
- 
there was never time. 
I couldn't explain how I felt to my Mother. 
Mother couldn't protect us. She didn't have anything in 
her to protect us. 
I don't remember going to her with problems. 
She didn't understand me. 
I kept it to myself. 
She was caught up in her own needs too much. 
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See Appendix 3 for full table of interview material from 
the CECA 
Table 9 reports the breakdown of categories by 
participant. As can be seen from this table, 799. - of total 
comments are in the category of Emotional Availability. 
e'm 
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TABLE 9: DATA DISPLAY OF CATEGORIES FROM CECA BY PARTICIPANT 
(N=24) 
Subject Em 
Avail 
Soo 
Alt 
Ac 
Art 
Fav Phys 
API 
Int Rej 
& 
Den 
Love 
& 
App 
Isol Mat 
Aff 
Psych 
con- 
trol 
Child 
as 
Rem 
Mat 
Jeal 
Mat 
Lose 
Accept 
28 " " " " " " " " 
36 " " " " " 
39 " " " " " " 
46 " " " " 
49 " " " " " " " 
51 " " 
95 " " " " " 
118 " " " " " " 
130 " " " " 
132 " " 
136 " " 
143 " " " " " 
147 " " " " " " " " 
158 " " " " " 
161 " " " " 
164 " " " " " " 
166 " " " " " " " " 
175 " " " " " " " 
191 " " " " " " 
201 " " " " " 
221 " " " " " " " " 
223 " " " " " " 
243 " 
248 " " " " 
Total 
% 
19 
79% 
15 
62% 
14 
38% 
14 
58% 
12 
SO% 
11 
46% 
9 
37% 
a 
33% 
6 
25% 
5 
20% 
4 
16% 
2 
8% 
2 
8% 
2 
8% 
1 
4% 
Inter-rater Reliability 
Inter-rater agreement of assignment of data to categories by an independent rater was 
0.9 indicating a high level of reliability (Robson 1993, p. 222). 
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Negative Case Analysis of Atypical Cases 
There are six atypical interview comments which, on the 
face of it, appear to contradict the overall findings 
both within- and between- participants. However, these 
represent only 3.6% of the total interview data, and are 
explored in further detail below. 
See Appendix 4 for full table of negative cases from the 
CECA 
Closer examination will show that in three of these 
participants (S95, S147 and S201) relating to Material 
Affirmation & Celebration, the comments were in response 
to a direct question by the interviewer: "Did your 
Mother remember your birthday? " which all three answered 
positively. Indeed, the majority of participants in the 
sample answered this question simply and briefly in the 
affirmative, although occasionally qualifying this (such 
as having to share birthday treats with other family 
members, only getting "sensible" presents etc. ) 
confirming the author's view that it would be unusual, 
particularly in the UK, for basic social conventions, 
such as birthdays, not to be celebrated 
- 
not least 
because of feared negative evaluations by significant 
others (neighbours, schoolteachers etc. ) if this were not 
done. It is of note here that in total only five 
participants reported non-celebration of a birthday, 
confirming the atypicality of this pattern of response. 
On the question relating to Academic Attitude, the fourth 
participant (S36) who said "Only Mum would go to 
meetings at school" must be taken in the context of her 
other remarks during the research interview, such as 
"There was no time for me 
- 
Mother was too busy running 
the hotel", "there was no interest in who I was with or 
when I came back after going out with boys", "I wasn't 
close to either parent 
- 
both were distant", "I couldn't 
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go to my Mother if I was upset - she was too busy running 
the hotel" and "there was little interest in my friends". 
Relating to Emotional Availability, the fifth 
participant (S147) who reported "I could go to my Mum if 
I was upset" (stated early in the interview) must be 
taken in the context of her subsequent remarks, such as 
"Mum was always working 
- 
there was never time" and "I 
couldn't explain how I felt to my Mother", suggesting her 
mother's preoccupation with business and work concerns 
(in cases S36 and S147 both relating to financial 
necessity rather than maternal indifference or active 
disinterest in the child per se). 
On the subject of expression of Love & Approval, the 
sixth participant (S191) who reported that "Mother was 
frightened to show her approval, 'cos of Dad's reaction" 
must also be taken in the context of her other remarks 
during the interview, such as "Mother was neutral in a 
way. She wasn't positive 
- 
but not negative either" and 
"there was never any encouragement. I don't really 
remember those sort of things". Such a description 
suggests a maternal overcompliance and "flatness of 
affect" (possibly her mother suffered from depression as 
a result of social circumstances) rather than active 
indifference or disinterest. 
Such analysis of "atypical" cases highlights the salience 
of how such behaviours and attitudes were experienced by 
the child rather than their actual determinants and 
causes in reality 
- 
such as financial pressures or other 
constraints on the family. In other words, what was 
important for each of these respondents was that their 
subjective emotional experience was one of maternal 
disinterest and unavailability, which was often perceived 
as different and unfair, when compared with that of other 
families, often leaving the child feeling isolated and 
separate from others. 
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Conclusion 
The advantage of conducting a negative case analysis is 
that the researcher can explore cases that do not appear 
to fit an emerging conceptual system. This is invaluable 
because it serves to challenge initial assumptions and 
categories, and hence can work as a check against the 
very real danger of building indefensible arguments from 
a corpus of data. 
Therefore, from the negative case analysis in the current 
study, it can be seen that it is the subjective 
experience or "meaning-making" of events that is 
important for the child in shaping their inner world 
rather than the reality of circumstances relating to 
maternal preoccupations and behaviour, such as poverty or 
pressures of work (for example, S36's comments on Mother 
being too busy running the hotel). 
Tangney and her colleagues in their (1994) study found 
that the most striking shame-guilt difference centred on 
the nature of interpersonal concerns 
- 
that is, with 
respondents' interpretation of the interpersonal meaning 
of the event or behaviour in question. Shame experiences 
were more likely to involve a concern with others' 
perceived evaluations or attitudes towards the self, 
whereas guilt experiences were more likely to involve a 
concern with one's effect on others. It could be argued, 
as Ausubel (1958), that what is important for childrens' 
emotional development is not what really happened, but 
how parental behaviour is perceived. Therefore, the 
current content analysis shows that, in shame, the focus 
is less on the objective facts of the emotion-eliciting 
event or behaviour in question, and more on the meaning 
made of the event and how that impacted on the child's 
sense of self (as bad, unloveable, invisible etc. ). This 
seems particularly true in the experience of childhood 
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maternal indifference and the evidence suggests it may 
predispose the child to shame-proneness as an adult. 
Discussion of Results within a Psychoanalytic Framework 
The combined results of Chapters 4 and 5 support the view 
that it is the mother's emotional unavailability, as 
experienced by the child, which plays an important role 
in the development of shame-proneness in adulthood. 
Triangulation of data from all sources enhances the 
validity of these findings. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, other-directed favouritism in childhood 
appears to potentiate social anxiety in the adult; 
rejection and denigration as a child appear to potentiate 
adult submissive behaviour. The research question: "Why, 
and by what mechanisms, does childhood maternal 
indifference make adults vulnerable to shame? " can now be 
more fully explored. 
Shame and Attachment 
These findings firmly support the conclusion that lack of 
parental warmth and emotional unavailability constitute 
an important vulnerability factor for subsequent 
psychopathology as reported in the literature (see 
Gilbert & Gerlsma in press). According to the authors, 
such data are generally interpreted as evidence that it 
is dysfunctions in attachment mechanisms that mediate 
early experiences and subsequent pathologies (Bowlby, 
1973; Fonagy, 1996; Main, 1996). Attachment approaches 
highlight issues of interpersonal closeness and distance 
and, as "distance-regulators", operationalise 
interpersonal dysfunctions in terms of faulty attachment 
styles (such as avoidant, anxious, ambivalent or "mixed" 
attachment styles). In his later writings, Bowiby (1977, 
1980,1988) would seem to be more concerned with the 
implications of his theory for the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship. According to Bowlby, the role 
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of the therapist is seen as providing the patient with "a 
temporary attachment figure" and Bowlby (1977) states: 
". 
.a therapist has a number of 
inter-related 
tasks 
... 
first, and above all, to provide the 
patient with a secure base from which to explore 
both himself and also his relations with all those 
with whom he has made, or might make, an affectional 
bond" (p. 423). 
In keeping with this view, Gilbert's notion of shame as 
a "distance-regulator" in therapy (1997c) reflects an 
adult manifestation, in the therapeutic context, of the 
early disruption of a healthy and responsive relationship 
with childhood caregivers. 
It is the relational position of the self which is 
crucially important in identifying the shame experience. 
For, in shame, the other is experienced in some way as 
unlike the self 
- 
alienated or with the potential to 
alienate. The other may be viewed as less caring about 
the relationship than the self (as abandoning, rejecting, 
affectionless etc. ) or as the source of potential injury 
or harm. The other becomes focal in awareness and may 
appear as mocking, ridiculing, powerful, haughty, 
authoritative, controlling, unjust, hostile, 
unresponsive, detached or emotionally uninvolved. The 
other's self appears intact, whereas one's own self feels 
diminished, fragmented or dissolved. In either case there 
is a perceived chasm between the self and the other and 
this constitutes the essence of the shame experience. 
Shame and Self-Esteem 
Although self-esteem is essentially a self-evaluative 
construct and shame is an affective state, a 
corresponding trait or disposition exists in shame- 
proneness, being the tendency to experience the emotion 
shame (in contradistinction to guilt) in response to 
specific negative events, as measured in the current 
study by Gilbert et al's (1989) Shame and Guilt Scale. 
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Jung (1921) believed that the personality is artificially 
stunted when the process of its natural unfolding is 
arrested in some way. In his view, the greatest dangers 
to the unfolding of individuality are present during 
infancy and early childhood, when the young child's 
development is completely at the mercy of its caretakers. 
Such interaction patterns influence the child's emerging 
self-esteem and also the quality of human relationships 
into the present. Jacoby (1994) states "usually this 
artificial stunting has its roots in these early phases 
of life" (P. 103). 
At the turn of the century, Cooley's (1902) concept of 
the "looking glass self" emphasised the role of other 
peoples' evaluations in constructing one's sense of self 
(Chapter 2 refers). This has three aspects: imagining 
one's appearance to others; imagining their evaluation or 
judgement of that appearance; and some response to that 
imagined evaluation such as pride or mortification. Shame 
theories have followed a similar pattern, focusing on 
social beliefs (of how others see the self), personal 
beliefs (how one sees the self), or an interaction of 
both. 
IN. 
Mead (1934) emphasised the important role of significant 
others, especially early caregivers, in shaping self- 
beliefs and early self-appraisals. Such beliefs, 
according to Mead, are increasingly influenced by social 
attitudes as the child matures into adulthood. The 
important role played by early caregivers (especially 
parents) in the development of self-esteem was 
empirically investigated by Rosenberg (1965) and 
Coopersmith (1967). More recently, Andrews and Brown 
(1988,1993) have shown how early negative experiences 
with caregivers influence self-esteem in adult females. 
The important role of positive mirroring from others in 
endorsing adult self-esteem in succinctly captured by 
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Tolstoy in the following passage from War and Peace 
(1973: original published 1869): 
"After seven years of married life Pierre was able 
to feel a comfortable and assured conviction that he 
was not a bad fellow after all. This he could do 
because he saw himself mirrored in his wife. In 
himself he felt the good and bad inextricably mixed 
and overlapping. But in his wife he saw reflected 
only what was really good in him, since everything 
else she rejected. And this reflection was not the 
result of a logical process of thought but came from 
some other mysterious, direct source" (pp. 1373- 
1374). 
These results also raise interesting questions about 
shame's association with maternal emotional 
unavailability which find support in the analytic and 
self-psychological ideas of Winnicott (1931/1988) and 
Kohut (1971/1985). Winnicott (1958) in his concept of 
"good enough mothering" and "the failing maternal 
environment", and Kohut in his concept of "mirroring" 
(1971,1972), both address the central role of the mother 
in the construction of a healthy and shame-free self, 
despite the relative inattention to shame in their 
writings. More recently, Bifulco and Moran (1998) cite 
Bronfenbrenner: "It has been suggested that for healthy 
psychological development children need at least one 
adult who is irrationally enthusiastic about them" 
(p. 49). 
Psychoanalytic Expositions of Shame 
Shame and Indifference: The "Failing Maternal 
Environment" 
Shame is typified by an anxious self-consciousness where 
there is a perceived "loss of self". In the shame 
experience, the other's self appears intact whereas one's 
own self feels diminished, fragmented or dissolved. 
Winnicott (1945) referred to this sense of fragmentation 
when he argued that the infant started life in a state of 
"unintegration" with disparate bits and pieces of 
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experience. According to Winnicott, the infant has to 
draw upon the mother's organised perceptions in order 
to organise its own experience and in this way she 
provides a "holding environment" within which the infant 
is contained and experienced. "An infant who has had no 
one person to gather his bits together starts with a 
handicap in his own self-integrating task" (p. 150). 
Winnicott referred to this state as that of "primary 
maternal preoccupation" in which the mother offers 
herself as a medium for her baby's growth and 
development, and supplies its needs in an almost 
magical fashion. Winnicott refers to "the moment of 
illusion" when the infant believes it has created the 
object that it has desired in fantasy, such as the breast 
when it is ready to feed. In this way, the infant begins 
to experience itself as omnipotent and the source of all 
creation, which, if successfully modulated by the mother, 
becomes the basis for the later development of a robust 
and shame-free self. 
Winnicott (1967) saw this "bringing the world to the 
child" as playing a crucial and intricate role in self- 
development, and in the infant's "hallucination" with the 
mother's response, that gives the repetitive experiential 
basis for its sense of contact with, and power over, 
external reality. In this way, by providing the infant 
with a reflection of its own experience, despite its 
fragmentations, the mother provides a stable "holding" 
environment in which the child can self-integrate: "When 
I look I am seen, so I exist" (p. 134). Empathic failure 
or emotional unavailability on the part of the mother 
undercuts the infant's imagined omnipotence, constricting 
its beliefs in its own creativity and sense of self 
- 
giving birth to shame. Another need in the infant is the 
ability to be alone, and to develop this capacity the 
mother must be able to provide a "nondemanding presence" 
when the infant is undemanding of her. This state of 
unintegration (which results from the mother's fine 
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attunement to the baby's needs and is the antithesis of 
maternal indifference), Winnicott calls "going-on-being". 
This awareness of the infant's need for being alone in 
the mother's presence becomes a central feature in 
Winnicott's concept of a stable and personal self. It is 
essentially an ability to bear formlessness and to 
tolerate uncertainty. 
Shame and Indifference: The "Good Enough Mother" 
Once such omnipotence has been established, it is 
necessary for the child to learn the reality of the world 
outside its control and to experience limitations. The 
"good enough mother" (1960) is able to facilitate this 
process by gradually failing to shape the world according 
to the infant's demand and this gentle decline in 
responsiveness should synchronise with the gradual 
exercise of active ego functions on the part of the 
infant, resulting in greater differentiation and 
interaction in their relationship. Such "graduated 
failure of adaptation" (p. 246) is a prerequisite for the 
development of separation, differentiation and 
realisation of a strong sense of self. Winnicott 
therefore stresses the importance of the mother's 
capacity for appropriate and sensitive withdrawal from 
her infant in order to foster healthy psychic development 
and structure. 
Winnicott believed that deficiencies in providing a "good 
enough" environment, and its graduated withdrawal, will 
adversely affect the emotional development of the child 
and that such failures are of two kinds: an inability to 
actualise and respond to "hallucinatory creations" and 
needs of the infant, and interference with its 
unintegration when in a "quiescent" state. While the 
first may be associated with emotional unavailability, 
the second is closer to the concept of "affectionless 
control" (Bifulco & Moran, 1998) or "emotional over- 
involvement" (Vaughn & Leff, 1976ab). According to 
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Winnicott (1956) both kinds of failure on the part of the 
mother are experienced as a terrifying interference with 
a sense of personal continuity, and both result in the 
experience of the "annihilation of the infant's self" 
(p. 304), which is the essence of the shame experience in 
the adult. This results in the child losing touch with 
its own spontaneous needs and gestures, as these bear no 
relation to the way he or she is experienced by the 
mother, and a kind of "objectification" ensues. 
Shame and "Objectification" 
In defining objectification, Broucek (1991) states that 
shame follows as "a response to having one's status as a 
subject ignored, disregarded, denied, or negated" (p. 8) 
which is an extension of the infant's experience of being 
gazed at unresponsively, with a "still face". He 
continues, "It is when one is trying to relate to the 
other as a subject, but feels objectified that one is apt 
to experience shame" (p. 47). 
An example would be of a child experiencing joy over 
their newly-crayoned picture and proudly showing their 
"achievement" to their mother, who then proceeds to 
reprimand them for some fault in their attire. Such 
resulting "fragmentation" of the infant's experiences 
(Kohut, 1971) leads to a split between a "true self" 
(which lies dormant but available for rediscovery at a 
later date, especially during the therapeutic encounter) 
and a "false self", which is compliant and attuned to the 
claims and requests of others. The "true self", being the 
source of spontaneity, goes into hiding to avoid the 
possibility of "psychic annihilation" ie. of being 
rejected or ignored, while the "false self" provides an 
illusion of stabilised personal existence and can come to 
take over the caretaking functions which the environment 
has failed to provide. Thus, the integrity of the 'true 
self' (Winnicott, 1960) is protected by the "false self's 
compliance with environmental demands" (p. 147), which 
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anticipates shame's association with adult submissive 
behaviour referred to in Chapters 2 and 4. This results 
in a separation of the cognitive and affective processes 
within the individual because of the need to maintain 
two opposing self-presentations. 
Shame and "Personhood" 
In Winnicott's (1971) view, a further aspect of the 
process of the development of a strong and shame-free 
"personhood" is the formation of "transitional objects", 
where the nature of the relation to the objects 
represents a developmental stage between "hallucinatory 
omnipotence" and the recognition of reality. In order to 
achieve "personhood" the individual must move from a 
state of illusory omnipotence to a state of objective 
perception and the process is not a clear linear 
progression. Winnicott argues that both children and 
adults continually vacillate between them. Relations with 
"transitional objects" constitute a third, intermediary 
and transitional realm through which the child can 
negotiate and make sense of their experience. The whole 
realm of transitional experiencing rests on a paradox 
whereby there is agreement between mother and child not 
to question the nature and origin of the object. The 
mother both acts as if the baby has created and controls 
the object, and yet acknowledges its objective existence 
in the world of other people. The withholding or 
unresponsive mother, who is unable or unwilling to enter 
the child's "magical world" in this way, cannot 
facilitate self-integration in the child, thereby laying 
the foundations for later vulnerability to shame. 
Under the term "good-enough-mothering" (1960), Winnicott 
postulates specific environmental provisions on which the 
emergence of a healthy, shame-free self is contingent. 
Such provisions facilitate the shift from dependence to 
independence, from omnipotent conception to realistic 
perception, from unintegration to self-integration; and 
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it is such "good-enough-mothering" that determines the 
quality of the individual's life in adulthood. Because 
"personhood" is such a fragile phenomenon, Winnicott says 
there is always a tension between subjective experience 
and objective reality. 
Shame and Alienation 
According to his view, our total infantile development 
leads to an inevitable residual vulnerability where a 
part of us is ultimately inaccessible and isolated - 
feelings intrinsic to shame. Winnicott (1963) states: 
"At the centre of each person is an incommunicado 
element, and this is sacred and most worthy of 
preservation" (p. 187). There remains, according to 
Winnicott, a "noncommunicating self" which is "truly 
isolate" and despite his relative inattention to shame, 
this statement encapsulates the apocryphal shame 
experience of isolation and alienation similar to 
Kierkegaard's "existential dread". The question remains 
(Winnicott, 1963) of "how to be isolated without having 
to be insulated" (p. 182) and this again reflects his 
central concern of how to negotiate the gap between 
conflicting human needs for'intimacy and solitude, 
openness and privacy, stability and change. 
Psychotherapeutic Implications (Winnicott) 
Such questions reflect those features of the therapeutic 
situation which bear most directly on early developmental 
processes facilitating the emergence of "personhood". In 
Winnicott's view, the earliest object relations consist 
of interactions between developmental needs within the 
child, and provisions or "supplies" offered by the 
mother. Winnicott argues for the centrality of "good- 
enough-mothering", defining it as an (initial) perfectly- 
responsive facilitation of the infant's needs and 
gestures; a nonintrusive "holding" and mirroring 
environment throughout quiescent states; the collusive 
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agreement to respect transitional objects; to ensure 
object survival 
- 
despite the intensity or 
destructiveness of the infant's needs; and failure to 
retaliate against such features of "object-usage". 
Winnicott (1948b) argues that the mother's personality 
and interpersonal parenting style have an enormous impact 
on the child's development, and maternal psychopathology, 
or deficiency, reverberates in the psychopathology, or 
deficiency, of the child: "The child lives within the 
circle of a parent's personality and 
... 
this circle has 
pathological features" (p. 93). 
Winnicott saw the curative factor in psychotherapy not in 
its interpretive function but the manner in which the 
analytic setting provides missing parental provisions and 
fills early developmental needs. Schafer (1967) states: 
"On the other hand, as a benevolently curious or 
empathic therapist, the analyst may, for some 
patients, fill an ideal form that has lain empty for 
many years. And, in expressing appreciation of the 
analyst, such a patient may say or imply, 'This is 
how I wanted to believe a parent could be' or 'This 
is the idea of a good parent I once created'". 
Winnicott speaks in one place of a patient's 
"creating" his analyst (1948a). In this limited 
respect it is not a repetitious transference 
phenomenon that is contemplated: it is a form of 
remembering and of renewed invention and reality 
testing; it is a fresh and hopeful attempt by the 
patient to find a fit for leftover and tenaciously- 
held ideal forms, or perhaps even to create 
meaningful ideal forms for the first time (pp. 167- 
168). 
Interestingly, from the cognitive therapy literature, 
Young (1990) has promoted the term "early maladaptive 
schemata" (or EMSs) to describe the persistent 
dysfunctional core beliefs which underpin enduring 
psychological problems. Young maintains that schemata are 
extremely stable enduring themes that develop during 
childhood and are elaborated upon throughout an 
individual's lifetime. He describes them as templates for 
the processing of later experience. Young postulates 
that maladaptive schemata are the result of dysfunctional 
experiences in the first few years of an individual's 
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life, and he emphasises their unconditional, self- 
perpetuating nature. He has gone so far as to propose 
that the therapeutic relationship be used as a "partial 
re-parenting" forum for the client who has experienced 
adverse parenting. 
Such an idea has obvious parallels with the analytic 
psychotherapies (cf. Alexander & French's (1946) 
"corrective emotional experience") and underscores the 
importance of the therapeutic relationship when working 
with people experiencing enduring psychological 
problems, especially those originating in childhood. 
Patients presenting with issues relating to shame would 
be particularly sensitive to the Rogerian qualities of 
"accurate empathy", "non-possessive warmth" and 
"genuineness" in the therapeutic relationship (Rogers, 
1957) in a (conscious or unconscious) effort to avoid 
repetition of the original pathogenic relationship. 
Therefore, according to Winnicott (1948a), the function 
of psychotherapy is to compensate for parental failure in 
adaptation and "to provide a certain type of environment" 
(p. 168). He argues that only if the appropriate 
facilitating environment is provided by the therapist can 
the "true self" be reached and allowed to grow in a way 
that is healthy and free from vulnerability to shame. 
Shame and Indifference: Lack of Mirroring 
it is this emphasis on the significance of the primary 
maternal environment for the development of a shame-free 
self that is reflected in the writings of Kohut 
(1971/1988) who has built on, and developed, Winnicott's 
ideas and woven these subsequent formulations into a more 
systematic framework of psychological theory. Both 
theorists focus on the significance of the infant's early 
maternal environment for the self's optimal growth and 
healthy integration. 
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Kohut's exploration of narcissism, conceptualised as a 
defence against shame, and his emphasis on a concept of 
self as an "experiential core of the personality", has 
led to an alternative paradigm for psychoanalysis known 
as Self Psychology. In this new framework, disturbances 
in the experience of the self are seen as primary, and 
object relational disturbances (involving withdrawal from 
relatedness, as in narcissism) are seen as secondary. 
A theme of central concern is Kohut's concept of the 
"self-object" which refers to the caretaker's functions 
of mirroring and emotional availability for idealisation, 
which are needed to maintain the cohesion of the infant's 
self (an extension of Winnicott's "good-enough- 
mothering"). This means, for Kohut, the ability to 
resonate with her baby's needs so it becomes attuned to 
its own bodily functions and impulses, thus paving the 
way for a slowly-unfolding and healthy sense of self. 
Similarly, the self-object functions to maintain the 
cohesion of the self, akin to the role of Winnicott's 
"transitional object". But whereas Winnicott emphasises 
the priority of relational processes leading to the 
emergence of a shame-free self, Kohut focuses on the 
infant's world. That is, he centres on the view 
"empathically grasped" from within the infant/patient's 
experience, as opposed to a more external or objective 
viewpoint. 
Shame and Empathic Failure 
Such a concept highlights the significance of empathy for 
Kohut in the therapeutic process. According to his 
theory, empathic failure in the caregiver leads to a 
splitting off of the infant's "grandiose self" (a crucial 
stage of early self 
-organisation). Socarides and Stolorow 
(1984,1985) comment: "The child 
... 
becomes vulnerable 
to self-fragmentation because his affect states have not 
been met with the requisite responsiveness from the 
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caregiving surround and thus cannot become integrated 
into the organization of his self-experience" (p. 106). 
Pathology, according to Kohut's model, results when the 
cohesive self (the steady-state function) has been 
faultily developed so that the individual persists in 
turning to the outside human environment for help in 
maintaining the internal state which cannot be maintained 
autonomously. The regulation of a robust and shame-free 
self is, according to Kohut, virtually absent at birth 
and is only slowly acquired by empathic contact with the 
nurturing, soothing other who is experienced as part of 
the self ie. the self-object. 
Shame and Grandiosity 
Following from this, it is necessary to review Kohut's 
(1971,1972) self-developmental theory as it relates to 
shame. Kohut grounded his schema of development in the 
notion that the infant begins life making use of two 
psychic states, one of which is grandiosity. The early 
grandiose sense of self is shared with the mother, or 
other caretaker, through exhibitionism. The infant's 
exhibitionism must be responded to warmly (mirrored) by 
the caregiver in order for the infant to gradually modify 
its grandiose sense of self, so that the mature self can 
emerge competent and ambitious, but no longer dominated 
by an archaic sense of power and greatness. 
According to Kohut (1971) the second infantile state 
relevant to self-development is the child's experience of 
the "idealized parent imago" or "the idealized omnipotent 
selfobject". In this state, the infant relates to the 
other, not the self, as perfect and powerful. To the 
extent that the idealised other offers an empathic 
response to the infant's admiring interest, the infant 
shares in the object's perfection, and its own self- 
esteem is enhanced. Kohut believed that the two types of 
experience co-occur in the infant, rather than one 
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preceding the other (later referred to in his writings as 
the "bipolar self", 1977). He also believed that empathic 
responses from significant others are crucial to the 
positive outcome of both types of experience. In his 
view, empathic responses lead to modification of early 
grandiosity and to attenuation of early idealisation. 
Images of perfection gradually shift to mature "guiding 
ideals" and realistic aspirations. 
Shame and the Need for "Self-Objects" 
For Kohut (1977) therefore, the child is born into an 
empathic responsive human milieu where relatedness with 
others is essential for psychological survival. Self 
emerges at a point where "the baby's innate 
potentialities and the [parents'] expectations with 
regard to the baby converge" (p. 99). But others are 
needed to provide a sense of cohesion, constancy and 
resilience, and Kohut terms these "self-objects" as, in 
the infant's mind, they are not yet differentiated from 
the self. These self-objects (who serve functions which 
will later be performed by the individual's own psychic 
structure) provide the experiences necessary for the 
gradual development of the self. Kohut considers the 
relations between the infant and its self-objects as the 
basic constituents of psychic development and structure. 
The healthy and shame-free self is seen as supported by 
its self-objects throughout life, and this understanding 
of the infant as both psychologically separate, and at 
the same time partially merged with its self-objects, has 
important parallels in Kohut's concept of the 
transference configurations in narcissistic 
personalities. 
Crucial for shame theory is Kohut's additional notion 
that repeated empathic failure, as is the case in 
maternal emotional unavailability, leads to the splitting 
off of early grandiose images of self and other, so that 
these images are retained in their original, unrealistic 
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form and cannot be integrated into the personality. 
Whenever the original aims of the child are split off in 
this way (rather than being modified and integrated) the 
"nuclear ambitions" of the self are not realised and 
grandiosity acts as a defence against a vulnerable, and 
shameladen, self. 
Shame and Narcissism 
Kohut, whilst often referring to the self-esteem of the 
person whose personality is split off in this way, says 
little about shame per se. But he does conceptualise 
shame as the response to the flooding of the ego with 
grandiose-exhibitionistic libido. Therefore, one 
important prior condition for shame is the splitting off 
of the grandiose self. The person who has split off their 
early grandiosity is highly shame-vulnerable because 
split-off exhibitionistic libido may suddenly flood the 
ego at any time. Kohut (1971) describes why a person 
experiences shame: "because revelation at times is still 
accompanied by crude, unneutralized exhibitionistic 
libido" (p. 149). In other words, when a narcissistic 
person tries to share the self with another, they do so 
in a way that activates and exposes their split-off, 
infantile grandiosity, and such exposure leads to shame. 
A further reference (Kohut, 1972) describes the 
relationship between exhibitionism and shame: "It will 
suddenly flood the reality ego with unneutralized 
exhibitionistic cathexes and overwhelm the neutralizing 
powers of the ego, which becomes paralysed and 
experiences intense shame and rage" (p. 373). 
For Kohut therefore, shame is intricately linked to 
narcissistic disturbances in self-structure. Shame is, in 
essence, a judgement-free, primarily physical and pre- 
verbal experience of flushing, shrinking and gaze 
aversion, * which occurs automatically in response to 
exposure of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self. In his 
view, shame is a feeling state that functions to 'ground' 
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a person who is overstimulated by feelings of 
omnipotence. 
Shame and the Transference 
Kohut (1971) described three transference configurations 
which reflect his self-developmental theory of the 
mother-infant relationship, and which are characteristic 
of narcissistic personalities. 
The first configuration Kohut described is the "mirror 
transference", when the patient derives a sense of 
wellbeing from the empathic mirroring of their grandiose 
self. In the second, the "idealising transference", the 
patient attempts to feel partially merged with the 
therapist as an idealised figure. In this particular 
configuration, it may be the process or technique of 
analysis that is idealised, and this bears some 
similarity to Winnicott's notion of the "environment 
mother", denoting the "mother-as-therapist's" functions 
as distinct from her/his person. In the third, that of 
"twinship", the patient feels they are the same as the 
therapist, and failures in empathy or disruption of 
analysis may cause the patient to regress to cold 
grandiosity, haughty withdrawal or hypochondriacal 
preoccupations with a fragmented self. 
Kohut (1977, p. 3) defines narcissistic personality 
disorders as "(1) defects, acquired in childhood, in the 
psychological structure of the self and (2) secondary 
structure-formations, also built up in early childhood". 
The latter include defensive and compensatory structures 
and Kohut refers to the "vertical split" or "false-self 
organisation" of the personality where repressed and 
unfulfilled needs for affirmation co-exist with displayed 
but denied grandiosity in the split-off part of the 
psyche. In narcissistically disordered individuals, 
ideals are perfectionistic (and often rigid) and they are 
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highly invested as goals towards which to strive. As 
such, they are shame-generative when the individual 
cannot achieve them. In other words, for those 
individuals who are hugely invested in idealised images 
of the self, evidence that the person cannot become their 
imagined self will bring shame, unless the evidence is 
denied. Such individuals are generally classified among 
the narcissistic personality disorders. 
Shame and the "Nuclear Self" 
Kohut (1985) also refers to the concept of a "nuclear 
self" 
-a deep and central structure established early 
in childhood, which struggles throughout life to realise 
its true goals. He remarks that Self-Psychology discovers 
"the depression of the adult in the depth of the child" 
(p. 215), by which he means that the depression of the 
lonely child is based in the dim realisation that the 
future will not be fulfilled. Such an idea could 
similarly apply to shame affect. This experience is 
poignantly described in Janet Frame's (1984) 
autobiography, An Angel at My Table: "I would feel like 
a child excluded from her mother's attention... struggling 
constantly to move through a wilderness of deprivation, 
slowly planting tiny cherished blossoms in the waste" (p. 
104). 
Kohut's "nuclear self" is very close to Winnicott's 
notion of the "true self" outlined above, and Kohut notes 
that the aspirations of the "nuclear self" may be in 
conflict with the more "peripheral selves" who seek "easy 
adaptation and comfortable consistency": in fact, this 
was Frame's primary survival strategy in her precarious 
attempts at self-preservation, because of which she came 
to see herself as characterised by others' definitions of 
her, namely, "always eager to please and good with 
guests" (Frame, 1984). One implication of this for 
narcissistic personalities is that their grandiosity 
- 
which defends against painful feelings of shameful 
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inadequacy 
- 
attempts to maintain an illusion of 
independence: they are both afraid of dependence and of 
surrender to their deeper "nuclear self". This often 
leads to an air of superficiality and lack of depth, 
especially in the therapeutic encounter. Kohut argues 
that his approach to the treatment of narcissistic 
personality disorders is more consistently psychoanalytic 
and neutral than other approaches, which he sees as 
taking a moralistic and more challenging stance (cf. 
Kernberg). For Kohut, narcissism is to be understood and 
transformed into higher forms 
- 
mature ambitions, values 
and ideals 
- 
and not be regarded as a "bad" part of the 
self that needs eradicating. 
Psychotherapeutic Implications (Kohut) 
Kohut's (1977) view of the therapeutic process is that 
change takes place not through interpretation but through 
experience or "micro-internal izations" of the analyst's 
functions as self-object. He argues that much of the 
therapeutic effect produced by classical psychoanalysis 
stems from the empathic response to the patient, although 
this is not regarded as a salient factor in itself. His 
theory of compensatory structure suggests that early 
developmental failures which are not rectified via 
therapeutic reconstruction may be adequately ameliorated 
by satisfactory experiences with the transferential self- 
object, in the person of the therapist. Thus, it may be 
too threatening for a patient to acknowledge the depth of 
their mother's psychopathology, and subsequent inability 
to provide adequate mirroring, but a satisfactory 
experience with the "idealized" analyst can lead to a 
self that is strong enough to make a full interpretation 
of the earliest experience unnecessary. 
Therefore, Kohut's depiction of the therapeutic process 
is consistent with the premises underlying his 
theoretical position. The analytic situation is defined 
in terms of an interpersonal field in which the 
participation of the analyst is essential. He states 
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(1977) that a "fundamental claim of the psychology of the 
self [is] that the presence of an empathic [... ] observer 
defines [... ] the psychological field" (p. 32). Similar to 
Winnicott, disorders of the self, particularly the 
narcissistic disorders where shame is highly defended 
against, are understood as environmental deficiency 
disorders. The child has not been allowed, through the 
process of "transmuting internalizations", to generate 
healthy structures within the self, and so further 
psychic growth is constrained and a vulnerability to 
shame develops. In Kohut's view, in therapy the patient 
establishes a self-object transference in either a 
mirroring, idealising or twinship mode, which provides a 
kind of developmental second chance. The internalisation 
of the transferential relationship can then become the 
core of a compensatory self structure and the true 
"shame" self can be elicited, or uncovered, by the 
therapist, explored and modified. 
Conclusion 
In summary, although Kohut and Winnicott both focus on 
the importance of the early maternal environment and its 
implications, where it was O' deficient, for the 
therapeutic encounter, Kohut has formalised these ideas 
into a broader metapsychological framework, paying 
particular attention to the defensive role of 
grandiosity, and its converse shame, in personality 
organisation. It is interesting that both theorists see 
the curative factor in analytic psychotherapy not in its 
interpretive function, but in the manner in which the 
analytic setting provides missing parental provisions and. 
fills early developmental needs. 
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Chapter 6. Case-Study: Childhood Maternal Indifference 
and Narcissism as a Defence against Shame 
"It's quantity that counts, not quality" (quote from session 5) 
Another methodology to study shame and its association 
with childhood maternal indifference is that of the 
single case-study. 
Morrison (1989) argues that shame is the central affect 
of narcissism and M. Lewis (1992) appears to hold a 
similar view. He states: 
"The extreme pathology of prolonged shame produces 
narcissistic disorders and the disintegration of the 
self system 
... 
Narcissistic disorders generate a 
wide range of symptoms including grandiosity, rage, 
inferiority, overidealisation, feelings of 
entitlement, and a lack of empathy. For me, the 
inability to cope with shame and humiliation 
underlies these pathological disturbances. 
Narcissists seek to avoid shame, and, when avoidance 
fails, engage in emotional behaviour that masks 
their underlying feeling" (p. 11). 
The quantitative and content analysis findings of the 
current study, with the latter being grounded in a 
subsample of high-shame/high indifference participants' 
verbatim interview comments, strongly suggest that it is 
maternal indifference, characterised by emotional 
unavailability and perceived disinterest in the child, 
which significantly contributes to shame-proneness in 
the adult. It is argued that these findings give strong 
empirical support to ideas drawn from the analytic and 
self-psychological literature, where shame is 
conceptualised as a highly important affect within 
narcissistic contexts (although Miller (1996) argues it 
is not necessarily always central). Accordingly, its 
development is seen to be largely due to the original 
personality-forming stresses on the child. 
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Background 
I present here a case-study of such a narcissistic 
personality organisation in a patient I had referred to 
me as suitable for long-term psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, presenting with depression (her major 
symptom) and anxiety, underscored by a general 
unhappiness and sense of pervasive emptiness and failure 
in her life, particularly in her marriage. She was also 
experiencing problems with anger, strong control needs, 
feelings of deprivation, excessive rumination and a 
tendency to "black-and-white" (dichotomous or rigid) 
thinking which often resulted in interpersonal 
difficulties with the world in general, and her husband 
in particular. In the past she had suffered with 
intermittent panic attacks and these had recently 
recurred, although in a milder form. 
The case material demonstrates those "shame" components 
associated with childhood maternal indifference (reported 
in Chapter 4) of internalised anger, a stable 
attributional style for negative outcomes, general 
negative automatic thoughts and beliefs, and general 
negative self-evaluation: the latter being 
narcissistically defended against in an attempt to 
deflect painful feelings of shameful inferiority and 
unworthiness. 
Referral was originally made by her GP to the local NHS 
Psychotherapy Department for assessment, where she 
presented with symptoms of depression and anxiety, and 
self-report questionnaires showed narcissistic features 
of grandiosity, lack of empathy, feelings of entitlement, 
rage, cognitive rigidity, excessive rumination and a 
tendency to dichotomous thinking or "splitting" 
(including overidealisation and denigration). The 
assessor's view, a consultant psychotherapist, was that 
her depression was the result of unresolved Oedipal 
jealousy for her father, compounded by rivalry with her 
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mother, whom she perceived as emotionally detached and 
indifferent. It was concluded that she was suitable for 
long-term once-weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy with 
a female therapist. Names have been changed to preserve 
confidentiality. 
Introduction to the Patient: Early Roots of Shame 
The patient, whom I saw for two years once weekly, I 
shall call Kate. She was a 46-year old married woman, 
with a daughter aged 25, and two teenage stepchildren 
aged 14 and 16 who were living with her present husband's 
ex-wife. From a working-class background, and married for 
ten years, she had in the past taken occasional part-time 
work of a clerical nature, while her husband ran his own 
small electrical business. Towards the end of therapy, 
Kate had started work as a "Victim Support Scheme" 
counsellor and had decided that she would like to train 
professionally in the counselling field. She was a bright 
and articulate person, having passed her 11+ examination 
to grammar school, but never having followed a specific 
career, due to the constraints of becoming a single 
parent at the age of 21. 
Her present husband and herself were homeowners and their 
house had been on the market for several years; its 
failure to sell, and difficulties with her husband's 
business, she attributed less to the impact of the 
recession than to his general lack of assertiveness and 
inability to make decisions. This general attributional 
style of "blaming others" was to recur throughout the 
sessions. 
Kate's first significant relationship was at the age of 
18, with a Catholic French Algerian called Claude, whom 
she met when he was working as a waiter in London. She 
reported that she was attracted to him by his being 
"different", that is, foreign and "exciting". She soon 
became pregnant and there was family pressure on her to 
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marry, which she did before the birth, and they went to 
live in Algeria. Although she loved the lifestyle, she 
left her husband when aged 21, and took their daughter, 
aged three, back to England, attributing problems in 
their marriage to "communication difficulties", his 
infidelity and their sexual incompatibility (she never 
achieved orgasm for the duration of their marriage). 
During this period she suffered an ectopic pregnancy 
which profoundly disturbed her, as she had not been 
prepared for the operation (induced miscarriage) which 
followed. For the next five years, she and her daughter 
lived with her parents followed by a ten-year period of 
independence, punctuated by two medium-term 
relationships, until she married her present husband at 
the age of 36. 
Kate's family history was that a younger sister by two 
years, Barbara, had died of meningitis at the age of 7, 
when Kate was 9 years old. The death was "hushed up" by 
her mother and Kate remembers her mother saying, upon 
enquiries from neighbours, that she had "lost Barbara": 
no explanation was ever given. She later told me, in 
therapy, that she had been "terrified" her mother would 
"lose" her too. It came as a shock to Kate when, over a 
year later, she discovered her sister was dead. Kate 
also had another sister, then aged 2, and a baby brother 
born the following year. 
She had two significant memories relating to Barbara, 
namely, seeing her in some kind of "transparent bubble" 
and was reminded of this when she later visited Madame 
Tussaud's and saw the waxen figure of Sleeping Beauty 
lying in a glass coffin 
- 
apparently dead but her heart 
still beating. The other was an image of her father 
crying at Barbara's graveside, when she was about 11, 
which particularly disturbed her, as she'd never seen him 
cry before and felt angry with him for being "weak". 
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It was significant that Kate had become confused in the 
past (and still was) over the dates and their ages at the 
time of Barbara's death. She had said at assessment that 
she was 9 and Barbara was 7, but in a later session said 
that was wrong and she had been 7 and Barbara must have 
been 5. That changed again when she realised her mistake, 
but she reported that, in her mind, she had often thought 
that she was 7 at the time of Barbara's death, because 
she had suffered "an amnesia" for the following two 
years. She'd said "Somehow I'd always stuck at 711 
(Session 3), "There's a gap there" (session 11) and "It's 
always been jumbled up in my mind" (session 14). So, in 
other words, she had psychologically placed herself at 
her sister's age of death. Apparently, her mother would 
dress the two girls alike, to the extent that people 
often mistook them for twins, although they were about 18 
months apart in age. During the course of therapy it was 
established that the first account was correct. 
From a classical Freudian perspective, a family death at 
the time of such intense, complex and emotional 
developments and one which is, moreover, a "family 
secret", would no doubt engender strong repressive forces 
in the child's psyche to defend against the pain of loss, 
survivor guilt and shame at her triumph. Moreover, 
Kohut's self-psychological concept of a "self-object 
merger" (1977) is useful here as a way of making sense of 
the amnesia that Kate developed, because Barbara's death 
reflected her "death" too, psychologically speaking, at 
the same age. This chain of events resulted in the 
development of a "grandiose self", characterised by a 
strong self-reliance, rigid ideas about what was right 
and wrong, feelings of entitlement, rage if her view of 
the world was challenged and a tendency to "black-and- 
white", dichotomised thinking. One consequence of this 
was that Kate often had difficulty in "de-centring" and 
being able to view things from another's perspective. 
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This illustrates how defensive narcissistic needs can 
result in a failure of empathy, which is generally 
associated with shame-proneness (Tangney et al., 1994). 
In Kate, strong perfectionistic needs and ideals meant 
that anything short of perfection was valueless and hence 
shame-generating, and this theme became repeated in the 
transference. 
After Barbara's death, as eldest child with a younger 
sister, then aged 2, and a brother born the following 
year, Kate had to take on premature responsibility for 
her siblings, as her mother was too depressed (and 
therefore emotionally unavailable) to resume this role. 
If Kate asked her mother why she was crying she was told 
"not to ask questions" and therefore eventually stopped 
asking. In this way, she was forced to take on an early 
adult role as caretaker which left her feeling resentful 
and controlled, unable to join her friends in ordinary 
childhood games owing to the extra burden of family 
responsibility. From this experience there developed a 
pervasive sense of feeling unprotected, unloved, 
invalidated, angry and let down, and an unwanted and 
precocious self-reliance emerged, while her true self 
and needs for unconditional love remained hidden. In 
adulthood, such needs were experienced as shame- 
generating and were therefore strongly defended against. 
A further significant memory of later years was of being 
bullied as a young teenager at school when she attempted 
to go to the rescue of a younger classmate. It seemed 
particularly unfair to Kate that, in so doing, she had 
made herself vulnerable and her vulnerability had been 
abused. This was undoubtedly a "matching (shaming) event" 
which resonated with her needs for protection from 
caregivers and those in authority, and her expectation of 
being let down and abandoned. 
Her understandable anxiety about secrecy had been 
triggered in her relationship with her present husband 
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whom she felt had a "secretive side" and was not always 
as open with her as she would have liked, particularly 
about how he spent his time during the day when he was 
away from her. This made her chronically angry, which 
became internalised as depression - her presenting 
symptom. 
She also spoke of two significant recurring dreams, the 
first of which she would have as a child, especially when 
unhappy, and this was of being in an exotic and warm 
foreign land, where she felt free and unrestrained. It is 
revealing that her earliest memory was of the feeling of 
triumph she experienced after escaping from her baby 
harness while in the garden. The second recurring dream 
was of being chased by wild animals, usually dogs, in an 
open space where there was no chance of escape, upon 
which she would wake up sweating and terrified. The last 
time she recounted this dream she had managed to escape 
by knocking at the door of a cottage where a "kindly old 
lady" took her in. 
It is interesting that on her honeymoon her present 
husband was attacked by dogs and she went to his rescue, 
resulting in one of the dogs biting her arm. She felt 
angry and shamed by him because he publicly told her off 
for "rescuing" him and this event ruined their honeymoon, 
setting the scene for her later concerns with feeling 
unprotected and let down. Indeed, in an earlier session 
she had told me that she'd always wanted an older brother 
to protect her and then, when she was old enough to 
understand this would never happen, asked her mother, 
"Why did you have me first? ", thus generating a script 
of feeling let down and alone. 
Seven years prior to the start of therapy, she had been 
hospitalised for a drugs overdose and subsequently 
prescribed anti-depressants for several months, which 
she felt had been of no real benefit. In an early 
session, she described her initial feelings of relief at 
129 
being taken into hospital and of being able to "hand over 
control" to staff in the short term, but this was quickly 
followed by feelings of panic at her perceived loss of 
control and the wish to escape. 
Kate was in therapy with me for two years and, although 
understanding the implications of her childhood for her 
current relationship problems and inner conflicts, still 
very much saw her husband as "the problem". In addition 
to experiencing him as "secretive" and "sly", she often 
felt let down and shamed by him, and this became the 
source of much of her depression and anxiety. Her strong 
needs for security, reassurance, mirroring and 
unconditional love, were experienced as shame-generating 
as they conflicted with her need to be in control in 
order to feel safe. This dilemma repeatedly emerged in 
the therapy, and in the transference, and was difficult 
for her to reconcile. Her acceptance of the underlying 
fragility of her sense of self alternated with her 
withdrawal into haughty grandiosity, angry defensiveness 
or cold detachment, all of which served to defend against 
the underlying shame of her own neediness. 
Formulation and Treatment Considerations 
Formulations in therapy were expressed primarily in terms 
of Luborsky's (1984,1990) Self-Psychology concepts of 
"core-conflicts" and "core-conflictual relationship 
themes" (CCRTs), the primary one being Kate's wish for 
ideal and unconditional (maternal) love and 
understanding, which was experienced as shame-generating. 
This was often expressed as the need for others to 
provide external structure for her, in order to make her 
feel safe. 
Indeed, Kate's presenting symptoms of depression and 
anxiety, and emergent fears of her uncontrollable and 
destructive anger, could be understood in terms of this 
initial formulation. A subsidiary CCRT of wanting 
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something from someone (W=Wish), expecting it to be 
withheld (RO=Response from Other), and resulting in angry 
self-righteousness or haughty grandiosity (RS=Response 
from Self) 
, 
was useful as a way of understanding those 
narcissistic personality features of grandiosity, 
perfectionism, self-preoccupation, rigid thinking and 
overwhelming rage. 
In cognitive therapy terms, this sequence could be 
reformulated as comprising negative automatic thoughts 
or core beliefs such as "You can't trust anyone" and "I 
have to look after myself" 
. 
Shame was experienced when 
others highlighted her unrealistic and perfectionistic 
ideals, when the rigid nature of her thinking was 
challenged, or when she stepped outside of her grandiose 
fantasies and viewed them more realistically (cf. 
Kohut's, 1971, definition of shame as the "revelation of 
exhibitionistic libido"). In the sessions, if Kate's view 
of the world was questioned or challenged, this resulted 
in angry attempts to stave off strongly-defended feelings 
of shame and vulnerability. 
Theme 1: Shame and the Wish for Unconditional 
Love/Expectation of Indifference 
One primary theme with Kate was her underlying wish for 
unconditional love or mirroring, often taking the form of 
wanting total compliance with her wishes, however 
unreasonable. Her expected response from others was that 
of indifference or rejection, which she then responded to 
with narcissistic rage, often displaced onto others or 
internalised as depression. With reference to her past, 
this configuration was explicable in terms of her deep 
wish for love and affirmation from her mother at a time 
when her mother was emotionally unavailable to her, owing 
to her preoccupation with her daughter, Barbara's, 
illness and death. Therefore, Kate came to expect 
indifference and emotional neglect from a mother who was 
not able to satisfy her needs for love and containment at 
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that time. Kate's response was to feel angry and deprived 
and to withdraw into a haughty and grandiose self- 
reliance, or prickly detachment, as a way of staving off 
shame-generating neediness and fears of emotional 
dependence. 
Theme 2: Shame and the Wish for Protection/Expectation of 
Disappointment 
Another pervasive theme, or dilemma, 
. 
was when Kate felt 
deprived or vulnerable and wanted protection or guidance, 
became attached to someone and expected to be 
disappointed or let down. She then responded by feeling 
angry, shamed or persecuted by the person concerned, who 
in turn became her attacker and was seen as hostile. Her 
past experiences with her mother around the time of 
Barbara's death explained the development of this 
particular configuration. One example of this was during 
one session when she accused me of deliberately 
"confusing" her by not answering her questions: 
"... it's other people who have confused me and 
you're doing it now. Yes I am let down 
... 
a lot of 
people think they're protecting me by not telling me 
what I want to know. [Angrily] 
... 
I only respect 
people if they answer my questions". 
It is of note that her mother's dictum when Barbara died 
was "not to ask questions". 
In addition to these recurring themes were central "core 
conflicts" (Luborsky 1984,1990) which often produced a 
form of "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957) as they 
appeared to be mutually exclusive, and therefore 
unresolvable. In fact, one of Kate's oft-cited criticisms 
of her husband was that things with him were "never 
resolved", illustrating her characteristic tendency to a 
stable attributional style for negative outcomes. 
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Core Conflict 1: Wish for Protection vs. Need for 
Control/Grandiosity as a Shame Solution 
One of Kate's principal dilemmas was that in order to 
feel safe she needed to be in control, but this 
conflicted with her wish for total protection, which 
involved giving up some measure of her control. In other 
words, she wanted to feel contained without feeling 
controlled (reflecting Winnicott's reference to "intimacy 
vs. solitude" needs in Chapter 5). However, if she risked 
this, she felt vulnerable, ashamed and angry which in 
turn increased her need for control: thus was born a 
"shame-rage" spiral which became self-perpetuating and 
led to grandiosity as a defence against the rage and 
(shame-generating) feelings of vulnerability. 
Kate's "grandiose self" functioned as a set of 
convictions regarding entitlement and self-righteousness 
and embodied an unshakeable belief that she was always 
right 
- 
an example of her narcissism as a defence against 
her underlying, general negative self-esteem. Other 
people tended to be regarded as extensions of her own 
mind or body, as if they were a mirror in which she could 
always be seen and admired. " An outside object was 
experienced as part of the "grandiose self" and its 
absence or perceived deficiencies could not be 
acknowledged or tolerated. 
Acknowledgement of people outside her own mental sphere 
existed, but often possessed an existence in the 
abstract, ie. were experienced as unreal or idealised 
"imagoes". The image of her father crying at Barbara's 
graveside profoundly affected Kate because she saw him 
for the first time as less-than-perfect, so he could not 
stay as the idealised parent imago in her mind. Hedges 
(1983) writes: "Although these imagoes rely on stimulii 
from outside, they are organised according to an 
internal, narcissistic investment, placing oneself at the 
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centre of the universe and those idealised imagoes at 
one's beck and call" (p. 62). 
Thus, the idealising and mirroring needs of the self, 
conceptualised by Kohut (1977) as two poles of the 
"bipolar self 11, give the individual two chances of 
developing a cohesive and shame-free self. In therapy, 
Kate's move towards reconciling opposites and tolerating 
shame-generating needs, particularly of feared 
dependency with regard to her mother/therapist, provided 
her with a "developmental second chance" on the way to 
the formation of a more integrated and shame-free self. 
Core Conflict 2: Wish for Escape vs. Need for Love/ 
Escape as a Shame Solution 
This "core-conflict" involved two seemingly mutually 
incompatible wishes, which were Kate's longing for 
freedom which conflicted with her wish for protection and 
unconditional love. Her past history explained this 
configuration in terms of her wish to escape from 
premature, adult responsibilities, but activating her 
fear that such escape would deny her the longed-for 
protection and love that, historically, she had craved. 
Her earliest memory, of escape and triumph, and recurrent 
dreams of a foreign land actualised by her first 
marriage, were symbolic of this wish, as was the first 
dream she brought to the session. 
Core Conflict 3: Wish for Love vs. Need for Control/ 
Contempt as a Shame Solution 
A further pattern had developed of a wish for love, 
experienced as shame-generating, her expected response 
from others (of emotional indifference), and her defence 
against that response (anger and contempt). Kate's past 
experience of taking on premature responsibility for her 
younger sister and baby brother fostered a precocious 
self-reliance which was necessary for her psychological 
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survival. Because Kate felt her mother was unable to look 
after her, or respond to her emotional needs, she was 
forced back onto her own resources to look after herself 
whilst still craving the maternal love and mirroring that 
she needed (but resented). This was often exemplified in 
the relationship with her husband when she felt she was 
the one who was protecting him, and then feeling angry 
and contemptuous at this perceived reversal of roles. 
Such contempt was often displayed in the transference 
when the source of her security was threatened. In one 
session when I'd told her about a planned change of day 
for her therapy, Kate dismissed this as being "beyond my 
control", and therefore forgivable, as I was "in 
training". This was an example of her anger at feeling 
controlled, and her attempt to devalue or shame the 
therapist, who could no longer be tolerated. By 
denigration and contempt, Kate could keep herself "good" 
and project the "badness" onto the therapist. 
Dreams and Shame 
Kate's dream was set in Spain and depicted a flamenco 
dancer "performing" to an applauding and enthusiastic 
audience, an appreciative crowd of spectators. Kate 
thought she was there in the dream, both as spectator and 
dancer, but couldn't be sure. She had the dream after a 
disturbing event the day before when she had found her 
husband in his shop, unexpectedly, with "another woman" 
(his accountant), whom she described as sitting on a 
swivel-chair, mini-skirted, and making flamboyant 
gestures with her arms, which she demonstrated to me. 
In classical analytic terms, this dream could be 
understood as the flaunting and discharged energy of a 
repressed and exhibitionistic self, wishing to be both 
seen and admired. In self-psychological terms, Kohut 
defines shame as the response to the flooding of the ego 
with grandiose-exhibitionistic libido (see Chapter 5). In 
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other words, it is born of an awareness of "the self 
flooded with exhibitionistic needs" (Kohut, 1977). 
However, the dream also expresses ambivalence about the 
desirability of being "centre-stage" (Kohut's "grandiose 
self"), because of the dreamer's slipping in and out of 
the spectator/dancer role. It clearly made use of "the 
day residue" of the previous day's events with the "other 
woman", and also connected with Kate's childhood dream 
symbolic of freedom and escape. The dream was also 
transferential in that the therapist was experienced as 
idealised and admired gipsy-dancer 
- 
an unconscious 
representation of myself as object of emulation (and, at 
times, envy). The dream also denoted the wish of the 
voyeuristic self in relation to narcissistic and 
libidinous impulses, displayed here in the form of 
extravagant dancing. 
In Kohut's (1977) self-psychological terms, the dream 
provides an interesting example of a "self-state dream" 
which he defined as "an attempt to deal with the 
psychological danger by covering nameless processes with 
nameable visual imagery" (pp. 108-109). As a "self-state 
dream" it expresses the ambivalence of the 
exhibitionistic self in wanting`to be both admired dancer 
("the grandiose self") and hidden spectator ("the shame- 
prone self"). Kohut (1971) says a person experiences 
shame when "revelation 
... 
is still accompanied by 
crude, unneutralized exhibitionistic libido" (p. 149). As 
such, the dream expresses Kate's self in its struggle to 
maintain an emerging but fragile sense of confidence and 
self-integration in the face of exhibitionistic, and 
hence shame-generating, impulses. 
In transferential terms, the dream represents Kate's use 
of the "idealising" and "twinship" transference modes 
(Kohut, 1971) in the process of the therapeutic 
relationship becoming internalised to form a stronger 
part of her functioning and less shame-full self, and as 
such, represents a "self-object merger" (Kohut, 1977). 
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Therefore, from a Kohutian perspective, the dream leads 
not just to an understanding of Kate's current "state of 
self", but also to an understanding of her current self- 
selfobject transferences with the therapist, and beyond 
these to their origin in her childhood, namely in the 
original dyadic relationship with her mother. Such dream 
material also reflects Winnicott's (1958) ideas on the 
"failing maternal environment" referred to in Chapter 5. 
The Process of Therapy 
Shame and Resistance 
In the sessions, resistances usually appeared in the form 
of silences, confusion, denial, avoidance, 
intellectualisation, rationalisation, trivialisation, 
contradiction and digression, the latter often involving 
an abrupt change in content, or affect, signifying 
shame-generating material. One common pattern was for an 
uncomfortable, or shameladen, topic to be tentatively 
introduced and explored, and then dismissed with the 
comment, "I didn't want to, get into that". This "state 
shift" (Luborsky 1984,1990), sometimes denoted non- 
verbally by a sigh or silence, indicated that Kate no 
longer wished to continue as the topic was affectively 
charged. 
For example, it was important for Kate to have the 
correct "labels" for her emotions in the sense that it 
was less shameful for her to talk about, what was in fact 
her jealousy, if she could redefine it as "anger" 
-a 
more acceptable emotion in her terms. One effect of 
these sudden changes of topic or definition was that she 
was able to subtly project responsibility onto the 
therapist, by implying it was the therapist's fault that 
she had "digressed". 
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Pines (1995) refers to this process as evidence of 
"bypassed shame", that is, the sudden dissociation that 
indicates the patient is threatened by the emergence of 
painful affect. Patients who fall silent, switch topics 
or begin to ruminate excessively on a limited area, 
bypass the threatening affect, which will often be 
returned to despite their resistance to it. Strupp and 
Binder (1984) write that: 
"Other forms of subtle 
resistance may be digressions 
to issues outside of therapy or 
preoccupation with childhood 
history 
- 
all in order to 
escape from what patients may 
experience as potentially 
dangerous antagonism between 
them and the therapist" (p. 181). 
This often occurred with Kate when shame-generating 
feelings were being discussed, and she would suddenly 
shift the focus onto her husband's "problems", often 
seeking me as an ally to validate her views. 
It is generally agreed that resistances take many forms 
and all serve to protect the patient from experiencing 
painful affects which are related to conflict and are 
interwoven with transferential and countertransferential 
processes. Strupp and Binder (1984) continue: 
"It can be seen that a therapist will be most likely to 
identify resistance if he or she attends to immediately 
observable behaviour" and this was illustrated early in 
the therapy. Kate chose to move from her usual chair to 
a sofa at the far end of the room. By thus placing a 
literal distance between us she could protect herself 
from her need for intimacy, which she saw as shaming (cf. 
Gilbert's (1997c) idea of shame as a "distance- 
regulator"). This occurred because, in the previous 
session, she had been particularly self-revealing and had 
become very tearful. 
Such resistance could usefully be formulated in terms of 
Ezriel's concept (1950,1952) of an avoided relationship, 
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a calamitous relationship and a required relationship, 
where for Kate, the wished-for but avoided relationship 
was one of intimacy; the calamitous relationship, 
arousing fear of the consequences, was one of 
indifference; the required relationship was the adoption 
of a compromise. In her case, the required relationship 
was one where she could feel in control in order to feel 
safe, and so conceal her wish for intimacy under a veneer 
of self-sufficiency, and indeed, this was the 
relationship she had with her husband. A number of 
researchers have suggested that patient challenges to the 
alliance reflect aspects of their underlying pathology, 
and that these junctures represent an opportunity for 
therapeutic change; however, if not handled sensitively, 
they may also bring about the temporary or permanent loss 
of the patient to therapy (see Safran & Muran, 1996). 
Shame and the Transference 
In the transference, Kate wanted me to provide a "good 
mothering" experience for her ie. to be infinitely 
available emotionally and possessing unlimited knowledge. 
In self-psychological terms, Kate's "idealising 
transference" was manifested in her dreams as the 
idealised (and envied) gipsy-dancer and the "kindly old 
lady" who protected her from the wild animals. This had 
important implications for Kate's "working through" of 
the negative transference. When her narcissistic rage 
with me did emerge, she quickly felt the need to make 
things all right again and to mitigate against the 
anticipated loss. 
Indeed, one of Kate's many criticisms of her husband was 
that he "couldn't stand up" to her anger, and during the 
therapy she had similar fears that I, too, would not be 
able to contain, or stand up to, her anger if it was 
expressed, as she experienced it as overwhelmingly 
destructive. 
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In an early session Kate had asked me to "challenge" her 
more and stop her when she "talked too much" -a clear 
wish, expressed in the transference, for the longed-for 
maternal guidance, affirmation and structure that she 
felt she never had as a child. She had complained of 
feeling "stuck" in the therapy because I was not 
"providing the feedback" she expected, and was not giving 
her my personal views and opinions. 
It could also be argued that Kate's deep need for 
structure was pre-Oedipal in the sense that it reflected 
the failure of the "environment mother" (Winnicott, 1958) 
to adequately mirror and contain her, and as such was 
essentially concerned with this early dyadic 
relationship. 
Gradually, in the therapy, Kate came to recognise that I 
could not be the "all-perfect mother" and "provider of 
all the answers", although this realisation fluctuated at 
times with her anger relating to this perceived 
deficiency in her therapist. In one session there was an 
angry demand for me to provide her with "answers" 
- 
the 
repetition of the original pathogenic situation with her 
mother. Kate needed the recognition that this failure was 
not because of a bad therapist 
- 
but that this is "life". 
It is the belief that the therapist should/must be all- 
giving and all-knowing that maintained the difficulty. In 
this session, Kate is helped to move towards acceptance 
of a "good enough" therapist. 
After a date for termination of therapy had been set, a 
vigorous re-establishment of Kate's defences emerged to 
mitigate against the anticipated loss, involving shaming 
and denigration of the therapist. In this session, Kate 
reported she had been ready to finish anyway, but would 
continue to the arranged date. In the event, her anger 
and devaluation of the therapist were worked through in 
the remaining sessions, and she approached the final 
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session with gratitude and sadness -a bouquet of 
flowers and tears. 
Miller (1996) states that the therapist's capacity to 
receive gifts from her patient and to acknowledge such 
receipt is as important as the ability to give. She 
states: 
"The therapist who cannot allow herself to receive 
from a patient will threaten the patient's self- 
regard within the relationship and beyond it, 
especially if the patient is someone whose early 
caregivers could not find pleasure in the patient's 
gifts of love and trust" (p. 219). 
The transference tended to fluctuate from Kate 
experiencing me as an idealised, infinitely emotionally 
available, mother to a bad and withholding one, and this 
was clearly evidenced in her angry demand for "answers" 
to her questions. With a termination date arranged, Kate 
experienced a dilemma about needing to remain in control 
(ie. to leave me before I left her) conflicting with a 
wish to express gratitude for the emotional 
understanding, support and insight, she felt I had given 
her. 
Another example of the transferential relationship with 
the therapist/mother was Kate's wish for others to 
intuit her needs and to understand them without being 
told what they were. It was a symbolic, regressive wish 
for a form of "magical communication" whereby she 
imagined she could gain immediate and total understanding 
and gratification of her needs without having to express 
them in any way. This originated from her childhood wish 
for absolute love from an "idealised mother" who would be 
perfectly attuned to her, and understand her needs, 
without verbalisation. This was the antithesis of the 
"real mother" to whom Kate had to keep talking in an 
effort to communicate and make her needs known, to the 
extent that her mother would tell her off for "always 
asking questions". An idealised and magical wished-for 
relationship with mother was the unconscious and primary 
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wish, where communication and understanding could take 
place without the need for words. An example of this in 
therapy occurred when Kate remarked, "I think you ought 
to know how to deal with somebody who feels in this 
state" without having communicated to me what she was 
feeling. 
Throughout therapy Kate had often sought out my views in 
order to validate and shore up her precarious sense of 
self, and it was at such times that I became internalised 
as a "good mother" (in self-psychological terms, a good 
self-object experience) whilst simultaneously containing 
her disowned and unwanted (or projected) parts ie. the 
wild persecutory animals of her dreams. This had been 
illustrated in the sessions, where Kate experienced me 
as the one wanting control. In an earlier session she had 
remarked: "Control is a difficult question. Control can 
be easily shattered... the unpredictable can quickly 
happen and... the bottom falls out of my world. It's very 
fragile". 
Critical Events in Therapy 
Shame as Distance Regulator 
r 
Kate's changing from a chair to a sofa further away in 
the room was a critical incident in the therapy: 
justifying it to herself as her "feeling more relaxed" to 
sit like that, but symbolic of her underlying dilemma 
(ie. intimacy vs. control needs). My interpretation that 
it was a wish to place our relationship on a more equal, 
and hence more relaxed, footing was vigorously denied. 
This episode illustrated Kate's wish to feel equal with 
me, which could be understood historically in terms of 
her feeling superior to, yet controlled by, those around 
her: a feeling she had of her parents (particularly her 
mother) when she passed her 11+ examination and realised 
her own intellectual superiority. The resentment Kate 
felt at being placed, in her mind, in an "unequal 
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relationship" with me was also reflected in her current 
marriage, where she felt superior to, yet controlled by, 
her husband. 
Developmental Contributions to Shame 
Another significant event occurred when Kate told me for 
the first time of her ectopic pregnancy and the 
subsequent induced miscarriage, which was experienced as 
shaming, and how devastating the loss of a child could 
be. It was the first time, Kate said, she had ever 
allowed herself to really experience the grief of what a 
child's death means to a mother. Tearfully, she heard 
herself say, "It's a terrible thing to lose a child" and 
at this point could identify with her own mother's loss 
and grief at the time of Barbara's death. For the first 
time Kate understood that her mother's "not answering her 
questions" was not deliberate indifference or 
withholding, as she had always thought, but the 
manifestation of her mother's deep despair and inability 
to cope with a young child's demands at such a time. 
This was, in a sense, a "matching event" for Kate, 
resonating not only with the loss of her own childhood 
playmate (her sister, Barbara)'but also the "lost child" 
part of herself that had to take on family 
responsibilities too soon. 
Shame and Triumph 
A further critical event in therapy was the very tearful 
session when Kate told me how she'd got confused over her 
age at the time of Barbara's death. She spoke of having 
an "amnesia" for two years and having been unable to 
remember anything until she was aged 9 or 10. In this 
session we explored how she had psychologically fixated 
herself at her sister's age of death, and how she had 
identified with her to the extent that she felt she was 
still living on inside her. Interestingly, her mother had 
always dressed the two girls alike. The "Sleeping Beauty" 
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memory was explored, and why this image had disturbed her 
so much, of the dead-but-still-living child-woman, 
encased in a glass coffin. She broke down and sobbed that 
she couldn't still be crying for her. I interpreted 
that maybe she was crying for the "lost child" part of 
herself too, that part that had been forced into taking 
on early adult responsibilities, and the anger and 
resentment this had engendered. From this, we were able 
to tentatively explore the shameful feelings of triumph 
and survivor guilt that Barbara's death had triggered 
(Barbara's death left Kate with a room of her own) and 
how her pervasive sense of "feeling blamed" may have had 
its origin in this. During this session, Kate rummaged 
in her handbag and produced a mirror and proceeded, 
between sobs, to adjust her eye make-up: this was an 
interesting example of literal "self-mirroring" in an 
effort to make herself feel better when faced with shame- 
generating, painful affect, and confirmed her negative 
core-belief, "I have to look after myself". 
Narcissistic Rage and Shame Dynamics 
Towards the end of therapy I had to cancel a session at 
very short notice due to a family bereavement (my mother 
died). Kate "forgot" to come to the next session: no 
message was left and no explanation or apology given 
- 
just that she "forgot". This was the only time this 
happened during the therapy and in the following session 
we explored why it felt important for her to "repay" me 
in this way for (in her eyes) "abandoning" her at such 
short notice. This session was filled with Kate's shame. 
Shame and Loss of Attachment 
A final significant event was around the ending of 
therapy and Kate's announcement that she had been "going 
to stop anyway". She asked if I would be seeing private 
patients, and when I explored why she had asked me this 
at this point in time, she dismissed it as curiosity on 
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her part. This again exemplified Kate's dilemma of 
needing to feel in control, conflicting with her (shame- 
generating) need for love, empathy, understanding and 
support, which had been symbolically provided by the 
regularity of the therapy. Acknowledgement of this would 
have involved Kate giving up some measure of control, 
and risking exposure of her vulnerability and fears of 
dependency. 
Summary 
This case-study illustrates the contribution of childhood 
maternal indifference, or lack of mirroring, in the 
generation of a shame-prone self, and its pathological 
manifestation in adulthood as a narcissistically- 
organised personality which served to defend against the 
shame. It also illustrates the role of the transference 
in bringing about personality change and growth, rather 
than mere symptom relief, in the therapeutic encounter. 
., ý 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions: the Clinical Relevance of Shame 
and Implications for Therapeutic Practice 
"Human kind cannot bear very much reality" (T. S. Eliot, Murder in the 
Cathedral) 
Shame can be an emotion rooted in powerful feelings of 
vulnerability to rejection that seeks to avoid, or deny, 
reality by the construction of a "false self". It has 
important implications for the ability to develop, and 
use, the therapeutic relationship as the self-revelation 
required of a patient in psychotherapy can be 
intrinsically shame-provoking. 
Overall, the current study marks an important step in 
uncovering the mechanisms whereby shame contributes to 
psychological disorder and distress. The findings suggest 
an increasingly interpersonal understanding of 
psychological difficulties and the role of shame within 
them: particularly the process whereby a "shame-prone 
self" may be generated in childhood. The results from 
the current study suggest that it is other people being 
unable to respond to, recognise or validate the 
individual 
- 
rather than responding negatively 
- 
which 
may be particularly pathogenic. 
In this sample, guilt rather than shame is linked to 
level of depression as measured by the BDI. This could be 
accounted for by the concept of "pathological" or 
"shame-fused guilt" (Harder, 1995; Tangney, Burggraf & 
Wagner, 1995) which is reported in much of the clinical 
literature. This is, typically, a "neurotic" or 
exaggerated guilt that is fused with shame (see Angyal, 
1965; May & Yallom, 1984; Menninger, 1938) and is most 
likely to be linked with depressive symptomatology. It is 
true that two items in the BDI reflect this kind of 
"pathological guilt" rather than shame per se (eg. 
feeling excessively guilty or deserving of punishment). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, another explanation may be 
146 
that the measure used in this study (Gilbert et al's 
(1989) Shame & Guilt Scale) has a much smaller variance 
(5-25) than the BDI (0-63). This lack of correlation with 
the BDI means there is a ceiling effect with this scale, 
and this is confirmed by a visual inspection of the data. 
Also, the sample used in the current study is a moderate- 
to-severe depressed group, unlike other studies which 
have used non-clinical or mildly depressed, samples. This 
suggests that shame may have a more complex role in the 
aetiology of depression: it may be linked to mild 
depressive reactions, or even to vulnerability to 
depression, but not influence severity once a person has 
become clinically depressed. The empirical findings of 
the current study suggest guilt may play a more 
significant role in moderate-to-severe depressive 
symptomatology. And finally, the issue of guilt (or 
hurting others) may be particularly salient for this 
particular group, comprising couples where one partner 
was clinically depressed, and issues of hurting others or 
being a burden in the relationship are likely to be 
activated. 
Unlike other studies (Gilbert et al, 1996; Gilbert & 
Gerlsma, in press; Richter et""al, 1994), the current 
study shows no association of shame with parental 
antipathy but it does have a positive association with 
maternal indifference as predicted, and this remained 
robust when level of depression and guilt were controlled 
(Chapter 4). This finding gives support to the 
psychoanalytic literature on the importance of 
"mirroring" in the early development of a well- 
functioning and shame-free self (Jacoby, 1994; Kohut, 
1971,1977; Winnicott, 1967). 
When parental indifference and antipathy are rated 
separately, as in the current study, it appears to be 
indifference, as characterised by lack of emotional 
availability or response towards the child, which is the 
most pathogenic. No other childhood adversity factor 
147 
reached significance. Indeed, it is likely this is the 
first study to differentiate between indifference and 
antipathy in this way. It is argued that there may be a 
different threshold for mothers and fathers since the 
latter usually have less responsibility for the early 
emotional needs of their children, and this would explain 
the non-significant finding for shame and paternal 
indifference. The current study suggests it is the 
absence of an "affirming object", more than the presence 
of a dis-affirming one, which may impede the child's 
emotional development and lead to crises of identity and 
subsequent shame pathology. This is not to underestimate 
the role which parental hostility and criticism play in 
contributing to problems of adult self-esteem, as the 
case-study in Section C attests, and as shown in other 
studies (Gilbert et al, 1996; Gilbert & Gerlsma, in 
press; Richter et al, 1994). But it is the lack of any 
kind of response to the child that, on the current 
findings, appears to be the most pathogenic. In the words 
of Broucek (1991), shame follows as a response to "having 
one's status as a subject ignored, disregarded, denied or 
negated" (p. 8). The current study may also be the first 
to distinguish indifference from antipathy in this way. 
It is likely that shame plays a significant role in 
shame-prone psychotherapy patients' sense of emotional 
isolation, separateness or unreachability (cf. the 
"self-ostracism" of Lewis, 1971). This has important 
implications for psychotherapeutic practice requiring 
therapist skills in identifying and working with shame; 
it draws attention to the provision and quality of the 
therapeutic alliance. As Tangney (1996) remarks, "Any 
clinician knows, it is much easier to change a bad 
behaviour than to change a bad, defective self ° (p. 
750). 
As such, shame's focus on identity-relevant concerns in 
the eyes of the other underscores those non-specific 
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therapist factors of "accurate empathy", "non-possessive 
warmth" and "genuineness" (Rogers, 1957) which are now 
increasingly found to be the keystones of positive 
outcome in psychotherapy research, regardless of 
therapeutic orientation (see Clarkson, 1997; Roth & 
Fonagy, 1996, for recent meta-reviews of psychotherapy 
outcome research). 
The empirical findings in the current study show that 
shame (but not guilt) has a first-order association with 
a stable attributional style for negative outcomes, 
general negative self-evaluation, internalised anger 
and childhood maternal indifference. These 
characteristics are also typical of a person who feels 
subordinate in the world with little power to control 
desired interpersonal needs. Shame (but not guilt) also 
has a positive association with negative automatic 
thoughts and this association remained robust when 
severity of depression was controlled for. Multiple 
regression findings show that only submissive behaviour 
had a positive association with shame-proneness. It is 
arguable that the association of shame-proneness with 
submissive behaviour may be explained by a maternal style 
of indifference, where the child's sense of self had not 
been validated. 
The content analysis (Chapter 5) investigated those 
features of childhood maternal indifference which might 
account for the development of shame-proneness in 
adulthood. The results indicate that it may be the lack 
of external validation of the child which is most 
damaging, in that it throws the child back onto its own 
(poorly-developed) resources and cognitive structures in 
order to make sense of the world. This happens at a time 
when psychological growth is in a critical phase and in 
need of external mirroring and support to facilitate 
healthy psychic development. The child may attribute the 
emotional indifference of the mother to its own self 
and a "self-as-bad" schema may develop, along with other 
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dysfunctional and erroneous self- and other- beliefs, 
often characterised by a resentful and chronic anger at 
the perceived deficiency, or disinterest, of the 
caregiver. The gap between the child's subjective needs 
and the mother's empathic response to them may lead the 
growing child to experience the negative side of their 
dependency, which can elicit feelings of impotence, 
inadequacy and shame, in varying degrees, according to 
the inner resources of the child on the one hand, and the 
maternal capacities of the mother on the other. This, in 
turn, may promote a "shame-identity" which becomes part 
of an enduring self-image and perpetuates into adulthood. 
The rationale for carrying out a content analysis of the 
CECA interview material was to tease out, and explore in 
finer detail, those components of childhood maternal 
indifference which may contribute to shame-proneness in 
the adult, and to explore by what mechanisms they may 
operate. Therefore, comprehensive content analysis of 
recorded transcripts of the CECA interview data of a 
high-shame/high-indifference subsample, showed that it 
was maternal indifference, as characterised by emotional 
unavailability, which emerged as the most frequent theme. 
It is salutary to consider thel'following definition by 
Jon Allen (1995) of the origins of self-esteem: 
"Looking at others is like looking into a mirror. 
You see the "me" in reflection. How you see yourself 
reflects how you are seen by others, how you are 
treated by them and how you feel in relation to 
them. Many persons have been told they are bad in a 
myriad ways. But you need not be told directly; when 
you are mistreated you naturally conclude you are 
bad in some way" (p. 21). 
What is noteworthy about this statement is the comment 
"you need not be told directly". Indifference often 
involves rejection by implication through lack of 
recognition, validation and personal acknowledgement. 
Indifference is also a powerful indicator that one has no 
control over interpersonal relationships 
- 
literally, no 
matter what you do, no-one cares that much, not even 
enough to dislike you. 
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Because of these combined research findings, an 
exploration of the analytic and self-psychological 
literature was made and investigated the ideas of 
Winnicott and Kohut in their respective contributions to 
the role of the "failing maternal environment" 
(Winnicott, 1958) and its part in the generation of an 
unintegrated and shame-prone self. Implications for later 
psychopathology and for therapeutic practice were 
discussed. 
The results of the current study suggest that "bypassed 
shame", possibly originating in childhood, is an under- 
recognised phenomenon in psychotherapy, and a clinical 
example was presented to illustrate how the use and 
interpretation of the transference can be helpful in 
understanding the pathway from maternal emotional 
unavailability to the generation of a "shame identity" 
in adulthood 
- 
in this case, denied and displayed within 
a narcissistic personality structure. By identifying and 
exploring the patient's shame-generating material 
within the therapeutic context, it was illustrated that 
the way can be prepared for some kind of psychological 
understanding and hence resolution, or relief, of current 
symptoms, in addition to longer-lasting personality 
change. 
It was shown that the shame-prone patient in the 
therapeutic encounter uses many defences to cover this 
uncomfortable and distressing affect, such as silence, 
superficial ease, shallow conversation, grandiosity, 
anger, denial, contempt, evasion, trivialisation, 
digression and projection. At other times, relief may be 
sought by "acting out" ie. discharging anxiety through 
action and movement outside of the session. In any case, 
it is generally agreed that shame is an affect which 
seeks to remove material from therapy, while guilt, 
conversely, adds to it. 
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Research evidence is beginning to show that shame is 
generally more difficult to disclose than other 
emotions, and this is especially true in the therapeutic 
encounter (Macdonald, 1998). Macdonald shows that social 
considerations play a central role in "disclosure" 
decisions and "disclosure" outcomes. In Macdonald's 
study it was found that "non-disclosing" clients sought 
to conceal "destructive information" (Goffman, 1963) 
from people they thought would respond negatively. 
Helpful disclosure, on the other hand, took place in a 
context where the client felt "accepted and validated" by 
the recipient. Given this concern with how other people 
respond to them, it seems likely that the quality of 
interpersonal support constitutes a major non-specific 
factor in the effectiveness of psychotherapy. Wurmser 
(1981) refers to the powerful, relentless, self-attacking 
and masochistic elements in shame which can make therapy 
difficult. 
Riikonen and Smith (1997) emphasise the importance of 
clients feeling "understood" and, by implication, they 
argue the function of psychotherapy is to help clients 
"find a narrative" that re-connects them to other people, 
10 by making their experiences identifiable and 
understandable to others (and often) to themselves. If 
earlier "containing" had not been good enough, the result 
may be that a client has blocked of f large areas of 
emotional experience, or emotions may be felt but remain 
inexpressible in verbal form. In the view of Madill and 
Barkham (1997) therapeutic change results from the 
therapist's "legitimation of a morally defensible account 
of the client's actions" (p. 232). In Beck's (1997) 
words, the client must experience the therapist as being 
"on their side of the fence". 
To provide opportunities for patients to realise that 
what they do feel and think can impact on someone (the 
therapist), the therapist must be prepared to be highly 
reactive to the patient and not a "passive interpreter of 
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material". After all, the patient is struggling to find 
ways to control interpersonal needs and therapist 
passivity can easily be read as indifference. 
A Therapeutic Model of Working with Shame 
Implications of these findings for psychotherapeutic 
practice having been discussed, a model is now proposed 
for identifying, responding to and working with shame in 
the therapeutic encounter. According to Gilbert (1997bc) 
working with shame requires more than a rational "look 
at the evidence" or cognitive approach; it also requires 
the development of compassion to the self and others. 
Such properties of "compassionate thinking" (Gilbert, 
1997b) postulate that: 1. The compassionate mind is 
concerned with growth and helping people reach their 
potential 2. It is concerned with supporting, healing and 
listening to what we and others need 3. It listens and 
enquires about problems in a kind and friendly way and 
speaks with warmth 4. It is quick to forgive and slow to 
condemn 5. It does not attack but seeks to bring healing, 
repair and reunion 6. It recognises that life can be 
painful and we are all imperfect. It is encapsulated in 
the therapeutic intervention, "What would you say to a 
friend in your situation? ". 
The compassionate mind does not treat self or others as 
objects with a market value. Self-worth and self- 
acceptance are not "things" that can be earned; it is not 
conditional or based on fulfilling contracts. 
This concept of "compassionate thinking" is very similar 
to humanistic psychology's philosophy of treating clients 
with empathy, non-possessive warmth and genuineness 
(Rogers' "core conditions", 1957). It is particularly 
relevant when working with the shame-prone and is 
essential for challenging clients presenting with 
internal shame, which may often be of long duration (see 
Andrews, 1995 in Chapter 3). 
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Shame issues in therapy often involve a sense of badness 
being "taken in" from outside: the resultant cognitive- 
affective complex is close to Klein's "bad self" (1957), 
and each experience of shame is associated with an image 
of the self as weak, inadequate or deficient. There is 
often an experience of being damaged or scarred by 
others, being robbed of a "good self", early experiences 
of powerlessness and rage or fear. This is often 
associated with fear of intimacy or exposure in the 
therapeutic situation 
- 
fear of trusting, and even fear 
of being understood. As the clinical example described in 
Chapter 6 shows, the therapist and therapeutic encounter 
may, in itself, engender feelings of shame, rage and envy 
in the client. Resolution and working through may involve 
grief, and the closeness necessary to work with it may 
ignite further fears of shame, for example, of weakness 
and feared dependency on the therapist. 
Based on these reported research findings, I have 
constructed a therapeutic model of "working with shame" 
which essentially involves four stages: 
Recognition of Shame °"'bL 
(links with empathy): involves "active listening" and 
notes "state shifts" (Luborsky 1984,1990) denoting 
shameful affect. This can be verbal or non-verbal, such 
as sighs, silences or digressions; use of self-mirroring 
to "hide" or "shore up" self during experiencing of 
painful affect (eg. the "mirror" example referred to in 
Chapter 6); recognises "by-passed shame". 
Responding to Shame 
(links with non-possessive warmth): involves "permission- 
giving" in therapy to facilitate risk-taking; allows 
patient to talk about shame and meta-shame which 
involves recognising and responding to various levels of 
shame; pays attention and responds to signs of shame 
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avoidance. Therapist must be "active" and "reactive" as 
well as "containing" and "safe". 
Working through Shame 
(links with authenticity/genuineness/congruence): 
involves the concept of "compassionate thinking" to 
facilitate alliance; to counter patient's sense of 
emotional isolation; takes care not to repeat or 
reinforce the original pathogenic pattern, such as 
perceived indifference, lack of care, unconcern or 
inauthenticity. It presupposes an ability to help the 
patient accept, and work through, the challenge posed by 
the discovery of "multiple versions of one's self-image" 
(Anastasopoulos, 1997). 
Coming out of Shame 
(links with above three "core conditions"): involves 
encouraging the patient in the revelation and 
acknowledgement of shame; encourages "coming out of 
hiding" and acknowledges use of defences; helps patient 
accept and tolerate painful affect, including confusion; 
helps patient accept the role of disappointment in life; 
helps identify and change "voices from the past" ie. 
facilitates re-scripting of the past and re-connecting 
with the present; facilitates the growth of forgiveness 
and acceptance to self and others, such as learning it's 
acceptable to cry or feel pain and not be shameful. 
Metashame 
Brown and Pedder (1991) remark that the Self is "a 
consistent collection of images the individual has of 
himself and their relation to the images of others" (p. 
164). This is particularly true when working with shame, 
where the patient constantly evaluates their image in the 
eyes of the therapist. Similarly, behaviour is 
constantly being evaluated by the patient as a result of 
"meta-shame" or shame about shame (see Scheff, 1988) of 
how they perceive the therapist is experiencing them or 
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imagine the therapist would like them to be (Gilbert, 
1997c, refers to this as the "shame triad"). It embraces 
the fear of "not being a good patient", or being an 
"odd" or "unlikeable" patient and can engender strong 
feelings of shame, envy and fear. 
According to Miller (1989) the original emotion of 
helplessness towards the parents revives during 
psychotherapy. Morrison (1984) asserts that patients may 
feel they have been "shamed" by requesting or being 
referred for treatment, and they may feel shame over 
their dependence on the therapist. The threat of 
violation or annihilation of the patient's psychic 
reality by the parent, which created the original feeling 
of shame, may be revived in the therapeutic encounter 
(Miller, 1985). 
According to Lewis (1987b) the patient's shame over being 
in psychotherapy is inevitable. Worry over the loss of 
approval and acceptance, which has to be hidden because 
of anxiety about passivity and feared dependence, can 
often be acute. Moreover, the shame which causes the 
patient to feel ashamed also calls for further efforts 
Melk to cover it up. 
Patients find themselves literally "face-to-face" with 
the therapist, and the truth, and this stimulates further 
feelings of shame, when often the wish is to "save face" 
ie. avoid or deny their shame. Wurmser (1987) argues that 
in cases where psychotherapy, or a visit to a mental 
health professional, is socially stigmatising, the 
situation will clearly become more difficult. According 
to Wurmser (1987), there is greater awareness of the 
body, and the self is depicted visually and verbally from 
the point of view of the other. 
The position of relative omnipotence in which the 
therapist finds themself, and the power of their 
position, can make them forget how easy it is to wound 
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through any "expertise", "knowledge" or "dogmatism" which 
may be displayed, or by the absence of active listening 
or sufficient empathy. According to Miller (1985) the 
escalation from shame to rage may often take place 
unconsciously, and if not recognised and worked through, 
can endanger the therapeutic process. 
Jacoby (1994) encapsulates the relevance of shame for 
psychotherapy when he remarks: 
"Often, the people from the patient's childhood who 
contributed to the formation of these 
[interactions] ie. primary caregivers, failed to 
create a facilitating environment for processes 
intended by the Self, creating one of obstruction or 
disinterest instead. As a result, the person grew up 
not being able to rely on his or her feelings, 
especially when called on to evaluate his or her own 
self with its impulses, fantasies, and actions. 
According to Asper (1993) it is as if the Self were 
"overshadowed" ie. the tendencies originating in the 
Self were experienced as negative and shameful, when 
actually they would have been crucial for the 
development of adequate self-esteem, and ultimately, 
for individuation. Here the task of analysis or 
therapy is to help the patient re-evaluate his or 
her values" (p. 106). 
Aims of Therapy 
The above observation raises the following interesting 
points relating to the special nature of the therapeutic 
process when working with patients presenting with shame. 
Firstly, how individuation can emerge from shame in the 
creation of a "new self 11. Secondly, the importance of the 
patient's re-evaluation of values during therapy in the 
construction of a less shame-full self. Thirdly, defining 
the task of therapy in "uncovering shame" and 
facilitating the process of what it means for the patient 
to be "true to their self", such as being able to feel 
less shamed, beginning positive affirmations, re- 
scripting the past and realising the future. This 
therapeutic task will involve helping the patient forge 
a new identity based on new values, once the shame has 
been "worked through" in the sessions. 
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These points are crucial because a self that was 
constructed in childhood (almost by default) owing to 
lack of acknowledgement, external validation or 
emotional indifference, can be modulated in the 
therapeutic process to achieve individuation. The focus 
in therapy then becomes "how the patient would like to 
be" rather than how the patient thinks he/she is, should 
be, or is perceived by the therapist to be. 
Shame as Motivator 
Once shame is uncovered, addressed, and worked through 
in the therapy, 'it can act as a powerful `motivator for 
change (see Chapter iss opening quotation). Therefore, 
something historically perceived as "bad" can be 
transmuted into its opposite and become a catalyst for 
positive change in the therapeutic encounter. Although 
shame may have often functioned as a defence, or 
initiated psychopathological states in the past, it can 
also act as a motivation for achievements and social 
adaptation in the future. In the words of Anastasopoulos 
(1997), shame can "protect an individual's integrity and 
can be a modulator of interpersonal relatedness" (p. 
103). 
Similarly, Gilbert (1998b) points out that shamelessness 
is not necessarily an advantage. Lacking a capacity for 
shame may make it hard for people to be self-correcting 
in their behaviours and to set realistic aspirations. In 
the face of wrongdoing a shame display may reduce the 
anger of others compared to a defiant display (cf. 
President Clinton's recent public disavowal of his 
"inappropriate relationship", experienced by many as 
lacking in shame and therefore inauthentic). 
Conclusion 
In the current study, against prediction, guilt rather 
than shame had a positive association with depression 
severity. Reasons for this have been discussed and 
explored and it seems likely that a different pattern of 
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results may have emerged had a more sophisticated measure 
of shame been used. However, the association of shame 
with a range of other depression-related variables 
(Chapter 4 refers) shows that the affect of shame plays 
a significant role in intrapsychic and interpersonal 
processes which can lead to psychopathology. The current 
findings suggest that this is particularly true where 
there has been a maternal style characterised by 
indifference. 
Gilbert et al's Shame and Guilt Scale was developed in 
1989 and has now been superseded by more sophisticated 
measures which tap into more complex aspects of shame. 
However, the shame subscale's positive correlation with 
other shame-related phenomena in this study, such as 
submissive behaviour, social anxiety and internalised 
anger, demonstrates its usefulness as an indirect 
indicator of this important affect. As noted in Chapter 
3, self-report scales inevitably measure expressions of 
how people believe they would feel in certain situations 
and cannot represent their lived experience. Measures 
such as Andrews' semi-structured interview to assess 
chronic shame of personal characteristics or behaviour 
(Andrews & Hunter 1997) may have been more appropriate, 
although not developed at the time of this study's 
inception in 1990. 
With reference to the content analysis of the CECA data, 
Gottschalk et al's (1986) criterion (Chapter 5 refers) 
that for effective analysis the primary witness should be 
"able and willing" to tell the truth has obvious 
implications for the concept of "bypassed shame" (Lewis, 
1971) introduced in Chapter 2. This, too, may well be 
addressed by using a more sophisticated instrument such 
as Andrews and Hunter's (1997) semi-structured interview, 
where probes are used to distinguish between bodily 
shame, behavioural shame and characterological shame, all 
of which are independent and likely to elicit a wider 
range of shame feelings at different levels of complexity 
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and are multidetermined. This is in contradistinction to 
Gilbert et al's (1989) Shame and Guilt Scale which 
operates at a single level of scenario-based shame- 
proneness. 
These points are useful for further research in that 
although the Shame and Guilt Scale, with hindsight, may 
not be the most appropriate measure to use for a study 
of this kind, it has led to some exciting findings which 
have generated interesting questions for future research. 
The most important of these are the cognitive and 
affective mechanisms whereby maternal indifference may 
encourage the development of a shame-prone self. An 
aspect of the helplessness and fear of some patients is 
that they often feel helpless in the face of their 
emotions, or ashamed that they cannot control them. One 
of the mother's primary functions is to contain and 
transform the (otherwise overwhelming) emotions that a 
baby or young child experiences. This has significant 
implications for psychotherapy and the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship. 
Recognising and understanding shame is the future 
challenge for psychotherapy when working with patients 
presenting with shame, and one which undoubtedly 
highlights the importance of the therapeutic 
relationship 
- 
beginning in the first session. The 
combined findings of this study suggest that, in a very 
real sense, the therapist may often have only "one 
(therapeutic) shot" at getting it right, in order to 
avoid repetition or reinforcement of the original 
pathogenic situation, which may result in shame avoidance 
and the potential loss of the patient to therapy. 
To summarise, the recognition of shame in its various 
guises, and the quality of the therapist's response to 
it, is crucial when working with this particular client 
group and opens up a wide and challenging field for 
future research. 
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Appendix 1: The Shame and Guilt Scale 
Below are listed a number of situations that may cause you to fee l bothered or upset. 
Circle the number that best describes the degree of upset you may experience in each 
situation. The numbers relate to the following degrees of discomfort. 
1. Not bothered at all 
2. A little bothered 
3. A fair degree of upset 
4. Quite upset 
5. Very upset indeed 
1. To do something 
embarrassing in public (S) 123 4 5 
2. Secretly cheating on 
something that you know 
will not be found out (G) 123 4 5 
3. To hurt someones feelings (G) 123 4 5 
4. To be the centre of 
attention (S) 123 4 5 
5. To appear inadequate to 
other people (S) 123 4 5 
6. To behave in an uncaring 
way to others (G) 123 4 5 
7. To have something unfavourable 
revealed about you (S) 123 4 5 
8. To feel self-conscious 
in front of others (S) 123 4 5 
9. To behave unkindly (G) 123 4 5 
10. Not saying anything when 
a shop assistant 
gives you too much 
change (G) 123 4 5 
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Appendix 2: Background to the London Depression Intervention Trial (LDIT) 
About the Therapists 
The most experienced therapists were recruited for each intervention, as efficacy rather 
then effectiveness was being evaluated at this stage. 
The antidepressants plus psycho-education condition was clinically managed by an 
experienced senior psychiatrist. He formulated a protocol for the drug regime which 
began with a tricyclic antidepressant, desipramine (Amitripytiline) which could be 
changed to an SSRI (a specific serotonin reuptake inhibitor) if, despite having a full six 
weeks on a therapeutic dose (ie. 125mg/ml. ), there was no response or intolerable side- 
effects developed. Such a second-line choice would be trazodone (Molipaxin) if agitation 
was a major feature or fluvoxamine/fluoxetine (Faverin/Prozac) if retardation was a 
major feature. Additionally, ifon initial assessment there were medical contraindications 
to using a tricyclic antidepressant, one of the two second-line drugs would be used. 
Serum anti-depressant levels were taken routinely to check compliance at 4 and 8 weeks 
and at 6-monthly intervals. 
An educational programme about depression and antidepressant medication was given 
to the subject and, initially, their partner (two sessions only) to maximise compliance. 
The therapy sessions were conducted according to the previous work of the NIMII 
treatment of depression Collaborative Research Program (Elkin, 1989; Fawcett et al, 
1987). Although the main focus of therapy was on medicating the patient, the drug 
was administered in a context of minimal supportive psychotherapy alongside an 
educative programme relating to taking anti-depressants on a long-term basis. Once an 
effective dose had been achieved and symptoms had remitted, the full dose was 
continued for four months before being gradually reduced to about one-half or two- 
thirds of the effective dose, as laid down in the MRC guidelines for clinical trials. 
Subjects were then maintained on antidepressants for a further six months before finally 
reducing the dose over two weeks and stopping altogether. This regime (ie. six months 
active treatment followed by six months prophylaxis) mirrors good clinical practice. 
The therapist saw subjects for approximately 12-20 sessions, averaging 30 minutes per 
treatment. 
Cognitive therapy was conducted as described by Beck and his colleagues (Beck et al, 
1979). The general principles used included a range of techniques and strategies designed 
to help depressed subjects correct negative and distorted views of themselves, their 
world and their future, and to focus on the underlying maladaptive beliefs that gave rise 
to such views and cognitions. The therapy was provided by a number of experienced 
therapists, all of whom had undertaken at least six months training under Professor 
198 
I1 
EE Aaron T. Beck in Philadelphia. Approximately 12-20 sessions were provided, in line 
with the pharmacotherapy group, but each session lasted for approximately 50 minutes. Subjects were given homework assignments which would be completed between 
appointments and discussed at future sessions with a view to the self-monitoring of 
cognitions, feelings and behaviour during the previous week. The rationale for this was 
to practice skills learnt in the sessions, encourage self-help and maximise compliance. 
Systemic marital therapy, approximately 12-20 sessions, was provided by two senior 
couple and family therapists, one male and one female. During the pilot phase of the 
study, a manual was developed based on the therapists' experience with six couples 
who met the initial entry criteria for the study but were not randomised into treatment (Asen & Jones, 1992). The main focus of the therapy was the elicitation by the therapists 
of the partners' attitudes and emotions, and on the joint exploration and negotiation 
around issues of conflict. The focus was on the interaction between partners in the 
here-and-now and the acceptance of their joint responsibility for the creation, 
maintenance and resolution of problems. Little time was spent on exploration and interpretation of individual cognitions and feelings. 
Therapists' Adherence 
A concern of a major outcome trial of this type was to establish whether therapists 
adhered to their treatment manuals. Therefore, a treatment adherence study (piloted by 
the author and a final year psychology undergraduate) was carried out. Further work 
was done on this by an attached researcher (Schwarzenbach, 1993) whose aim was to 
monitor treatment integrity across all three interventions. A method adapted from 
cognitive therapy to assess treatment adherence was utilised, and specific interventions 
for each therapy were identified. Their use was assessed in a representative sample of 
videotaped sessions and results showed that, in general, therapists from all three 
approaches adhered to their respective manuals, although some techniques from other 
therapeutic orientations were implemented and there was some degree of overlap. Non- 
specific therapist variables were also investigated and recorded. 
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY TABLE OF MATERIAL FROM CECA 
INTERVIEWS (N=24) 
ect Cate o Interview Material 
Academic Attitude 
P 
Mother wasn't interested in school work 
- 
she 
wouldn't go to school functions. 39 Academic Attitude Neither went to school meetings although I 
4g Academic Attitude 
wanted to stay on. 
In fact I annoyed her ` cos I did well at school. 95 Academic Attitude a) Both would go to Parents' Meetings but 
Mum for the attention rather than because she 
was interested. 
b) Mum didn't help when I was having 
problems. 143 Academic Attitude She was only interested in school as far as 
getting good results went. 147 Academic Attitude a) She wasn't interested in school functions. 
She didn't go. 
b) If I got a clump at school she'd say, `it serves 
you rt'. 158 Academic Attitude She had no interest in school. 161 Academic Attitude Mother didn't encourage me academically. 166 Academic Attitude Only Dad was interested in my school 
performance. 191 Academic Attitude (Of Mother re: smoking and bunking off 
school): She just said `Don't let your father find 
out'. She would let me go shopping when off 
school. Everything was OK as long as Dad 
didn't know, I helped Mother out. 201 Academic Attitude They went to Parents' Meetings out of duty but 
only in a halfhearted sort of wa 
. 221 Academic Attitude I don't know. I don't remember. If she was 
(interested in school) she didn't show me. 223 Academic Attitude a) I never remember them going to my 
Parent-Teacher Meetings: they were never 
there. If you had homework to do you did it. 
They didn't help you 
- 
you did it. 
b) Mum never went to meetings at school. 248 Academic Attitude I had to et on with m homework alone. 
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P Sub'ect Category Interview Material 
28 Acceptance & Need to 
Please 
I was always trying to, please her. 
201 
F bject Category Interview Material 
- Child as Reminder of I was a great problem (to my grandmother). 
Parent She hated my Mother for bringing shame on the 
family. I was a constant reminder of it. 
147 Child as Reminder of a) Mum said I reminded her of my Father. I felt 
Parent unloved 'cos my Mum hated my Dad. I got the 
hate. 
b) All through my life I was made to feel like 
my Father, who was a `rotten man', so I started 
eating a lot and got fat. 
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Sub'ect 
Emotional ..,. _, 28 Availability 
36 Emotional Availability 
39 Emotional Availability 
46 Emotional Availability 
95 Emotional Availability 
118 Emotional Availability 
Interview Material 
a) I couldn't go to her if I was upset. 
b) I didn't confide in her. 
I wasn't close to either; both were distant. I 
couldn't go to my Mother if I was upset 
- 
she 
was too busy running the hotel. 
I couldn't go to her because it was like a brick 
wall. 
a) (Of Father): He'd take us everywhere, 
beaches and trips. He'd say, 
`I'll-take-you-here, you-do-what- 
you've-got-to-do, you-get-on-with-it- 
and-leave-me- and-Mum-alone' sort of thing (S 
reported that Mother implicitly concurred with 
his attitude towards the children). 
b) There was not much time for me; she'd be 
the last person I'd confide in. 
Mum was distant. There was no love, I don't 
think. I wouldn't go to her. 
Mother was caught up in her own needs too 
much. She wanted to keep us `young' when we 
were owin up. 
If I had a problem I couldn't go to Mum or 
Dad; I was petrified of them. 
My parents would come in late; I didn't know 
what was going on in my life. 
a) Mum was always working - there was never 
time. 
b) I couldn't explain how I felt to m Mother. 
I couldn't go to her if I was upset. 
I wouldn't even go to my Mother if I was upset. 
I couldn't kiss her. Raymond, the eldest, could 
kiss her easily. 
She didn't understand me. 
She was leading her own life in Jamaica - she 
130 Emotional Availability 
136 Emotional Availability 
147 
Emotional Availability 
161 
164 E motional Availability 
Emotional Availability 
A. 
166 
175 
19 
201 
Emotional Availability 
Emotional Availability 
was a suan er reau 
. Emotional Availability a) Mother couldn't protect us. She didn't have 
anything in her to protect us. She was over 
compliant, doing anything to `keep the peace' 
and avoid conflicts with Dad. 
b) I feel they shouldn't really have had children. 
c) I don't remember going to her with 
problems. I'd 
o to friends at school. I ran awa twice. Emotional Availability I couldn't go to either of them if I was upset. 
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Sub'ect Cate o 221 Interview Material Emotional Availability I couldn't go to her with my problems. She 
223 was indifferent. Emotional Availability a) I couldn't go to them ever. I just kept it to 
myself 
b) I was scared to speak to my Mother. 
c) The way she behaved was, it didn't matter 
what I wanted in life, I would go and get it. I 
was seen as the strong one. (S saw this as an 
243 unrealistic and an unhelpful attitude). Emotional Availability I was not close to either (parent) and had no 
expectations of them as they always assumed 
the kids would `look after themselves' as they 
were often not around. (There were six 
children in the family and both parents were 
248 working). Emotional Availability a) I've never been able to talk to my Mother as 
I'd like to. 
b) I felt she'd provide the bare necessities, but 
emotionally she wasn't there for me really 
thron out. 
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Sub'ect Category Interview Material 
39 Favouritism a) My sister was her favourite. 
b) Mother would compare me unfavourably 
with my sister. 46 
' s favourite 
- 
my Favouritism I wasn't 
- 
not Mum or Dad 
brothers were closer to Mother. 49 Favouritism a) She looked to my sister's interests rather 
than mine 
b) (Of Mother): I was always punished - my 
sister wasn't. 118 Favouritism I felt they favoured my sister because she was a 
very quiet child -I was outgoing and energetic. 
(They told S they preferred her sister 
. 13p Favouritism I always felt Mum was for my younger brother 
instead of me and I was jealous of him. She 
always thought of him as `the baby'. I always 
143 felt she took his side. Favouritism The eldest (boy) was favoured by Mother. 147 they ll li 
, ........ 
ng, we Favouritism (Of siblings): I grew up fee 
161 were better looking than me. Favouritism My eldest sister, Muriel, was favoured by 
Mother as she helped her with the children. 
Also, the other elder sister, Pat, was favoured 
by her for some reason. She used to get more 
than I did. 
Favouritism My sister Dolly who died was undoubtedly 
the 
favourite; then Cicely (other sister}. Dolly who 
died, and Cicely - she (Mother) remembered 
their birthdays. I'm not sure if Mother 
166 remembered mine. 
Favouritism a) Mother's favourite was her firstborn son, 
who was a slow learner. Also, my younger 
vature of the spine and d cur sister who ha 
needed special treatment. 
b) My Mother's favourite was the other two felt (sisters) and I was my Father's. I always 
175 safer there cos he didn't shout 
like her. 
his country - he i nt Favouritism My eldest brother who died 
22i was the favourite really. S 
is Jamaican 
Favouritism a) She (Mother) had more contact with my a 
younger sister left when S's father died). 
ugly Nay. (Nanny 
b) She would say `You're old enough n I ca 
enough to look after yourself, 
as long as 
remember. (Not said of younger sister). 
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Sub'ect Cate o Interview Material 223 Favouritism I had to do most of the work as the middle child 
- 
the first and last were favourites. 248 Favouritism My sister was regarded very highly (ie. in 
educational achievement terms). I always felt 
that I was compared to my sister educationally. 
She was regarded higher than me `cos she took 
her education seriously. Mother, in front of me, 
would say I didn't have the ability. She was 
alwa s com grin me to Jennifer. 
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Sub'ect Category Interview Material 
28 Interest Mother didn't take much interest in my life and 
Father was often at sea. 36 Interest Parents had no time 
- 
they were too busy 
running the hotel. Mum had no interest in who 
I was or when I came back after going out with 
39 
boys. (As teenager). 
Interest Mum took no interest. 45 Interest Mum didn't have time or take an interest. 118 Interest She took not interest in my life. 136 Interest The interest wasn't there, especially after my 
sister was born (When S aged 9). 143 Interest They had no interest in my life. They were too 
busy working and saving for the future 
- 
theirs. 
166 Interest She had no interest in my life. She was too 
stressed and depressed. 175 Interest They were preoccupied with other things and, 
with my Mum, with so many other children who 
made demands. (There were 21 brothers and 
sisters in S's extended Jamaican family). 191 Interest Mother provided no guidance and showed no 
interest in my aspirations. I had to get a job 
before I left school. 221 Interest My parents had no interest at all in my life. (S's 
care was the responsibility of the maid and was 
erratic. Mother lived in the same house as S but 
was frequently away. Maternal grandmother 
moved into top flat of house when S aged 8, to 
help look after her. Friends of Father moved 
into bottom flat of house for the same reason. 
S had more contact with her nanny than with 
her Mother. Both parents permanently left 
family home when S aged 15, leaving her 
-ý___ alone). 
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j tt Category Interview Material 
39 Isolation I felt left out when I saw friends with their 
mothers. 132 Isolation I felt isolated, ` on my own', although I was told 
I was sent away `for my own good', aged 12, to 
boarding-school, `to develop myself (S and 
siblings lived in separate cottage from parents 
who lived in a farmhouse nearby). 147 Isolation As I got older I always felt left out. I was `little 
fat Jackie' the ugly one. I always felt very 
alone. I sorted problems out m self. 1ý Isolation If there were problems, or any conflict, I'd 
suffer in silence. 175 Isolation I felt as if I was on my own. I was left to get on 
with it. 221 Isolation I always felt very alone. I sorted problems out 
m self 
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Sub'ect 
28 
Cate o Interview Material 
Love & Approval a) (Of Mother): There was no warmth 
- 
it 
wasn't a normal family life. 
b) Mother never acknowledged it when I 
36 brought her gifts. Love & Approval (Of Mother): There was no praise, despite good 
46 attainment. Love & Approval Although she loves me very, very much, she 
49 didn't never show it. 
191 
Love &A roval There was no love there. 
Love & Approval a) Mother was neutral in a way. She wasn't 
positive 
- 
but not negative either. 
b) (Of Mother): There was never any 
encouragement. I don't really remember those 
241 sort of things. Love & Approval a) She never said `Well done! '. 
b) She never told us she loved us - she did but 
221 never said it. Love & Approval She was totally indifferent 
.... 
was always 
223 Love & Approval 
distant. 
I can't remember being kissed and cuddled. I 
felt indifferent to Mother. 
209 
ect 
F 
Category Interview Material 
28 Material Affirmation & Mother didn't always remember my birthday. 
Celebration 
51 Material Affirmation & Mother didn't write, remember my birthday or 
Celebration send money. 118 Material Affirmation & My birthday was never celebrated. I was never 
Celebration allowed a party. I was told because it fell 
during the summer holida y. 
Material Affirmation & I had to share my birthday with everyone else - 
Celebration that is, share my treats with the others as they 
`weren't well'. (Brother, slow learner; sister, 
curvature of the spine). There was no card. It 
was always `sensible presents' like hats or 
scarves, but no toys. I felt very resentful about 
that. 17$ Material Affirmation & My birthday was only celebrated in the 
Celebration children' home. It was first celebrated when 
I 
was 9, in this country. Before that, 
I didn't 
even know it was m birthda . 
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Sub'ect Category Interview Material 
49 Maternal Jealousy (Of Mother: ) Maybe I took grandfather away 
from her. 
18 Maternal Jealousy Mother was terribly jealous ` cos I went to 
grammar school. She was deeply resentful of 
spending money on school uniform for the 
school. She would say ` If you'd gone to 
secondary school we wouldn't have spent so 
much'. 
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Sub'ect Category Interview Material 51 Maternal Loss I can't remember what she was like; I lost 
contact after she left. las Maternal Loss (Of Mother): She was like a stranger really 
- 
the 
only memory I have of my Mother is her sitting 
down and then start shouting and we'd say she 
`had the ghost' in her. (S is Jamaican and came 
to UK with Father when aged 9, leaving Mother 
in Jamaica). 
sý 
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Sub'ect Category Interview Material 
88 Physical Affection a) Of the two of them, Father was more 
sympathetic. I think he was frightened to show 
too much affection because my Mother 
wouldn't like it. (S reported that Mother was 
not affectionate). 
b) I don't think Mother could show affection - 
she was very distant. 36 Physical Affection There was little physical affection from Mother. 
Physical Affection Mother was not affectionate ph sicall ever. 46 Physical Affection No physical affection - she wasn't that kind of 
erson. 158 Physical Affection I can't remember being hugged - she'd go 
into 
`mood changes' and became a different person 
161 Physical Affection 
every day. 
There was not much love and affection. 
Mother 
was very distant, and grew more so as 
I grew 
1 Physical Affection 
older. 
I felt emotionally neglected. Seeing parents 
give affection to their children made me realise. 166 
175 Physical Affection 
f 
Neither (parent) was affectionate. 
ber no of ection from her. 
191 ection Physical Af Physical Affection 
As a teenager I remem 
a) I felt things weren't right compared to my 
friends and their families. (S saw friends 
`cuddled' by their parents, unlike her family). 
as more it ' w t affectionate E b) Mother wasn e- than her. wa a sisterly thing. I al ys stronger 
There was never love or cuddles or anything 
241 Ph sisal Affection 
like that. 
She never showed physical affection. 221 
Physical Affection I never remember a cuddle as a child. 
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Subject Cate go Interview Material 
49 Psychological Control a) (Of Mother): I feel it was `put into me' to be 
frightened. She'd say `Wait 'til your father 
, 
comes home'. 
b) (Of Mother): If he had known what she did 
to me she wouldn't have got her way. 
147 Psychological Control I was curious about my natural father and felt 
distanced from my stepfather. I could never ask 
her about my natural father as she disapproved 
and would say, `how do you think your 
stepfather would feel? ' (S wanted to make 
contact). 
158 Psychological Control I tried to buy her love by showering them with 
gifts, and later, sending them money. I was 
made to feel responsible for their state of 
affairs. 
248 Psychological Control a) (Of Mother): We were meant to take her 
side, after the break-up. 
b) Mum would make me feel bad for still liking 
Dad after the break-up. She punished him (for 
his affair) via the children. We had to sit on the 
doorstep to wait for him. 
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Subject Category Interview Material 
49 Rejection & She'd say `You'd be in a childrens' home if I 
Denigration had my wa '. 
95 Rejection & When I attempted suicide (aged 17) she just 
Denigration laughed and said, `Go on then, do it'. 
130 Rejection & a) I always felt she didn't want me. 
Denigration b) Mum always said I was a very awkward child 
-I gave her too many problems 
143 Rejection & I felt neglected when I was sent to boarding 
Denigration school. 
147 Rejection & a) `Ugly Bug' I'd be called and `Bulls Eyes' 
- 
Denigration comments on what I ate. (S started overeating 
at an early age). 
b) (Of Mother): She'd say, `Little fat Jackie'. 
c) I'd hear things like my Mother saying she 
didn't want to get pregnant. She did things to 
try and get rid of me. 
d) Mother used to say, `One day somebody will 
love you'. 
e) Mum always said I was Dad's favourite. I 
couldn't see it myself. She used to say I was 
Spoilt. 
158 Rejection & a) We weren't made to feel wanted; we were 
Denigration left to roam about. The Police would bring me 
back when I was 3 or 4. 
b) Since the age of 13, Mum used to say I was 
like a `Manuel', (a Scottish serial killer). That 
would really hurt. 
164 Rejection & 41 Bernard, and I, always felt not a) My brother 
Denigration , wanted. We felt Raymond, the eldest, was 
more important. 
b) I felt singled out. 
c) I cut my foot badly once and the park-keeper 
gave me first aid. My Mother didn't even 
bother to look and made me go to school the 
next day. I felt very angry about that. 
d) I suppose that by the time they'd had three 
children they thought that was more than 
enough and those that followed were just a 
damn nuisance. If she had a choice, I think 
she'd rather we hadn't been born. 
166 Rejection & (Of Parents): They endured us. 
Denigration 
223 Rejection & I was always a make-up freak. Mum would Denigration say, `You look ugly' and humiliate me by 
making me stand in the comer. She'd say 
`You'll never make anything in life'. 
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Subject Category Interview Material 
28 Social Attitude Friends had to wait on the doorstep 
- 
they 
weren't invited in. Mother was very cold 
towards them. Other families seemed warmer. 
36 Social Attitude There was little interest in my friends by either 
of them. 
95 Social Attitude Neither (parent) was interested in my friends. 
118 Social Attitude She never welcomed friends. They could soon 
outstay their welcome. 
130 Social Attitude Because of my Mum I never wanted to bring 
friends back 
-I mean, her attitude. 
132 Social Attitude I wasn't allowed to bring school friends home. 
She didn't take much interest in my friends 
-I 
saw them at school only. 
143 Social Attitude There was no interest in my friends. She would 
disapprove of me bringing friends home. 
147 Social Attitude I was never allowed to have friends in. 
158 Social Attitude There was no interest in my friends. 
164 Social Attitude I had few friends calling round 
- 
there was no 
interest. 
166 Social Attitude (Of Friends): Mum would reprimand us if we 
got into mischief, but there was no real interest. 
She didn't take much notice. 
191 Social Attitude We wasn't allowed to have friends round the 
house. 
201 Social Attitude a) Friends were never allowed in. She'd say, 
`Go to their house'. 
b) She had no interest in my friends or who they 
were. She was only interested in my boyfriends 
if she didn't like them. 
221 Social Attitude She took no interest 
-I don't remember any. I 
rarely took friends home. She would tell them 
what a cow I was. 
223 Social Attitude All my friends came to the house. She had to 
`know everybody' for safety reasons, but she 
had no personal interest in them. 
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APPENDIX 4: NEGATIVE CASE ANALYSIS (N=6) 
Subject Category Interview Material 
95 Material Affirmation & Mother remembered birthdays 
Celebration 
147 Material Affirmation & Mother remembered my birthday 
Celebration 
201 Material Affirmation & Yes 
-I always got presents on my Celebration birthday 
36 Academic Attitude Only Mother would go to meetings at 
school 
147 Emotional Availability I could go to Mother if I was upset 
191 Love & Approval Mother was frightened of showing her 
approval 
- 
she was frightened of Dad's 
reaction 
°U, 
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Appendix 5: Childhood Experience Of Care & Abuse (CECA) Interview 
CHILDHOOD 
Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your childhood. 
Are both your parents still alive? 
IF YES: 
Where are they living now? 
IF NO: 
Death before How old were you when s/he died? 
17 What did s/he die of? 
Was s/he ill for a long time? 
Who looked after you after s/he died? 
Do you have any brothers or sisters? 
Older or younger than you? 
When you were a child, was it your mother or father who was the main 
wage earner? 
What did s/he do? 
Have your parents ever been separated? 
LOSS Were you ever separated from either parent before you were 17? 
IF YES: 
How old were you? 
How long was it for? Why? 
Who looked after you while your mother/father was away? 
How old were you when you left home? 
Why did you leave then? 
Were either your mother or father ever seriously ill when you 
were a child? 
Did either of your parents ever suffer with their nerves? 
IF YES: 
What age were you? Get details of treatment and probe for suicide attempts 
Did either parent have a drink problem? 
IF YES: 
What effect did this have on the family? 
ASK OF PARENT(S) WHO LIVED AT HOME: 
Closeness/ Were you very close to either your Mother or your Father, say up to 
Antipathy the time that you were a teenager? In what way? 
Was s/he fairly distant or did s/he tend to hug and kiss you a lot? 
Which of them did you feel closer to? 
Why? 
Did this change at all when you got older? 
How? 
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IF PARENTS WERE SEPARATED, ASK OF ONE WHO LIVED AWAY: 
Closeness/ Did you get to see your Mother/Father a lot after s/be left? 
Antipathy IF YES: 
Was s/he fairly distant, or did s/he tend to hug and kiss you a lot? 
Did you still feel quite close to her/him, after s/he left? 
Did this change at all when you got older? How? 
IF NO: 
Why not? 
Did s/he write to you, or phone you quite often? 
Did you feel quite close to him/her? 
Did this change at all when you got older? 
IF S HAD SIBLINGS ASK: 
IndifoAntip Did your parents have their favourites? 
Up to the time you left home do you feel your parents always had time for 
and took an interest in your life? 
Did you feel you could go to them if you were upset or unhappy? 
Did they always remember your birthday? 
Neglect Did you ever feel neglected? IF YES: 
In what way? 
Were you well looked after materially as far as food, clothes etc were 
concerned? 
FOR PARENT LNING AWAY: 
Did s/he send you or your mother/father money for your keep? 
In /Antip. Did your parents take an interest in who your friends were? 
Were they interested in bow you did at school? 
Anbp$thy Do you think your parents approved of you up to the time when you were 
a teenager? 
What about your Mother, did she think highly of you? 
Did she praise you? 
Was she hard or easy to please? 
What about your Father, do you think he approved of you? 
Would he praise you? 
Was he hard or easy to please? 
Were either of them disapproving? 
Would your Mother or Father snake critical or hurtful comments? 
About what? 
-'. 
How often would this happen? 
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Did any of this change when you were a teenager? 
Parental Were your parents very strict? 
Control About what? 
About who your friends were? 
About clothes and make-up? 
When you were older were they strict about you going out with boys? 
Did your parents ever get cross if you came home late? 
physical Abuse Did your parents ever punish you in any way? 
IF YES: 
When would they do this? 
Which parent did the punishing? 
In what ways were you punished? 
Did they-ever hit you or hurt you in any way? 
IF YES: 
Was it your mother or father that hit you? 
What did s/he actually do? 
ESTABLISH THE EXTENT OF THE VIOLENCE: 
Did s/he throw something at you? 
Did s/he push or shove you? 
Did s/he slap you? 
IF YES: Where? 
Did s/he hit you with something? 
IF YES: What with? Where? 
Did s/he kick or punch you? 
Did s/he burn or choke you? 
Did s/he use, or threaten to use a weapon on you? 
Were you ever injured in any way? 
How badly? 
eg. bruised? IF YES: How badly? 
Were you cut or burnt? 
Did you have any broken bones? 
How old were you when this happened? 
Are you ever worried that s/he might be violent towards you now? 
Why? 
Did anyone else ever hit you or hurt you in any way? 
IF YES: 
Who was that? 
When did this happen? 
How often would it happen? 
220 
What did s/he actually do? 
ESTABLISH THE EXTENT OF THE VIOLENCE: 
Did s/he throw something at you? 
Did s/he push or shove you? 
Did s/he slap you? 
IF YES: Where? 
Did s/he hit you with something? 
IF YES: What with? Where? 
Did s/he kick or punch you? 
Did s/he burn or choke you? 
Did s/he use, or threaten to use a weapon on you? 
Were you ever injured in any way? 
How badly? 
eg. bruised? IF YES: How badly? 
Were you cut or burnt? 
Did you have any broken bones? 
How old were you when this happened? 
Are you ever worried that s/he might be violent towards you now? 
Why? 
Discord! How did your parents get on together? 
Tension Did they argue much? How often was that? What was it like? 
Raised voices? Throwing things? 
Was that in front of you? 
Did you or your brothers or sisters get involved. in family 
arguments? 
Was there a lot of tension in the house? 
Did they stop talking for periods of time? 
Was there any violence in the house? 
How often? 
What happened? 
Who was involved? Any serious injuries? Police called? 
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Sexual At what age did you have your first sexual experience? 
Abuse Who was it with? 
At any time in your life have you ever had any unpleasant or threatening 
sexual experiences? 
Have you ever been sexually approached against your wishes, or 
interfered with? 
IF YES: 
How old were you? 
Who was it? 
Can I ask you exactly what happened? 
Probe for details, but use discretion 
Did it involve actual intercourse or was it just touching? 
If latter. 
Where did he touch you? 
Did he make you touch him? 
Did he make you watch while he touched himself? 
If no touching: 
Did he make rude suggestions? 
Did he ask you for sex? 
Did he threaten you at all or use violence? 
What did he do/say? 
IF APPROPRIATE: 
Did he say be wouldn't love you any more if you didn't? 
Did be reward you in some way? 
Did anybody else know- that it happened? 
Who? Did they do anything about it? 
IF ABUSE UNDER THE AGE OF 18: 
Do you know anyone else who had the same thing happen to them? 
When was that? How did you find out about it? 
IF RELEVANT: 
Do you think it happened to anyone else in your family? 
Was it by the sane person? 
How did you find out about it? 
Did you tell anybody about it at the time? 
Who was that/Why not? 
Were they very helpful or not really? 
Did you tell anybody about it much later? 
Who was that? 
Were they sympathetic? Did they make you feel worse in any way? 
Was anyone like a doctor or social worker involved? 
Were they very helpful or sympathetic? 
Police? Court case? 
How did it go? 
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Appendix 6: Self 
- 
Evaluation & Social Support (SESS) Interview 
SELF SECTION 
I'd like to ask a few questions about how you see yourself as a person and the things that are 
important to you. 
Self Is there anybody you know that you would like to change places 
acceptance with ? 
IF YES: Who is it ? Why would you like to change places with them ? 
Because of the kind of life they have ? The kinds of things they do ? 
Because of the kind of people they are ? 
How happy are you with yourself the way you are ? 
Do you think anybody might like to change places with you ? 
IF YES: Why ? 
IF NO: Why not ? (PROBE: Because of the kind of life you have, the kind of things you do? Because 
of the kind of person you are ?) 
Self Thinking of your own life now 
- 
what do you think matters most to 
evaluation you ? 
Commitment Why do you say that ? (PROBE: For some women, a husband and children are their whole world 
-while for 
others they are only a part of it. What about you ? IF A PART: What else is part of your world ?) 
Personal What kind of person do you like to think you are ? 
attributes (How would you describe yourself? ) Do you think you are better or worse than other people? (In what ways? ) 
Self Is there anything about yourself that you would like to be 
acceptance 
different? (What sort of things? ) 
Personal Do you feel you are a sympathetic personlor do you tend to be a 
IýL 
attributes bit hard ? (Do you feel this is a good way to be? ) 
Personal Do you think you are an efficient person or do you just seem to 
attributes muddle through ? (Are you glad'to be that way? ) 
personal Do you put yourself first or do you give way to other people ? 
attributes (Are you glad to be that way? ) 
persona] Are you the sort of person who says what you think? 
attributes (Is this a good way to be, do you think? ) 
Personal Do you feel you are an intelligent person or not particularly ? 
attributes (Would you like to change this ?) 
Personal Do you think you are attractive or not particularly ? 
attributes IF NO: Do you wish you were ? 
How do you feel when you're dressed up to go out ? 
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MARRIAGE 
I would now like to ask you some questions about marriage and about how you and your 
husband/Partner get along. 
IF S IS MARRIED ASK 
Commitment Is being a wife important to the way you see yourself? 
+ (Do you like to think of yourself as married? ) 
eval. role 
performance Can you imagine not having married ? (Why/why not ?) (How would you feel 
- 
left on the shelf? ) 
Would you want to be single again? (Why/why not? ) 
Compared to married people, do you think that single people miss out on 
anything important? 
(In what way/why? ) (A family? Companionship? Security? ) 
IF S IS COHABITING ASK: 
Commit Is being in a long-term relationship important to the way you see yourself? 
evaL role 
Do you like to think of yourself as married? (Why/why not? ) 
peomnance Would you want to be single again? (Why/why not? ) 
Would you like to get married ? (Why/why not? ) as this something you ever talk about with your partner? ) 
Compared to people in long-term relationships, do you think that single 
people miss out on anything important? 
(In what way/why? ) (A family? Companionship? Security? ) 
Can you imagine not living with someone? 
(How would you feel? ) 
ASK ALL 
Confiding Do you find that you can confide in your husband/partner ? IF YES: Easily or with difficulty? 
IF NO: Why do you think this is? 
Have you confided in him recently about anything? (What was that? ) 
Do you tell him about things that worry you or get you down? (Do you just touch on it or go into detail? ) 
Do you tell hini about your most personal feelings? (Is there anything you wouldn't tell him? ) (What? Why not? ) (Because of what he would say or do? Or think of you? ) 
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Active Do you think he is interested when you confide, or not particularly? 
emotional - 
support What does be say or do when you confide? (Does he listen? Comfort you? Does he take your side, or is he a bit critical? Does 
he offer any advice? ) 
Do you think he worries about you if you are not feeling well or having 
problems? (How does he show it? ) 
In some relationships it seems like one person is trying more often that 
the other to get their partner talking. Would you say this is the case in 
your relationship? 
(Does one of you seem to hold back on your feelings ? Why is this? ) 
Overall Do you ever wish that your partner discussed his feelings more or 
Satis. showed them in different ways? (If yes, when was the last time you felt like this ?) 
Overall Do you think that your needs for confiding, sharing and talking about 
salis. things are met by your current relationships? (Do you ever feel that something is missing? ) 
Security Does he ever go out on his own in the evening or at the weekend? 
chars. 
How dolwould you feel about this? (A bit anxious on your own? Wish he didn't go? ) 
SecuritY Is your husband/partner a worry to you in any way? 
chars. 
Security Do you feel you can rely on your husband to be there when you need him 
chars. IF YES: Always ? 
Has he ever let you down when you needed him ? (When was that? How often does that happen? 
Does this make you feel that you can't depend upon him? ) 
Does he come and go at a regular time so you know when to expect him 
Involvement (Such what hobbies or 
take 
wh t sort of y each has had. ) 
To what extent do you make a point of talking to your husband/partner 
if you feel that there is something on his mind? 
Commitment To what extent do either of you do what you want, irrespective of what 
the other's feeHtigs about it might be? (Like going out with your friends when you know your husband/partner would like 
you to stay in? ) 
Quality of Do you and your partner manage to spend any time alone together? 
interaction 
What is it like when you are alone together 7 
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(PROBE: Relaxed ? Quiet ?A bit boring ? Tense ? Fun ? Cosy ?) 
Do you do anything together, or just sit? (Do you enjoy this? Does he? 
Do you have much to say to each other? 
Affection In general, is your partner affectionate towards you? 
eg. holding hands, hugging, kissing. 
IF YES: 
How often is that? Is it just at certain times? 
How about when you're feeling upset or down? 
Is he affectionate then? 
In what way? 
Pleasure of Would you say that sex is an important part of your relationship 
: ex now or not really ? 
Would you say you enjoy sex generally or not particularly ? (Do you ever feel that its a bit of a chore or obligation? ) 
Is it more important to one of you than the other? 
Unwanted In many relationships there are conflicts about sex. Have you had any 
sexual unwanted sexual experiences with your partner? 
experiences Do you ever find that you have to give some extra persuasion to your 
partner to make love to you? 
TO BOTH QUESTIONS, IF "YES": 
What happened? 
How did you feel about it at the time? 
How did you feel about it afterwards? 
How often does it tend to happen? 
Was it a one-off, or does it happen quite frequently? 
How does it/did it affect your feelings towards your partner? 
How does it/did it affect your feelings towards yourself? 
Competence Thinking of other women you know, how do you think you compare as a 
+ wife/partner? 
role per- (Are you better in any ways or worse ?) 
Do you think you pull your weight in the relationship? 
How does this compare with other women you know? 
What sort of person would you say you are to live with ? (Easy-going/moody ? quick tempered ? considerate/a bit selfish ? Affectionate/a bit 
cold ?) 
payers What about your husband/partner, what sort of a wifelpartner 
does 
evaluation he think you are ? he'd like to be different? ) (Is there anything he admires about you, anything (What does he say? ) 
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Does he ever make any critical or hurtful comments about the sort of 
person you are or what you look like ? (Does he ever make any hurtful or critical comments about the way you look ? 
Comment on your size or shape ?) 
Quality of What kinds of things make you irritable with each other ? 
interaction (Do you have a go at each other when you are niggled or do you bottle it up? ) (What about your last quarrel? at happened? )
IF EVIDENCE OF ARGUMENTS: How often does this happen - say over the last 
month? 
Quality of Do arguments ever become violent where one of you throws things or hits 
interaction the other? 
+ (Has this happened in the past? How often? ) 
security chars)(VVhat happens? ) (How do these arguments usually end? ) 
Pbysiosl Abuse Has be ever hit you, or Burt you in any way? 
IF NO VIOLENCE REPORTED: 
Have you ever thought that he might hit you even though that has never 
happened? 
(Why did you feel like that ?) 
IF YES: When did that happen? What did he actually do? 
ESTABLISH THE EXTENT OF THE VIOLENCE: 
Did he throw something at you? 
Did he push or shove you? 
Did he slap you? IF YES: Where? 
Did he hit you with something? IF YES: What with? Where? 
Did be kick or punch you? 
Did he burn or choke you? 
Did he use, or threaten to use a weapon on you? 
Were you ever injured in any way? 
How badly? 
eg. bruised? IF YES: How badly? 
Were you cut or burnt? 
Did you have any broken bones? 
Does he still hurt you sometimes? 
IF NO: Are you ever worried that he might be violent towards you again? 
Why? 
SeeuntY What kind of person would you say your partner is ? 
chars. (What kind of man is he like to live with ? Easy-going? Moody? Hot tempered ? Considerate ?A bit selfish ?) 
What kind of provider would you say your partner is ? (Is he a steady worker? Has he often had times out of work? ) (Do you think he could have done better job-wise? ) 
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Is be dependable about money, or can be be a bit careless? (Does he ever leave you short? Is this often? ) 
Security Most relationships have bad patches from time to time when they 
cliars. are not getting on or where one partner considers leaving - have you 
had 
times like this? 
IF YES: (When ? How. serious was it ? What stopped you ? 
Have either of you left the other ? For how long ?) 
Security As you know in some marriages one partner gets involved with 
characters- someone else of either sex, has anything like this happened to you? To your partner? (Have you ever been suspicious ?) 
IF YES: When was this ? 
Did you consider ending your marriage? 
What happened ? 
Overall Overall, how would you say you feel about your busband/partner 
amity and your marriage ? (Happy? Good? It could be better? 
It's not what you thought marriage was about? ) 
What do you think it is that keeps you together? 
^22L 
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FINANCIAL PROVISION/WORK 
Td now like to ask you about work 
FOR THOSE CURRENTLY WORKING: 
Commitment How do you feel about having a job ? (Like/not like it ? In what way ?) 
Some people we speak to feel that it is important for a woman have a job, 
while others feel that her real place is in the home, what do you think ? (Do you think it's alright ?A good idea ? 
What is the best thing about having a job ? (Being with other people ? Getting out of the house ? Having a bit of 
independence ? Having a routine ? Having money of your own ? Being able to 
support your family/help out with extras ?) 
What's the worst thing about having a job ? (Having to be at work at a certain time ? Never having time to relax ? Or do 
anything properly ? Having to let things slide in the house ? Feeling that you are 
missing out on things with the children or with your husband/partner ?) 
Eva1- role Do you see yourself as a worker? 
pet{ (Can you imagine not being one? Not having a job? ) 
Commitment How would you feel if you didn't have a job? 
+ 
(A bit lost/relieved? Disorientated? ) 
Felt security 
Do you expect to continue working over the next 10 years? (How do you feel about that? Have you thought about stopping? ) (Would you work if you didn't need the money? ) 
Does having a job make any difference to your feelings about 
yourself? 
Eval- role How good or bad do you' think you are at your job ? 
per; + (Are you able to keep up with the work each day ? Or not really? 
Competence Do you ever feel proud of your day's work? 
"' 
(When was the last time you felt this way ?). 
FOR THOSE WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED: 
Commitment How do you feel about not having a job? 
+ (Like it? Dislike it? In what way? ) 
Felt security Have you thought about taking a job? (How do you feel about that? ) 
What's the best thing about not having a job? 
What's the worst thing about not having a job? 
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FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MADE REDUNDA. N '. 
Self accept How do you feel about having been made redundant? (Is there anything good about not having a job at the moment? ) (What's the worst thing about not having a job? ) 
Has it made any difference to your feelings about yourself? (In what way? ) 
Corznitment Are you now looking for another job, or not? (Why is this? ) 
FOR THOSE ON SICK LEAVE: 
Commitment How do you feel about being on sick leave? (Does it make any difference to your feelings about yourself? ) 
Are you looking forward to going back to work? (When do you think that will be? )(How well do you think you'll be able to cope? ) 
IF S IS IN FULL-T IIVIE EDUCATION, ASK QUESTIONS AS FOR THOSE IN 
WORK 
I& 
0 
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HOUSING/HOMEMAKING 
rm noNv going to ask you some questions about the house and housework. 
Commitment To what extent do you see yourself as being a homemaker? 
+ (Do you enjoy making the home cosy? ) 
eval. role (Do you like buying things for the home? Decorating? ) 
pew Is it important for you to have the housefflat looking clean and tidy ? (Are there things that would make you change your household standards? eg. a 
chance to go out with family and friends? How about if you weren't feeling well? ) 
Would you pay someone else to do it if you could ? 
Eval. role In general what lind of housewife/homemaker do you think you are? (With regard to the tasks that you actually do - Cooking? 
. 
Cleaning ? Tidying ? 
Washing and ironing ? Shopping and budgeting, repairs; maintenance etc. ?) 
Competence How about compared to other people ? (PROBE: What about other women that you know, are there any ways you are better. Any ways worse ?) 
Competence Do you ever find that what you have to do around the house gets on top 
of you, so that you have too much to do ? 
IF YES: When is this? How often does it happen? How do you feel? (Disorganised or inefficient? Or do you feel that it's not your fault? ) 
IF NO: How do you manage to keep on top of it? (Is it because you organise the work efficiently? ) 
partners In general does your husband/partner approve or disapprove of the 
evaluation way you run the home ? 
of S (What is his opinion about your cooking ? Does he comment on how tidy and clean the house is kept ?) 
(How well does be think you manage? ) (What does be say? ) 
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J PARENTHOOD 
Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your feelings about children and becoming a parent. 
QUESTIONS FOR NON-PARENTS: 
Commitment In your ideal world, how many children would you like to have? (How would you feel if you were unable to have children for some reason? ) 
Is having children in the future something you think about or do you feel 
it doesn't concern you at the moment? (IF RELEVANT: Do you think you are too young to think about it? ) 
QUESTIONS. FOR PARENTS: 
Comniltrnent How far do you see yourself as being a mother? 
Self 
- 
Do you prefer to think of yourself as a mother or a wife ? 
evaluation 
ComrUitment Do you like talking to people about your children ? 
Can you imagine not being a mother? (Can you imagine never having had children? ) 
How would' you have felt if you and your husband/partner had been 
unable to have any children ? 
Do you think that people who don't have children miss out ? 
Felt security Are the children a worry to you for any reason? 
+ 
. 
(Have there been any problems at school? Trouble with the police? ) 
security (Health worries? ) 
chars. 
(Do they come home at a reasonable time? Generally helpful? ) (Do you always know where they are? ) 
Competence Would you say that looking after children is something that takes a lot of 
skill or ability of any kind, or not really? 
. t. 
Overall how good would you say you are as a mother ? 
role perf (Do you think you are good at looking after the children? ) Do you think you could be a better mother? (How? ) 
(Compared with your own mother, are you better in any ways or not as good? ) 
+ How patient would you say you are with the children ? 
quality of (Do you feel you are too sharp or irritable with them ? 
interaC, Or that you smack them even when they don't deserve it ?) How about in comparison to other mothers ? 
Do you ever find yourself unable to cope with all the demands of 
being a 
mother 
- 
when it's just too much for you? (How often is this? ) 
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How well do you think you manage to keep the children in check ? (Are the children well-behaved or do they play you up? ) (Can you influence them when they are like this? ) (Do you think this has anything to do with the way they have been brought up? ) 
Competence Do you- feel you` give the children enough time and affection 
- 
or do you 
find this difficult ? 
Partners Does anyone, such as your husband/partner notice the kind of 
evaluation' mother you are ? 
(What does he think? What does he say? ) (That you're too soft, strict? Patient/too irritable with them? ) (Is that often? ) 
Self- Many people would like their children to be different from themselves in 
acceptance some ways, do you feel this way at all ? (In what ways ?) 
Are there any ways you would like them to be the same as you ? (In what ways ?) 
Quality What is it like when you are with the children/baby, what sort of 
of 
- 
atmosphere is there ? 
interact- (A bit boring ? Tense ? Flan ? Do you talk much or have a laugh? Is there much fighting or arguing ?) (Do you enjoy these times or do you find them a bit of a drag? 
uaut; y Is it any different when your husband is around ? 
of (More/less fun ? Do they get on your nerves more/less ?) 
interact. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Everything that you have told us is completely confidential and will not be discussed with anyone 
outside the research team. However, we are interested in how your husband felt about some of 
these things that have been going on. We won't, of course, discuss what you have said about. what 
happened or any of your feelings about what went on, but is there anything that has happened 
that you wouldn't want us to raise with you husband if he doesn't mention them himself ? 
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Section C 
CASE-STUDY: AN EVALUATION OF THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
USING A COGNITIVE ANALYTIC APPROACH 
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Frontispiece 
This case-study is an example of a client who presented 
with chronic internalised shame originating in childhood. 
She experienced her father as overtly bullying and 
shaming, and her mother as hostile and indifferent. From 
early on, the client developed a defective core self 
which was characterised primarily by feelings of shame, 
inappropriate guilt and repressed and impotent anger. 
These feelings became introjected over time and 
manifested in adulthood as depression (see Section B, 
Chapter 2, for a literature overview of shame and shame- 
related phenomena). 
The therapeutic intervention was aimed at helping the 
client re-evaluate and reconstrue her sense of self by 
identifying and reframing unhelpful core beliefs and 
their role in repetitive and maladaptive cycles of 
behaviour. 
This was achieved within the framework of the Cognitive 
Analytic Model based on the work of Ryle (1975,1979, 
1985,1990,1995,1997). 
Background Information and Referral 
The patient, whom I shall call Pat, was first seen by the 
author in my role of General Practice Counsellor in a 
busy Kent Group Practice. I was working at the Practice 
one day per week in addition to my duties as a research 
psychologist, engaged on a major treatment outcome study 
on depression. Names have been changed to preserve 
confidentiality and permission has been granted to use 
this material in a case-study. 
1 
At the time of our first meeting, Pat was aged 58 and was 
working as a receptionist in the Practice I was attached 
to. She was newly-separated from her husband of many 
years and asked to see me after an initial confidential 
talk with one of the female GPs at the Practice who 
advised her she might benefit from counselling. 
Pat's presenting problems appeared to be agitated 
depression characterised by much residual anger, shame 
and guilt, originating in childhood and exacerbated and 
reinforced in the course of her long and unhappy 
marriage. Her symptoms included frequent tearfulness, 
agitation, feelings of entrapment and a sense of over- 
responsibility. She also suffered from bouts of 
irritability, sleep disturbance, low self-esteem, free- 
floating anger, much ruminative guilt and self-blame 
(especially over the recent death of her grandson for 
which she felt responsible), problems in structuring her 
time, and a pervasive sense of disappointment and of life 
being "a waste". 
In her initial talk with the GP she told her how bad she 
had been feeling and how fearful she was for the future. 
Pat was very vague about the nature of these feelings and 
what might be triggering or maintaining them. However, 
despite her confusion and uncertainty, she agreed it 
would be helpful to see a female counsellor. I had been 
at the Practice about two months at the point of the 
referral, so had built up a 'friendly' relationship with 
Pat in her role as receptionist. I had often sensed a 
feeling of tension or restraint in her presence which, 
with hindsight, I realised was due to her ambivalence 
and anxieties about becoming a "patient". I also noticed 
that Pat was often a little emotionally apart from the 
other staff, with whom she interacted in either an aloof 
or overly deferential manner. 
2 
I was approached by the GP who asked me if I would be 
willing to see Pat for counselling and I agreed. After 
the doctor "paving the way" in this respect I spoke to 
Pat, who was concerned about confidentiality. We agreed 
that professional notes would be held at my place of work 
(the Medical Research Council, Institute of Psychiatry 
in London) and that she could see me there if she 
preferred. She asked if she could see me early evenings 
at the Practice, after the other staff had left and I 
agreed. This arrangement gave Pat a clear degree of 
relief from her anxiety (and shame) about colleagues 
finding out she was seeing a counsellor. 
Our initial agreement was for 12 weekly sessions, as a 
predetermined limit is required in line with the 
Cognitive Analytic Model (Ryle 1990,1995,1997) although 
this was left open to review at a later stage if 
necessary. I explained to her about the supervision 
process and how this worked, and that all information 
that emerged in our sessions would be confidential to 
myself and my supervisor except in certain circumstances, 
such as potential harm to others or to herself. I also 
explained that I would be writing a brief report to her 
GP, as this was common practice in the setting where I 
worked. 
Pat clearly related to me as a "person in authority" and 
a "professional" and this was manifested in her 
deferential and overly respectful attitude towards me, as 
well as an anxiety about being pathologised which was 
shown in remarks such as "I know you'll think I'm mad 
... 
", "I know I shouldn't feel like this but 
... 
" and "I 
know it's silly to feel this way 
... 
". It transpired 
that Pat had left her husband about 18 months previously 
and had decided shortly after that time that she would 
give up smoking. She told me this was a very important 
decision in her life as it was "something I can do for 
3 
myself", although she believed her stopping smoking was 
at least partly responsible for her current anxiety and 
depression. 
It seemed she had experienced a long and unsatisfying 
marriage with a husband who was very domineering and 
shaming, but she became so overwhelmed with deep feelings 
of guilt if she even fleetingly considered leaving him, 
that the decision was always deferred. They had a 
daughter whose baby son, one of twins, had recently died 
of a "cot death" (aged one week) and this was clearly a 
source of great pain and loss for Pat, who tended his 
grave regularly. Pat also had a son who took drugs and 
this too was a constant source of distress and worry. At 
the time of our first meeting her son was living at home, 
but Pat wanted him to go and live with his girlfriend, by 
whom he had a child. Now she had finally left her husband 
Pat found her new "free" life brought unexpected 
disadvantages, namely that she had plenty of time on her 
hands and "space that I don't know how to fill". She told 
me she had spent so many years of her marriage in 
planning to leave it that she was surprised how she now 
felt faced with an "emotional vacuum". 
Very little of Pat's childhood was spontaneously elicited 
during the sessions. I think she found this topic quite 
painful and I was aware that, as I was not in a position 
to offer long-term psychotherapy, it did not seem 
appropriate to explore it in depth. But she described her 
father as "controlling" and "sadistic", and she reported 
her mother had been openly antagonistic and hostile to 
her with frequent denigratory outbursts, referring to her 
as "you cow" for no apparent reason. 
4 
Initial Session 
In the first session, certain core factors emerged in the 
way Pat told her story. Firstly, her world had been 
characterised by pervasive anger and guilt (associated 
with her husband but also self-directed) and this had 
been internalised and experienced as chronic emptiness 
and disappointment. It transpired that she spent a lot of 
time worrying about her small dog, wondering if he was 
"having a bad life" when she was at work and away from 
him. She felt she couldn't leave him or he would suffer. 
The significance of this early remark for her marriage 
was to become apparent in subsequent sessions. 
At a practical level, we identified and explored various 
options for increasing her social networks 
- 
such as 
evening classes, hobbies and social support from 
neighbours and children. We discussed how she had 
suffered many recent losses and how her sadness and sense 
of disappointment were understandable, and a "normal" 
mourning reaction, although hers was mixed with feelings 
of anxiety concerning the future and guilt relating to 
the past. It was agreed that Pat would make a list of 
"good things" in her relationship with her husband and so 
challenge her beliefs that it had all been "a waste", 
which was fuelling her negative thinking. I told her I 
thought the sadness belonged to the past, and that her 
anger and guilt often resurfaced in the present because 
of this. For some reason, this remark stayed with her and 
she told me at a later point in the therapy that it had 
given her an immense sense of relief and reassurance. This 
session culminated in the joint production of the 
Psychotherapy File (attached as Appendix A) which helped 
to consolidate the working alliance and demonstrated the 
unproductive circularity involved in Pat's characteristic 
ways of thinking and behaviour. 
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Session Two 
At the next session, Pat announced she had not done a 
list of "good things" about her estranged husband as 
there was basically "nothing good" about him and he was 
essentially "a bully". She reported that she was pleased 
because her son would shortly be leaving home, had 
arranged evening classes for herself, and for her dog to 
be minded. The weekend had been bad however because she'd 
had so much unstructured time, and didn't know what to do 
with it. When at home she wanted to be out, and when out 
she wanted to be at home. Pat became very animated, then 
angry, while telling me this. When this was pointed out 
to her, she said she was feeling guilty over her 
grandson's recent death and realised, too, that she still 
feels a lot of anger towards her husband, John, but had 
never been able to express it in the past. Historically, 
this anger would result in her feeling sorry for him, and 
then she would feel guilty. So, in her internal world, 
anger and guilt were often inextricably linked. 
She reported that John would often snap at her, "Who do 
you think you are? You're useless", and so decimate her 
already-fragile sense of self. This made her feel that 
she "didn't deserve to be happy" as she had no real self- 
worth or sense of value in relationships. We explored 
this neurotic feedback-loop of anger, guilt and low self- 
esteem, and how this was related to her deep fears of 
being unloveable as a child and, possibly, to an 
unconscious wish to suffer. Pat connected with this by 
saying she'd never felt good about herself and that even 
John's gifts to her were a gesture of ownership and 
status, like expensive jewellery (that she didn't like). 
It was at this point that she told me how similar to her 
father he was, but she'd never recognised it before. She 
wondered whether she'd unconsciously chosen a husband who 
would "invalidate [her] sense of self". 
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She then described how she had always felt "something 
would happen" to her grandson and how she had given 
him 
e because "my unconscious sp cial care when he was born 
must have known". She found this thought deeply 
disturbing. We explored her belief that if she sensed 
her 
grandson's vulnerability then she must be guilty of 
his 
death 
- 
and therefore deserved punishment. The fact that 
she didn't have this feeling with her other grandchildren 
(or the other surviving twin) confirmed the validity of 
her belief. This incident illustrated a characteristic 
process by which Pat's feelings were confirmed by events, 
thereby reinforcing and perpetuating the original belief. 
I suggested that she keep a Personal Diary over the next 
few weeks to monitor these frequently-recurring thoughts, 
feelings and beliefs, as they seemed to suggest an 
inherent tendency in her to feel both over-responsible 
and to blame for external events. 
Session Three 
The third session explored how Pat had never been able to 
acknowledge her anger, either with herself or towards 
others. At the beginning of this session she became very 
tearful, then angry, saying that she had always 
experienced difficulty in putting her needs first, and 
how she believed her low self-esteem had originated in 
childhood. Her mother would often refer to her as "that 
cow" and, in her marriage, John would call her a "slut". 
Her definition of herself had therefore derived largely 
from others' views of her, and was often denigratory. 
When she couldn't find a way of expressing her 
(justifiable) anger at others' responses she felt guilty, 
and this, in turn, made her depressed and reinforced 
her 
low self-worth. We discussed the implications of 
her 
pending divorce and how it might be helpful to redefine 
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herself as a "single woman again" rather than a divorcee 
(or, in her terms, a "cast-off possession"). 
Assessment and Case Formulation: Session Four 
In line with the Cognitive Analytic Model (Ryle 1990, 
1995,1997), at the fourth session I provided Pat with a 
Reformulation Statement written in the first person 
(attached as Appendix B), which identified some of the 
problems and "double-binds" she had experienced in her 
life, and her characteristic ways of dealing with them. 
It is important to emphasise that the objective here was 
to provide "accurate description" rather than 
"interpretation" in the analytic sense, in an attempt to 
increase empathy and strengthen the therapeutic alliance. 
The Reformulation Statement was based on Pat's clinical 
history and the ideas contained in the Psychotherapy 
File which had been jointly worked on and agreed in the 
first session. The Reformulation Statement provided a 
basis for further discussion and set the agenda for the 
therapy. It was supplemented by an exploration of Pat's 
Diary in which she had been regularly monitoring the 
links between her thoughts and beliefs, feelings and 
behaviour, especially at times of distress. In fact, Pat 
had found this diary-keeping so useful that she decided 
to continue with it after the therapy had ended. 
By the fifth session, Pat's mood had improved remarkably 
although she had reported feeling very angry at times, 
especially with a friend who'd had her unfaithful 
husband back. She was angry too with her friend's 
husband when she had seen him on his way to the pub 
while she was coming to our session. We talked about 
how 
this anger could be explained by her identification with 
her friend as "the mistreated woman", and how she 
had 
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her displaced this anger onto others, particularly 
friend's husband, who reminded her of John. She expressed 
surprise that she had actually been "strong enough" to 
leave John and escape from the marriage in the first 
place, having always seen herself as "weak". Together we 
explored her "inner strengths" and she identified these 
as being "not immediately obvious" (this being a shame 
characteristic in Pat to under-report or deny her good 
points), but that she had always had a "firm moral 
sense". 
She went on to say how John had been "sadistic" and 
"publicly shaming" to the children in that he would 
punish them out of all proportion to their 
misdemeanours, often when they had company. He would 
punish and attempt to shame her, too, by staying out late 
and denigrating her if she refused him sex. It became 
clearer to her during the therapy how John had kept most 
of the control in their relationship and how she had 
retained very little, which was exacerbated by her pre- 
existing (childhood) sense of a "bad self", where she 
had also had very little power to control relationships 
or outcomes in her life. This meant she had felt forced 
to "live a lie" in her marriage and had feigned sexual 
enjoyment, which had resulted in her losing touch with 
her own needs and desires. She realised now how angry 
this made her feel, and how angry she had always felt, 
although she'd experienced this as a mixture of 
depression, helplessness and hopelessness (Abramson et 
al., 1989; Alloy & Abramson, 1982; Seligman, 1975). 
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Subsequent Sessions 
Over the remaining sessions (which emphasised the three 
'R's of CAT 
- 
Reformulation, Recognition, Revision), Pat 
came to see how her anger was quite rational because it 
had been impossible to express it as a child, against an 
overbearing and shaming father, for fear of the 
consequences. We looked at the role of disappointment in 
her life and how she couldn't plan ahead or look forward 
to things incase they got spoilt, and the implications of 
this for her future. 
It became clearer over the next few sessions that John 
and her anger towards him had become less important. In 
the penultimate session (number 11) Pat reported having 
had a good week, had joined a "cot death" society, had 
taken part in other social events and had started 
knitting again. She also looked well in a new bright red 
blouse! She told me she had been able to ignore her 
husband on the 'phone and just speak to the children now 
without feeling guilty or that she was "bad". Even an 
altercation at work, when a colleague called her "bossy" 
(although threatening to re-awaken all the old feelings 
of guilt and overcompliance) no longer did so. She was 
very talkative in the session, defending her position by 
saying she now felt she had a "right" to say what she 
feels and didn't put so many things on her "guilty list" 
as she used to! 
In summary, Pat reported she was enjoying her new-found 
sense of singularity, while at the same time realising 
how much John had needed to control her, and the 
children, throughout their marriage. His legacy to her 
had been years of unmet needs 
- 
for love, warmth and 
companionship. She said she felt she was ready to end 
therapy and we arranged a final session, with built-in 
time for review at three months if she felt she needed 
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it. This is in line with the CAT model of setting a 
follow-up date to see how termination has weathered and 
to assess further needs. We also agreed to exchange 
"Goodbye letters" (attached as Appendix C). 
Final Session 
In the last session (number 12) our letters were 
exchanged. Pat wanted to read hers in private so I handed 
it to her to take away. She looked very happy, saying she 
had written a letter to John telling him how miserable he 
had made her over the years 
- 
but she'd lost itl She 
remarked that it didn't seem so important now. 
She also told me of an affair she had once had and how 
she had wanted to tell John to "get her own back" but had 
decided not to, incase it hurt him. We explored how, in 
the past, her feelings of anger, guilt and shame had 
spiralled into depression and how a more balanced view of 
herself, and others, was now emerging. With regard to her 
affair, she now saw it as representing herself in 
control, with John as the victim 
-a complete role 
reversal. She also felt she wanted to "keep it her 
secret" ie. something she could keep for herself. 
Finally, she said she still had difficulty in saying 
"no", and showing anger to others, but realised how much 
this feeling came from her past, especially from her 
relationship with her controlling and shaming father, and 
how these feelings were no longer appropriate now she was 
grown up. But she felt that the balance had shifted, and 
that she was building up real inner confidence, as well 
as making outer changes in her home, in her life, and in 
herself. One problem she still had was the inability to 
look forward to things incase they got spoilt, but she 
now understood why she felt this way and was ready to 
take more risks. 
11 
We ended the session by Pat handing me her "Goodbye 
letter", with some embarrassment (and, I suspect, some 
shame) saying she was pleased she could contact me again 
if she needed to and that, although she knew the future 
wouldn't be easy, I had "shown her the way" and she was 
grateful. 
Because termination had been kept on the agenda 
throughout the therapy, in line with the Cognitive 
Analytic Model, Pat approached the last session with a 
mixture of sadness yet relief that she had gained some 
control over her emotions and insight into her unhelpful 
patterns of behaviour. 
Active Treatment 
The treatment was Cognitive Analytic Therapy (known as 
CAT) based on the work of Ryle (1975,1979,1985,1990, 
1995,1997). My rationale for choosing this particular 
approach was that it is time-limited, usually 16 
sessions, and requires a degree of "psychological 
mindedness« which Pat possessed, as she was easily able 
to articulate and reflect upon her feelings and behaviour 
with very little defensiveness. I also felt this choice 
would minimise the transference, which I viewed as 
desirable, given the setting of a G. P. practice and time- 
limited work. Our predetermined contract for 12 sessions 
provided a clear and focused structure for a joint 
exploration of the way in which Pat's past had 
influenced, and contributed to, her present difficulties. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, and the developmental 
psychology of Vygotsky (Wertsch 1985), learning takes 
place through the process of internalisation, whereby 
what is first experienced and enacted in an interpersonal 
relationship (initially with parents and significant 
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others), generates intrapsychic functioning in the 
developing child. This idea has some correspondence with 
. 
Luborsky's "Core Conflictual Relationship Theme" or CCRT 
(Luborsky 1984), where he postulates that maladaptive 
scripts or schemas learnt early in life have profound 
consequences for the future adult's internal world and 
way of relating to others. Through this process, an 
"internal conversation" is acquired as the capacity for 
self-observation, self-protection and self-control is 
gained. Internalisation is the key to personality 
_development, and problems arising during this can lead to 
emotional conflicts which become the concern of 
. 
psychotherapy. With Pat, I felt that this internalisation 
process had become quite distorted, largely owing to her 
early experiences in her relationship with her parents. 
The underlying theory of CAT, the Procedural Sequences 
Model (PSM), postulates that neurosis is best understood 
as the persistent use of, or failure to change, damaging 
or ineffective procedures. Such coping strategies which 
were useful (or even essential) for the child, become a 
permanent way of dealing with the world as an adult, even 
though they are no longer appropriate or effective. Pat's 
primary "reciprocal role procedure" or RRP (Ryle, 1985) 
was of "submissive child/shaming parent" which 
perpetuated into adulthood and became the major dynamic 
in her interpersonal relationships. 
in his key work, Ryle (1985) introduced RRPs as a 
relational variant of the Target Problem Procedure, which 
develop from early infancy via interaction with 
caregivers. By way of the "reciprocal role procedure" 
Ryle argued that personality development occurred in an 
interpersonal context, and that these self-to-other 
procedures become internalised to form the basis of the 
child's sense of self. 
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Cognitive Analytic Therapy synthesises cognitive 
(Kellian, information-processing) and psychoanalytic 
elements (principally object relations) both in its 
theory and in its therapeutic interventions. Key accounts 
of CAT and its developments can be found in Ryle (1979, 
1982,1985,1990,1995,1997) ; Beard et al. (1990) and 
Leiman (1992,1994ab, 1997). 
Because Ryle's interest in psychotherapy outcome research 
involved the use of Kelly's Repertory Grid technique 
in 
Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955) Ryle believed 
that there were two types of therapeutic language, one 
primarily psychoanalytic and the plainer, cognitive 
language derived from the Grid. Moreover, he felt there 
was a need to be clear about the aims of therapy which 
led to an increasingly direct involvement of patients in 
defining their problems. Ryle (1979) identified three 
main ways in which people fail to modify ineffective 
procedures which he called "traps", "dilemmas" and 
"snags". These would initially be described by the 
therapist and then become a focus of therapy in which the 
goal is "to achieve a change in the terms through which 
experience is construed" (p. 50). 
U 
"Traps" are circular negative beliefs or assumptions 
which generate action, the results of which confirm the 
original belief. "Dilemmas" are false choices and 
represent restrictions of choices or acts to polarised 
alternatives 
- 
often one pole is repeated for fear of the 
consequences of enacting its opposite (similar to Kelly's 
concept of "bipolar constructs"). In "snags", aims are 
abandoned owing to the prediction of negative 
consequences or outcomes, either the reactions of others 
(truly or falsely predicted), or internally predicted, 
and are not always recognised. For example, 
in a 
relationship the choice might seem to be between 
being 
compliant and ensuring love, or being independent 
and 
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risking 
rejection. Such a difficulty, in Ryle's terms, 
would 
be listed as a "Target Problem Procedure" when 
the 
Reformulation (usually in Session 4) is given to the 
patient. This concept of a feared or imagined response 
is 
similar to Luborsky's (1984) model of the "Core 
Conflictual Relationship Theme" cited above. In this, the 
patient's original wish or need (w) leads to a feared or 
imagined response from the other (RO) and a response from 
the self (RS) to that response, again emphasising the 
complex interplay between interpersonal and intrapsychic 
processes. Examples of Pat's "traps", "dilemmas" and 
"snags" are contained in the Psychotherapy File (attached 
as Appendix A). 
The strength of Ryle's model lies in its incorporation of 
the essentials of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
with selected ideas from psychoanalysis. For example, it 
can identify and challenge erroneous or unhelpful 
beliefs, negative self-evaluations and distorted 
predictions of consequences (the "dysfunctional 
attitudes', of Weissman & Beck, 1978). It can aid more 
realistic evaluations of outcome and the therapist can 
help to model action that is more appropriate, adaptive 
or less self-sabotaging to the patient. From the 
psychoanalytic model, it incorporates the "ego defences" 
(CRT's "cognitive editing") of denial, repression, 
dissociation, reaction formation, symptom formation or 
substitution, and splitting. Such processes derive from 
the infant's interactions with adult caregivers and 
reflect significant early experiences (cf. object 
relations theory, Fairbairn, 1952) and the developmental 
psychology of Piaget and Vygotsky (see Wertsch, 1985). 
In this case, the Reformulation was completed in session 
4, based on Pat's clinical history, her relation to me 
in 
the early sessions and her Personal Diary, supplemented 
by the Psychotherapy File. The Reformulation was in the 
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I' form of a Statement written by the therapist in the 
first 
person and aimed to provide "accurate empathy" 
(Rogers, 
1951,1957) so that Pat might feel her internal world had 
been understood, accepted and validated. It targeted the 
"procedures" Pat used which needed to be changed and how 
they were being maintained, often unconsciously, thereby 
demonstrating their circularity and self-perpetuation. I 
gave the Reformulation Statement to Pat to read as a 
basis for further discussion in the sessions, and the 
emotional impact of this on her was profound. She sobbed 
uncontrollably and said she'd "never felt so understood" 
before. Its effect was to strengthen her sense of purpose 
and self-efficacy (an area of key importance to Pat where 
shame had played a central part in her inner world) and 
recruited her to an active, co-operative role in the 
therapy: she became "co-author" of her own story. It also 
strengthened the therapeutic alliance. Indeed, this may 
have paved the way for the remarkable improvement I saw 
in her in the following (fifth) session. 
Termination 
At the twelfth and final session it was necessary to 
balance the reality of termination with reminders of what 
had been learnt and could be taken away. So it was at 
this point that "Goodbye letters" were exchanged, 
attached as Appendix C. These provided a tangible form of 
internalisation and consolidation of the gains of 
therapy. Insofar as the therapist is internalised as a 
more caring and coping figure than the patient's own 
(internal) parents may be, s/he will be internalised an 
the "bearer of understanding and initiator of change' 
(Ryle 1995), not as the omnipotent or shaming caretaker 
of the submissive and shamed child. In reality, if the 
shamed and needy part of the patient has been adequately 
contained by the therapist, then the subsequent capacity 
to self-nurture and value the self can-develop. 
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Critical Evaluation of CAT Therapy 
, S. 
Cognitive Analytic Therapy (CAT) is a brief, focal and 
integrative psychotherapy which is fast growing 
in the UK 
and Europe. It is practised in many settings such as 
NHS 
Psychotherapy departments, community mental health teams, 
psychiatric outpatients' clinics, primary care, 
day 
hospitals and forensic settings. There is now a national 
association which regulates training and practice, and 
the-'demand for CAT courses is growing. Research, service 
1evaluation 
and audit are currently being carried out and 
more formal research trials are planned. 
CAT's growing popularity lies in its theoretical 
flexibility: the model summarised in the Procedural 
Sequences Model (PSM) provides a basis for understanding 
a wide range of problems. Although it is essentially a 
cognitive model, many psychoanalytic ideas can be 
represented in its terms. CAT differs most markedly in 
its focus on sequences and non-revision, rather than 
conflict, as in the Freudian dynamic model. The 
unconscious-conscious division is not emphasised, for 
most procedures are seen to operate automatically. 
Although mental processes are largely unconscious, it is 
3U 
argued by Ryle (1995,1997) that their effects are open 
to reflection, and that both conscious and unconscious 
processes derive from the early interactions of the child 
with its caregivers. The psychoanalytic "dynamic 
unconscious" is only known or hypothesised on the basis 
of the patient's acts, or in the manifestations of 
assumed conflicts in the form of "compromise formations". 
In CAT, all procedures correspond to these "compromise 
formations" in analytic terms. The procedures 
of a 
patient may show those distortions or restrictions 
which 
would, in analytic terms, be described as the results 
of 
repression or denial. offering possible explanations 
in 
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terms of intrapsychic conflict (interpretations) would 
be 
secondary in CAT. For example, submissive behaviour might 
be attributed to "castration anxiety" in psychoanalysis, 
but would, in CAT, be described as a procedure leading to 
negative outcomes often associated with shame, guilt or 
depression (see Alexander et al, 1999 and Section B, 
Chapter 2). For example, the source of the patient's 
perception of the reciprocal role patterns of others as 
shaming or threatening, would be discussed within a 
cognitive analytic framework. 
The joint production of the Reformulation Statement, the 
use of it by the patient to develop more accurate, 
relevant self-reflection, and the use of it by the 
therapist to guard against any collusion with the 
patient's negative procedures, are seen as the main 
therapeutic factors eliciting change (or revision). The 
Reformulation Model combines the two modes of learning 
identified by Bruner, the "narrative" (the retelling and 
linking of the patient's life story) and the 
"paradigmatic,, in the provision of focused descriptions 
of the ongoing processes (Bruner, 1986; Ryle, 1994). The 
method combines accurate, detailed, empathic 
understanding with the "corrective emotional experience" 
(Alexander & French, 1946) of an honest, thoughtful, 
relationship which involves respect, joint work and non- 
collusion, enabling patients to learn new ways of 
reflecting upon, understanding, and valuing themselves. 
Research has shown that cognitive analytic therapy has 
been applied to a very wide, and often severely 
disturbed, range of patients (Ryle, 1997) and seems a 
safe first intervention: there is no reported evidence of 
dangerous negative effects in terms of 
breakdown or 
suicide. In 1987, a comparative study by 
Brockman and 
colleagues had demonstrated that CAT effected more 
cognitive change than did a similar psychodynamic 
brief 
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"therapy. More recently, other outcome studies are under 
way and suggest a promising future for this form of time- 
limited therapy (Ryle 1995,1997). 
Ryle (1997) states that the results of ongoing research, 
whose aim is to describe the scope and limits of CAT, are 
yet to be published. As these are not available at the 
time of writing, this makes a definitive assessment of 
CAT difficult at this stage. However, process studies 
have defined measures of "CAT delivery" and prepared the 
way for controlled comparisons with alternative 
treatments. So far, the results are considered by Ryle to 
be encouraging enough to justify the use of CAT with 
borderline personality disorder patients (Ryle, 1997). 
This development is contemporaneous with similar 
developments in schema-focused cognitive therapy (Young, 
1990). 
Ryle states that one source of CAT was the evaluation of 
dynamic psychotherapy and that CAT has some claim to the 
current, popular call for "evidence-based practice" in 
the NHS. CAT-associated research is summarised in Ryle 
(1995) and Ryle concedes that its scale and design is 
not as comprehensive as he would have liked (the work 
having largely been done in the course of clinical 
practice). But he argues that the accumulating evidence 
supports his claim for the general efficacy of time- 
limited CAT with a wide range of patients (Ryle 1995, 
1997). Brockman and colleagues (1987) had randomly 
assigned 48 outpatients to 12 sessions of CAT or 12 
sessions of treatment following the model of Mann (Mann 
& Goldman, 1982). Mann's model was chosen as it resembled 
CAT in its time-limit and explicit sharing with the 
patient of a focal issue. There were significantly better 
outcomes for the CAT sample on the "Target Problem" And 
"Target Problem Procedures" ratings, but thoso 
disappeared when initial score levels were allowed 
for. 
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More recently, ongoing research into treatment 
of 
borderline patients using CAT (yet to be published) 
is 
encouraging, although a more sustained research 
base is 
needed. Ryle argues that the reciprocal influence of 
using repertory grid measurements in CAT research, and 
developing cognitive analytic methods in practice, 
has 
been fruitful and, over time, has generated many 
interesting developments, such as the use of the self- 
states sequential diagram (SSSD) as a diagrammatic 
alternative to the written Reformulation Statement 
(Beard, Marlowe & Ryle, 1990; Ryle 1990). 
With regard to process studies, Evans and Parry (1996) 
looked at the impact of reformulation in CAT with 
"difficult-to-help clients" using a multiple base design 
to evaluate the short-term impact of reformulation on the 
therapies of four clients who had previously been 
difficult to help. Results showed that reformulation did 
not have a systematic short-term impact upon measures of 
the clients' perceived helpfulness of the sessions, the 
therapeutic alliance or individual problems. However, in 
semi-structured interviews clients reported that the 
reformulation had considerable impact upon them. A 
further process study by Bennett and Parry (1998) 
supported the view that, in CAT, it is possible for the 
therapist to create a descriptive diagram (SSSD) which is 
a valid representation of recurrent relationship 
patterns. 
Another question relating to CAT is the extent to which 
it is an integrative psychotherapy. Ryle believes it is 
(see Ryle 1995,1997) and although it receives only a 
footnote in Roth and Fonagy's (1996) recent review of 
psychotherapy outcome research, the authors clearly view 
it as a theoretically sound and useful 
integration of 
cognitive and analytic ideas: 
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"It is worth noting that over the past 20 years 
considerable efforts have been made to 
systematically integrate differing components of 
; psychotherapies within a coherent theoretical framework; in the United Kingdom the most notable 
such development is that of cognitive analytic 
therapy (CAT; Ryle, 1990). Practitioners of CAT are 
likely to use intervention techniques belonging to, 
for example, psychodynamic or cognitive-behavioral 
therapies. However, intervention strategies follow 
from a formulation of the patient's difficulties. This coherent and planned eclecticism is distinct from therapies in which techniques are "borrowed" in 
the absence of a guiding theoretical framework" (p. 4, footnote). 
CAT is a cognitive therapy insofar as it is concerned 
with information-processing, and explores the link 
between appraisal, beliefs and action. It focuses on 
emotional and behavioural sequences which become self- 
maintaining. But it differs from Beck's model of 
cognitive therapy, not so much in incorporating emotion 
or highlighting the childhood origins of self-defeating 
beliefs, but in positing a more complete account of 
cognitive processing, and in drawing attention to the 
relationship between the therapist and patient. 
Further concerns relate to the wider social and cultural 
'context in which therapy takes place. Hagan and Smail 
(1997), whilst acknowledging the reformulation as a 
"sympathetic and respectful statement" of how the client 
has learned to cope in life (p. 272), argue that such 
approaches run the risk of "psychologizing the 
materiality of social power". By this they mean that 
there is an inherent power imbalance in the world. CAT's 
assertion that a person's situation in the world has 
(fundamentally) changed since childhood, and therefore 
the "procedures" which were adaptive in the past may have 
become problematic and in need of revision, does not take 
into account the actuality of material power. 
In other 
words, simply becoming adult does not necessarily result 
in significant increases in power, nor neutralise the 
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Er lexperience 
of power in the past. The authors' argue that 
i tý may be more important for an abuse survivor to 
confront their abuser(s) in the real world outside the 
consulting-room, than to confront their painful "inner" 
memories as part of the "therapeutic" process. Ryle 
(1997) unconsciously acknowledges this imbalance when he 
states, "Referral patterns, unfortunately, result in the 
fact that more educated patients are over-represented 
in 
the [Munro] clinic" (p. xiii). This concern with inequity 
has been echoed by Bell (1995) and Masson (1990). 
Finally, Bell (1995) argues that CAT is still a 
relatively "young" psychotherapy and that some elements 
in the Psychotherapy File (see Appendix A), such as the 
final section on state shifts, are crude and need further 
refinement. Bell also argues that CAT is in danger of 
"blaming the parents rather than blaming the victim" 
(p. 29) and, like Hagan and Smail (1997), claims that it 
ignores the wider social and cultural context of clients' 
-lives. On a more practical level, the Reformulation 
Statement (or SDR if used) can, according to Bell, take 
5 to 6 hours of therapist time, in addition to the usual 
administrative tasks. Because of this, in a busy NHS 
psychological therapy department, CAT is most likely to 
be reserved for identified clients with unresolved issues 
relating to their past. 
Conclusion 
CAT is clearly a valuable and potentially powerful time- 
limited psychotherapy which offers much to the practice 
of counselling and clinical psychology. It has unique 
strengths in addressing the origins and meanings of 
peoples' problems, whilst encouraging their self- 
efficacy. Main criticisms centre on CAT's 
focus on the 
inner world of the client, or the early 
dynamic between 
client-as-child and caregiver, whilst neglecting 
the role 
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of power inequities in shaping peoples' views of self, 
world and future. 
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Appendix A: The Psychotherapy File 
#v1onitor familiar ways of feeling and acting - these can 
often be "self-sabotaging" and are often automatic. 
Recognising them is an important step to changing them. 
ii 
Keep a "Personal Diary" of moods and behaviour. 
- 
Symptoms, moods, uncomfortable thoughts or behaviour 
What triggers them? How often? In what context? 
Keep a running record of any particular mood, thought, 
symptom or behaviour (daily if possible). 
1. How were you feeling about yourself before the 
problem started? 
2. Any external event, thought or image in your mind 
when the trouble came on? 
3. Once started, what were the thoughts, images or 
feelings you experienced? 
Writing these down will help you recognise and eventually 
help you control how you feel or act at the time. Often 
bad feelings like resentment, anger or depression are the 
result of ways of thinking and acting that are unhelpful. 
Keeping a Personal Diary will help you learn different 
ways of coping with things. 
Keep this for 2 weeks and then we will discuss 
it in the 
following session. 
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Traps, Dilemmas and Snags in Your Life 
In 
Traps 
Traps are things we cannot escape from and certain 
characteristic ways of responding can escalate, so making 
things worse. In an attempt to deal with feeling bad 
about ourselves, we often think and act in certain ways 
that "confirm" our badness or sense of shame. 
For example: 
1. For a long time now it has been important for you to 
please others 
- 
this is because your own sense of self 
has been largely derived from what others think of you, 
starting with your father and mother, and ending with 
your husband. As a result, you often end up being taken 
advantage of by others (as in your marriage) which makes 
you feel guilty, ashamed, angry or depressed. 
2. Because of the difficulty you have in showing your 
true feelings, especially anger, and at the same time 
wanting to please others, you prefer to "take the line of 
least resistance" ie. put things off or hide how you 
really feel, in an attempt to keep the peace. People 
sense this compliance in you and it can make them angry 
or critical, thus confirming your fears that you are weak 
and unloveable. 
Both of these examples can be seen as dual "traps" of 
"trying to please" and "avoidance" and show in the way 
you often think, feel and behave. Because you had shaming 
parents who were unkind and invalidating of you, you felt 
you "didn't deserve" happiness. Your disappointments in 
life confirmed your expectations about yourself which, in 
turn, confirmed your feelings of worthlessness and shame. 
Such an idea has been reactivated by the death of your 
grandson. Because you knew he needed "special care" you 
"must have known" he would die and blamed yourself for 
not preventing it. This confirmed that you are therefore 
"guilty" of his death and consequently, "deserve to 
suffer,,. 
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Dilemmas 
These are forms of "false choices" with either/or options 
that seem right to us 
- 
indeed, often they seem to be the 
only way of thinking and behaving. They are not 
consciously recognised but we often act "as if" these 
choices are true. 
For example: 
1. If I express my feelings I risk being out of control 
and rejection by others, but if I don't express them, or 
deny them, I feel angry and risk being exploited by 
others. 
2. Either I give up control in a relationship and have 
material security, or I keep the control and risk 
emotional insecurity. 
3. Either I ignore my own needs and give to others, or 
I put my own needs first and risk alienating others. 
4. Either I look forward to something and risk being 
disappointed, or I don't look forward to it and avoid 
being let down. 
5. Either I keep something to myself and it stays safe, 
or I share it and risk disapproval or hurting others. 
Snags 
What happens when we say "I want to 
... 
but" (cf. the 
game "Why don't you? 
- 
Yes but", Berne, 1964). Sometimes 
this comes from how we or our families thought about us 
when we were children (eg. Pat as "difficult"). Sometimes 
"snags" come from other people in our lives not wanting 
us to change (Pat as "submissive") or not able to 
tolerate what our changing means to them, as in your new- 
found sense of independence from your controlling 
husband, and his response to that. At other times, we 
"arrange" to avoid pleasure or enjoyment or, if they come 
our way, we "pay" by feeling guilty, ashamed or 
depressed, convincing ourselves we are "undeserving" by 
spoiling things in advance. It is helpful to learn to 
recognise these patterns and how they affect your life 
because only then can you start changing them. 
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1. Notice that: you do things now because this is how 
you learned to manage best when you were younger, eg. not 
showing you were angry with your father to avoid the 
consequences of being shamed and humiliated by him. 
2. Realise that: you don't have to go on doing them. 
What was appropriate then (as a child) is no longer 
appropriate now (as an adult). 
3. Understand that: by changing your behaviour, you not 
only control it but you change the way people behave 
towards you. For example, your recent "altercation" at 
work when you didn't feel you were in the wrong, and 
demonstrated that belief by your behaviour. 
4. Believe that: by really being firm about your right 
to change, those who really care for you will accept and 
respect it. 
5. Learn to: avoid "snags" by staying true to your 
self 
. 
IT& You feel limited by: 
1. The fear of others' responses 
2. The fear of your own responses to their responses 
Learn to monitor how some states are accompanied by: 
- 
intense and uncontrollable emotions 
- 
feelings of "emotional blankness" or cutting off 
- 
feelings of shame, guilt and anger 
- 
fears that others might hurt you 
- 
wanting to retaliate 
- 
swift mood changes that seem to emerge from nowhere 
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Appendix B Reformulation Statement 
I have felt bad about myself for as long as I can 
remember. I never felt loved or wanted by my parents and 
they both used to put me down although I've never 
understood the reason for this. I suppose I must have 
been a bad child in some way and a disappointment to 
them. They must have felt ashamed of me. I soon learnt to 
"be a good girl" in order to please them, or at least, to 
avoid the consequences of showing them how unhappy and 
ashamed they made me feel. I didn't feel happy inside at 
all. In fact, I often felt angry and resentful. As I grew 
up, I thought that by caring for others more than myself 
it would make other people come to love me and value the 
sort of person I was 
- 
and in that way I would find 
happiness. But I couldn't get rid of this feeling that 
maybe I "deserved" unhappiness because I was really bad 
-otherwise why did my parents dislike me so much? And so 
I began to believe that other peoples' views and opinions 
about me were the only ones that mattered 
- 
and that they 
were probably true. It was all so confusing 
... 
Because I had never felt loved as a child, when I met my 
husband I felt safe with him. He looked after me in a 
material way and it was a familiar feeling, being around 
this man "in authority" who always knew what to do and 
how to cope. Now I realise how like my father he is. As 
a child, when I got angry with my father I would hide it, 
because I was scared of what he'd do to me if I 
"rebelled". When I got angry with John I did the same : 
although I wasn't happy with him I was still frightened 
of the consequences of losing the only security I had 
and I "lived a lie". He was unkind to the children out of 
all proportion to their misdemeanours. What I thought was 
his setting them firm boundaries, I now realise was 
bullying and shaming behaviour. Yes, that's how he 
reminds me of my father. I'd never realised it before, 
but they both had to be in control in order to feel good 
about themselves. And they could only do that at someone 
else's expense, by making sarcastic remarks or threats. 
But these things have been very difficult to sort out. I 
often have times when I think I am to blame for 
everything that goes wrong in my life - as well as other 
peoples'. When my little grandson died recently of a cot 
death, just one week old, I felt it was my fault. I knew 
he needed special care. I felt it intuitively and so my 
unconscious must have known. That means that I let him 
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die: in other words, I was responsible for his death. I 
let him die so therefore I must be bad and am being 
punished. That's why I go to his grave so often, to make 
up for the wrong I've done him in not acting, not warning 
anyone, not taking extra care. But is that really true? 
Maybe there are some things in life that just happen and 
that are nothing to do with me at all. It's getting a bit 
easier to believe that now, although I often lapse into 
my old ways of thinking. 
I'm very confused about who I am and what I want from 
life. When I'm at work I want to be at home, and when I'm 
at home I want to be at work. I don't know what to do 
with my time 
- 
I've nothing and no-one to fill it. I 
would like to meet people and start some new things, but 
I know what I'm like. I soon feel disappointed or get 
bored and want to withdraw. I wonder, will you get fed up 
with me? Am I worth all this help? I've always felt like 
that 
- 
not feeling I belong anywhere, not feeling I'm 
worth the effort. Disconnected. I want to make changes in 
my world but I think I'm afraid. 
IIAL 
Note 
It is the therapist's view that, historically, both 
parents have chronically shamed this patient who has 
internalised the shame and, in analytic terms, come to 
see herself as a "bad object". This dynamic was 
maintained when the "shaming father" was replaced by the 
"shaming husband". The "self-as-bad-object" schema is 
automatically reactivated by a traumatic event (her 
grandson's death) which calls into question the patient's 
self-worth and exacerbates her pre-existing negative 
self-beliefs. The patient's sense of over-responsibility 
perpetuates the self-blame, which fuels further the 
schema of "self-as-bad-object" and confirms her 
underlying core beliefs that she is bad and undeserving, 
both being fundamental concomitants of shame. 
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Appendix C: Goodbye Letters 
Dear Pat, 
Over the past few weeks of therapy you have gained some 
awareness of how difficult it has been for you to show 
your true feelings, both with your parents and later, 
with your husband. 
You have connected the way in which John resembles your 
father 
- 
both strict and shaming men who had to be in 
control, so that you never really felt good about 
yourself. You experienced your mother as hostile and 
critical, which undermined your self-worth even further. 
Understandably, you were unable to make sense of their 
behaviour towards you, which confirmed your beliefs that 
you were different from, and inferior to, others. This 
left you feeling unloveable, lonely, and of little value 
in the world. In order to please people, in the hope that 
they would like or love you, you developed a compliant 
and submissive self. This denial of your own needs often 
made you feel angry, which then led to guilt, thus 
driving the anger even further underground. 
Attempts to express 
.. 
your real feelings have always made 
you feel ashamed and guilty, which then became 
internalised as depression. Sometimes you've found it 
hard to know what your true feelings are, having learnt 
so young to consider everybody eises'. 
I said at our first meeting that the sadness and shame 
you feel belong to the past 
-I think they do - and 
that's where they belong. We talked about the role that 
disappointment has played in your life, stemming from 
childhood feelings of not being wanted and of being 
actively disliked, and how this has implications for you 
now, in that you find it hard to plan, or look forward to 
things, incase they get spoilt. By not anticipating 
pleasure or enjoyment, you are able to avoid the pain of 
disappointment that you were unable to express as a 
child. 
We saw how your shame and self-doubt during the sessions 
have given way to anger, with yourself and others, but 
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particularly John, and how you can now accept this 
without feeling guilty. 
Finally, we talked about how you feel able to put the sad 
part of your life on one side, and how "the anger seems 
less important now" (your words). You can enjoy being on 
your own and living life how you want, learning it's O. K. 
to put your needs first and that you no longer have to 
accept other peoples' definitions of how you should be. 
It seems you were caught in a basic dilemma concerning 
your relationship with others. It is as if you either 
expressed your feelings, got hurt, felt helpless, 
rejected and powerless, or denied your feelings, so 
avoiding disappointment and rejection. But this was not 
helpful because it left you feeling alone and isolated 
with no sense of belonging or intimacy in your life. 
However, you realise now that there are alternatives. You 
can be in control of your life, be more assertive about 
your needs and be involved with others in mutually 
caring, sharing relationships 
- 
using that "inner 
strength" you referred to. You have also learnt to be 
more positive and less shame-full in the knowledge that 
you were not to blame for your parents' attitude towards 
you. 
We are saying "Goodbye" and you can see this time as an 
important testing-out period for your new strengths and identified weaknesses. Alone, but not completely, as we 
can always arrange more time together if you'd like it. 
Ift 
So "Goodbye Pat" and good luck 
- 
for a future of your own 
making. 
With warm regards 
Barbara 
P. S. I hope there won't be so many things for your guilty 
list now 
- 
perhaps you may even tear it up one day? 
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Dear Barbara, 
I'm not very good at writing letters, but here goes. 
I would like to say how much I have got from our weekly 
sessions. You have helped me understand myself and to 
realise that I am as good as others. 
I know that my life isn't going to change overnight, nor 
is it going to be easy. But you have shown me the way and 
I thank you for that. 
It is also comforting to know that if things get too 
difficult I can contact you again. 
Yours sincerely 
, *h 
Pat 
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"It is is certainly true that there are dreams which embody suppressed 
wishes and fears, but what is there which the dream cannot, on occasion, 
embody? Dreams may give expression to ineluctable truths, to 
philosophical pronouncement, illusions, wild fantasies, memories, plans, 
anticipations, irrational experiences, even telepathic visions, and 
heaven knows what besides. " C. G. Jung, 1963, Memories, Dreams, 
Reflections. 
Frontispiece 
Because shame is becoming increasingly acknowledged as 
such an important affect, which is often unconscious or 
defended against (Section B refers), its recognition has 
particular significance for the handling of the 
therapeutic relationship and therapeutic outcome. The 
"pain of shame", which is often denied or repressed by 
the patient, has far-reaching implications for the place 
of dreamwork in psychotherapy. Dreams often provide 
clinically useful information which can alert the 
practitioner to the patient's shame-generative material, 
which the patient may disown, or be unaware of, in 
conscious life. 
The aim of this review is to critically evaluate the role 
of dreams within the psychotherapeutic context. By her 
notion of "bypassed shame" (Section B, Chapter 2), Lewis 
(1971) makes implicit reference to the role of the 
unconscious in the repression, or avoidance, of shameful 
affect. Lewis suggests that the "pain of shame" may be 
actively avoided by the patient and can remain 
unrecognised by, and inaccessible to, the conscious mind. 
Lewis (1971) described shame in its two main variants: 
overt, undifferentiated shame and bypassed shame. Whereas 
overt shame is analogous to being ashamed, bypassed shame 
is a state of shame that is largely unconscious. Bypassed 
shame is a low-visibility state which is difficult to 
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detect. Bypassed shame cannot be detected in bodily 
arousal; it is primarily observed in thought processes 
and interpersonal relationships. Sometimes it may be 
confused with guilt. The concept of bypassed shame is 
critical for understanding the therapeutic process and 
can have a dramatic effect on outcome. Lewis also 
discovered that "shame in the patient-therapist 
relationship was a special contributor to the negative 
therapeutic reaction" (p. 11). She showed that, because 
one unresolved aspect of transference is bypassed, or 
unconscious, shame, it could easily be overlooked. 
Dreams, therefore, make a significant contribution to 
identifying and understanding bypassed shame. It is the 
unconscious aspect of dreams, and in particular the role 
of dream interpretation as postulated by Freud, that can 
play a crucial role in making sense of a patient's shame- 
generating material. This review will therefore begin 
with an assessment of Freud's conceptualisation of the 
function of dreams and the role they play in expressing 
repressed psychic material. 
Freud: Dreams and The Unconscious 
Freud (1900) originally used the term '"dreamwork" to 
denote the complex process by which the dream "censor" 
(ie. the theoretical ancestor of the superego) converts 
the "latent" content of the dream into its "manifest" 
content, thereby giving the dream its often succinct and 
surreal quality. In the therapeutic situation, the 
process of dream interpretation requires that the 
therapist "unravel" the dreamwork by methods such as the 
patient "free associating" to dream components, in order 
to uncover their deeper meaning. Due to the "dreamwork", 
which involves such complex processes as condensation, 
overdetermination, displacement and symbolisation, the 
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wide-ranging nebulous quality of the dream-thoughts is 
replaced by a brief and often meagre dream fragment - 
rich in underlying content but often extremely sparse in 
its dreamed state. 
In this way, two aspects of dream function become 
apparent: the representation and symbolisation by which 
the dream thoughts are replaced by visual images, and the 
process of "secondary revision" whereby the dream is 
dramatised and given a sense of coherence or a 
"storyline". Because Freud originally maintained that the 
underlying function of the dream was "wish fulfilment", 
it followed that there was no such thing as an 
inconsequential dream or gratuitous dream material, 
because its aim was to establish connections and fuse 
them into a complex and unified whole, despite its 
seemingly fragmentary, often archaic, quality. Freud 
(1920) extended his notion of dreams as wish fulfilments 
by suggesting that dreams could also function as a form 
of "active mastery" over events that had previously been 
suffered passively. A contemporary example of this was in 
the recurrent traumatic dreams of shell-shocked soldiers 
which Freud called the "repetition compulsion". Even so, 
the central concept of a disguised and repressed wish 
(often sexual and originating in childhood) still 
remained. 
To illustrate this notion of "reworking" I present an 
example of a dream which a patient, whom I shall call 
Kate, described and which had stayed with her over the 
years (Section B, Chapter 6 refers). Her younger sister 
by two years, named Barbara, had died of meningitis at 
the age of seven, when my patient was nine years old. The 
death was "hushed up" by her mother and my patient was 
told that her sister had "gone": no explanation was ever 
given. It came as a shock to her when, over a year later, 
she found out Barbara had died. Around this time, as the 
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eldest child, she was caretaker to her two younger 
siblings (a younger sister and a brother born in the year 
following Barbara's death), as her mother was depressed 
and unable to resume this role. She felt prematurely 
forced into taking on an "adult" role, which left her 
feeling resentful and neglected 
- 
not able to join her 
friends in normal childhood games. 
During therapy, it soon emerged that the issue of 
"secrecy", understandably, caused her great anxiety and 
psychological distress. This had been compounded in her 
marriage as she felt her husband had a "secretive side" 
and was not always as open with her as she would have 
liked him to be. This made her feel angry and 
resentful, which became internalised as depression, her 
presenting symptom. 
She spoke of a recurring dream which she would have as a 
child, especially when she was unhappy, and this was of 
being in an exotic, warm and foreign land, where she felt 
free and unrestrained. The few days prior to the (dream) 
session had been particularly painful for her, as she'd 
arrived at her husband's office unannounced, and 
discovered his accountant (whom she did not expect to 
see) sitting on a swivel-chair in the middle of the 
room, mini-skirted and animatedly gesticulating and 
chatting to Kate's husband. Her description of her was 
"all gestures 
- 
like she does", flamboyantly extending 
her arm in a re-enactment of her painful "discovery" a 
few days earlier. This event had profoundly disturbed 
her as it resonated with her worst fears and anxieties 
around secrecy. That night Kate woke up crying in the 
middle of a dream, set in Spain, and depicting a flamenco 
dancer "performing" to an applauding and enthusiastic 
audience. Kate thought she was there in the dream both as 
a spectator and, at times, the dancer but couldn't be 
sure. 
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In Freudian terms, the dream could be understood as the 
flaunting, discharged energy of an exhibitionistic and 
grandiose self wishing to be seen and admired. At the 
same time, with the dreamer as onlooker, it could imply 
the longed-for wish of the voyeuristic self observing 
exhibited sexual impulses (and therefore shameful) 
depicted here in the form of flamboyant dancing. 
According to Freud's (1920) later view, which embraced 
the "repetition compulsion", the dream could also be seen 
as a "reworking", or attempt at mastery, of past 
traumatic events: in this case Kate is no longer merely 
a "spectator" of life, as childhood events had made her. 
The dream is also very interesting clinically in that 
it expresses Kate's ambivalence about the desirability of 
being "centre-stage", hence her slipping in and out of 
the spectator/dancer role (another example of affective 
and cognitive "reworking"). The dream clearly made use of 
the "day residue" (Freud 1900) with the flamboyant "other 
woman", as well as connecting with Kate's recurring 
childhood dream of freedom and warmth, symbolising escape 
from a household in which she had been forced to take on 
premature responsibilities. It is of note that her 
earliest memory was of escaping from her harness when 
in the garden and she recalled the enormous sense of 
pleasure and relief that such "illicit" freedom gave her. 
At a more cognitive level, the dream also served to 
bolster up her flagging self-esteem at a time when she 
was feeling jealous and vulnerable, believing that she 
compared unfavourably (in her husband's eyes) to "the 
other woman. " Such feelings of jealousy were inevitably 
accompanied by shame. 
It is Freud's concept of dream material providing a 
"working through" of traumatic events that can bring 
significant benefit in the therapeutic encounter as such 
painful, and shame-generating, reminders are often 
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avoided in the patient's conscious life (cf. Lewis' 
(1971) "bypassed shame"). However, Freud's view of the 
role of dreams as providing access to unconscious and 
repressed material has attracted much criticism 
(Fairbairn 1952; Jung 1963; Meltzer 1984; Segal, 1983) 
and various theorists have extended the whole concept of 
"dreamwork" to include the totality of the patient's 
emotional and cognitive experiences, in addition to the 
unconscious meanings attached to them. 
Because the concept of dreamwork, since Freud, has been 
extended to cover all aspects of working therapeutically 
with dreams, this review will examine the use and 
function of dreamwork across a range of therapeutic 
orientations. Because dream analysis has also evolved as 
such a central feature of Jungian "analytical psychology" 
Jung will be considered first. 
Jung: The Healing Function of Dreams 
Despite the importance of dream analysis for Jung, he 
intentionally did not develop a general theory of dreams, 
believing as he did that the aim of the therapist is to 
increase the patient's capacity to "conduct his own 
therapy" (Jung, 1963). Jung, in fact, stressed how 
important it is to abandon any preconceived opinions and 
theoretical predilections in working with dreams. He 
urged the therapist to "stand ready in every single case 
to construct a totally new theory of dreams" (Jung, 
1963). However, Jung did hold a number of basic 
assumptions: firstly, that dreams did express unconscious 
structures and processes both personal and archetypal 
(ie. universal); secondly, that they contained a meaning 
that could be understood if the "dream context" could be 
established; thirdly, dreams revealed a compensatory 
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process in the unconscious; and fourthly, they showed a 
"purposive trend" towards individuation in the psyche. 
Freud and Jung: A Comparison 
Unlike Freud, Jung did not endeavour to dismantle the 
dream into its component parts, and only pursued the 
patient's associations insofar as they provided a clue to 
the dream's meaning. He did not urge the patient to 
pursue them because, he claimed, dreams lead to parts of 
the self only, and can cause disintegration in the person 
as a whole. In Jungian therapy, the patient is often 
advised to write down his dreams in a "dream book" or 
"dream journal" and, in this way, a whole "dream series" 
can be constructed. The patient is inducted into an 
ongoing therapeutic but self-healing process, minimising 
regression and dependence on the therapist. 
Whilst Jung agreed with Freud that dreams were "the royal 
road to the unconscious" (Freud, 1900), his understanding 
of their meaning and function differed radically from 
Freud's. As Freud considered the "manifest" content of 
dreams to be the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish 
which had its origins in infantile sexuality, Jung 
believed dreams had much wider and deeper significance. 
Jung rejected the idea that the dream is a facade 
concealing the "true" meaning: "the so-called facade of 
most houses is by no means a fake or a deceptive 
distortion; on the contrary, it follows the plan of the 
building and often betrays the interior arrangement" 
(Jung, Collected Works 7, p. 295). He believed that dreams 
were the direct expression of unconscious psychic 
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activity and acted as symbolic communications or "a 
message from the soul". 
As such, Jung believed dreams provide a view of the 
dreamer's situation, and mobilise the potential of the 
personality to meet it. Since dreams can introduce new 
and unexpected factors into the total situation, they 
enable the patient to view things differently, and 
through their "compensatory action" can support and 
strengthen the Self, promoting development of the 
personality. One could see this process as similar to 
"reattribution" in the cognitive therapy literature (Beck 
et al., 1979) or as "reframing" within the systems 
paradigm (Epston, 1989; White, 1989; Woolfe & Dryden, 
1996). 
Jung believed that, as an efficient homeostatic system 
(cf. Freud) the psyche possesses the capacity to heal 
itself, and it is in the "compensatory function" of the 
unconscious that this power for self-healing resides. A 
vital expression of the propensity with which the 
unconscious gives rise to symbols, and is capable of 
reuniting conflicting tendencies which are seemingly 
irreconcilable at the conscious level, Jung referred to 
as "the transcendent function". His view was that 
individuals are never able to "solve" the most crucial 
problems in life 
- 
only "transcend" them. 
According to Jung, it is only by the awareness of both 
"poles" of every conflict, and one's endurance of the 
"tension" created between them, that radical shifts can 
occur in personality change. This comes about, he argued, 
through the power of the unconscious to create a new 
symbolic synthesis out of the existing conflicting 
propensities, reflecting Kohut's (1977) ideas on the 
"matrix of tension arcs in the bipolar self" (referred 
to in Section B, Chapter 5). 
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Therefore, to Jung, dreams were seen to be extremely 
therapeutic and this is emphasised repeatedly in his 
(1963) autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections. At 
every crisis period in his life, a dream or a vision 
provided Jung with an essential source for developing a 
solution. Jung also realised the importance of "waking 
consciousness" as well as dreams, and found ways of 
bridging the gap between the two by inducing from them 
"active imaginations". In these ways, the whole concept 
of the dream was extended to include both the dream 
experience as dreamed and its waking memory ie. it 
included both waking and dreaming elements. Jung was 
therefore influential in recognising the multi-faceted 
nature of "dreaming", with his inclusion of the patient's 
visions, fantasies and "active imaginations" as part of 
the overall dreaming process. 
By such means, according to Jung, the "transcendent 
function" can find expression and so lead to personal 
growth and individuation. But Jung also warned that the 
use of a "dream book" or "dream journal" in the sessions 
could be used defensively (often by intellectualisation) 
and so impede the progress of therapy. He commented: 
"However much people underestimate the psychological 
significance of dreams, there is an equally great 
danger that anyone who is constantly preoccupied 
with dream analysis will overestimate the 
significance of the unconscious for real life" 
(Jung, Collected Works 8, p. 256). 
In the Jungian view, Kate's dream could be seen as an 
example of the "transcendent function" in which a 
"transitional self" attempts to reunite conflicting 
tendencies which may seem irreconcilable at the conscious 
level, capturing the tension between a desired (shame- 
free) and an existing (shame-full) self: hence her 
slipping in and out of the dancer/spectator roles. It 
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portrays the dreamer in touch with previously-disowned 
aspects of her personality in order to achieve a fuller 
integration, and embraces the Jungian concepts of 
"dualities" and "psychic compensators". 
Perls and the Gestalt View of Dreams: Dreams and 
Individuation 
Such ideas of individuation and potentiation of the 
"missing links" of the self are also central to the 
Gestalt way of working with dreams. The founder of 
Gestalt therapy, Fritz Perls (1951), conceptualised the 
dream as providing a means of exploring unrealised parts 
of the personality. Dreams were not seen as "disguised 
wishes" as in the Freudian view, but as "existential 
messages" from the dreamer, anchored in the here-and-now, 
which function as a form of creative, dynamic expression. 
The Gestalt way of working with dreams suggests the 
dreamer must re-own, re-integrate and "take 
responsibility for" the sum of his or her existence, 
which, through the dream process, can finally be 
assimilated into the Self. Because of this, Gestalt 
"dreamwork" encourages the dreamer to speak as all parts 
of the dream, and to identify with each in turn. This 
concept of differentiation and integration, and of 
working with polarities and dualities of the Self, is 
very close to Jung's notion of dreams as "psychic 
compensators". The aim of therapy then becomes to 
"unblock" repressed dreams, and dreamwork is seen, 
essentially, as a continuous process towards self- 
actualisation by "entering into a dialogue with the 
exposed aspects of the dream" (Fantz 1975, p. 80). 
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Perls and Jung: A Comparison 
For both Perls and Jung, the "message" was in the dream 
and both used dreamwork extensively. Within the Jungian 
approach, the dream is supremely valued for its healing 
and balancing function; in the Gestalt view it contains 
the "existential difficulty" ie. the missing part of the 
potentially integrated self. Both Perls and Jung looked 
on dreams as the primary therapeutic vehicle which had 
direct relevance to the patient's present life situation 
as well as his or her basic personality structure, 
informed by early experience. Both theorists agreed that 
the dream is a revelatory process and not a mechanism for 
disguise and distortion, as did Freud. They saw working 
with dreams as conducive to growth and self-knowledge 
and, in this sense, to be dynamic, rather than providing 
an outlet for repressed or unacceptable (shameful) 
wishes. 
Perls believed that any particular dream has reference to 
the dreamer's present life situation and should be 
interpreted in whatever way the dreamer finds most 
useful. For example, if the dream generates an infantile 
wish, this should be explored to see how it is affecting 
the dreamer's life in the present. Perls, like Jung, 
believed that such a method could be used by ordinary 
people at home to gain insight into personal problems and 
conflicts 
- 
and was not to be regarded as a "specialised" 
(and often "mystified") approach to be used only by 
"experts" in the consulting-room. Perls was even 
reluctant to use the word "interpretation", just as Jung 
was reluctant to develop a general theory of dreams. 
A Gestalt therapist might ask the dreamer to identify 
with (and possibly actively play out) each of the 
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different dream parts or components. In the clinical 
example described here, the dreamer might be asked to 
become the dancer's skirt, the staccato'd rhythm of the 
music, or the cheer of the applauding crowd. 
Two concepts central to the understanding of Gestalt 
formulations are "need fulfilment" and the processes of 
"differentiation" and "integration". Perls saw needs as 
being patterned in a constant flux or movement, and he 
regarded them as a "function of shifts" in a figure- 
ground relationship. In Kate's dream, the shifting nature 
of the figure-ground relationship is clearly portrayed, 
in the fusing of dancer and spectator, and it is by the 
process of identification with the changing dream- 
components, and actually taking them into the Self, that 
the dreamer can come to a fuller and more integrated 
awareness. As such, the dream is a means of dynamic, 
creative expression, allowing the dreamer to experience, 
and be aware of, their self at various levels. This may 
often involve "re-owning", or taking responsibility for, 
shame-generative material. 
Kelly and Personal Construct Theory: Dreams and Construct 
Loosening 
Interestingly, this idea is reflected in the personal 
construct approach, where one of the therapist's first 
concerns is often a continuation of the process of 
elaboration of the patient's construct system, which is 
likely to have already commenced during the assessment 
process. The personal construct therapist is concerned to 
either "loosen" or "tighten" a patient's construing. 
"Loosening" may serve several functions, such as setting 
the stage for a re-alignment of constructs or 
facilitating the attachment of a verbal label to a 
12 
preverbal construct. It may be done in various ways, 
including relaxation, free association or uncritical 
acceptance of the patient's construing. Such methods 
minimise patient shame and encourage authenticity in the 
therapeutic relationship (cf. Roger's "core conditions", 
1957); they also encourage the reporting and exploration 
of dreams within the sessions (Woolfe & Dryden, 1996). 
Klein and Object-Relations: Dreams and Phantasy 
The Object-Relations position on dreams is, in practice, 
not essentially different in its principles from the 
Freudian one. But it recognises and interprets features 
of the transference more readily. It is seen as the 
therapist's task to get the patient working, or playing, 
with the ideas (from dreams or other sources) that 
preoccupy him or her. The repressed wish underlying the 
train of associations in the dream is, according to the 
Kleinian view (Klein, 1952), secondary to the attempt to 
deal with bad or threatening "object relationships" and 
to "put right what once went wrong" (p. 48). Winnicott's 
personal contribution to therapeutic technique was to get 
therapists to conceptualise their patients as people who, 
in childhood or adolescence forgot (or never developed) 
the capacity to play, and who now need to experience this 
as a key component in the therapeutic process (Winnicott, 
1951). 
For Klein (1975) the unconscious is viewed as a 
"container" full of contents with no clear distinction 
between pre-consciousness and consciousness. The aim of 
the Kleinian therapist is to find the "unconscious 
content of the phantasies" and the workings of the 
unconscious ego. As Susan Isaacs (1958) notes, the 
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primary content of all mental processes is unconscious 
phantasies, and such phantasies are the basis of all 
unconscious and conscious thought processes. As such, 
Klein is not concerned with the unconscious as a system 
of thought. It is the content, not the dreamwork, which 
is central to a Kleinian therapist's interpretation of 
dreams. 
Such a view, along with Klein's observations of children, 
resulted in her orientation towards the "phantasy" 
content of symbolic play, which she saw as 
representative of the same archaic mode of expression 
which occurs in the dreams of adults. Klein (1926) 
states: 
"symbolism is only a part of it 
... 
we must take 
into account not only the symbolism which often 
appears so clearly in their games, but also all the 
means of representation and the mechanisms employed 
in dream work, and we must bear in mind the 
necessity of examining the whole nexus of phenomena" (q. Mitchell (1986) pp. 64-65). 
Klein (1926) maintained that symbolic play can only be 
fully understood if-approached by the method that Freud 
used for dreams, because "children produce no fewer 
associations to the separate features of their games than 
do adults to the fragments of their dreams". Moreover, 
Klein (1926) argued that, in their play, children often 
represent the same thing that has appeared in some dream 
which they have narrated before, and often produce 
associations to a dream by means of the play which 
follows. She maintains that play provides childrens' 
most important mode of expressing themselves. In this 
way, Klein believed that children substituted actions, 
the original precursors of thoughts, for words. Symbolic 
play-acting was seen by Klein as both an extension and 
representation of the dream process. 
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In Klein's view, the concepts of symbolism and phantasy 
(ie. how the baby relates psychically to the conjunction 
of its inner and outer worlds) are central to her 
therapeutic work. The affinity of the child's world of 
play to the dream world of the adult is self-evident. 
Therefore Klein, whilst accepting the importance of the 
Freudian process of "unravelling" dreams through 
"dreamwork", modified its use to encompass the 
"unravelling" and interpretations of a child's symbolic 
play. In this way, she developed and extended the dream's 
function, but did not focus on it exclusively as a 
therapeutic tool. The dream was seen as indicative of the 
contents of the current transference relationship, and 
was therefore located in the "here-and-now" of the 
therapeutic sessions. However, the association of shame 
with self-consciousness reported in the literature 
(Section B, Chapter 2 refers) suggests that shame would 
be less problematic for children than for adults. 
Moreover, the actual "reality" of the patient's historic 
life-events would be seen by Klein as of secondary 
importance to the internal, psychic, and primitive 
interplay of life and death instincts and those 
infantile phantasies, and adult dreams, that are 
generated by this interplay. 
It is interesting that, in the example described above, 
the patient reported "waking up crying" in the middle of 
her dream, illustrating the pain that such psychic 
conflict can evoke. In her dream, the primacy of the 
"life-depleting" (and shaming) forces of rage, 
persecutory anxiety and envy, are portrayed in opposition 
to the "life-enhancing" instincts of love, gratitude, and 
freedom, where these forces embody a self that is 
"shame-prone" or "shame-free" respectively. In Kleinian 
terms, the dream demonstrates the "paranoid-schizoid" 
position of a patient whose feelings are "split" into 
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envy on the one hand, and gratitude for life on the 
other, denoted by the tension between (envious) onlooker 
and (envied) dancer. 
Segal: Dreams and "Psychic Evacuation" 
In contradistinction to Klein's focus on the importance 
of the unconscious content, Segal (1983) made the point 
that the form and function of a dream could be more 
important than its content and, in her view, dreams 
frequently function as a means of "evacuating psychic 
material" which the dreamer is currently unable to deal 
with at a conscious level (again, reflecting Lewis' 
(1971) concept of "bypassed shame" referred to in Section 
B, Chapter 2). It is also similar to Freud's notion of 
the "repetition compulsion" 
-a reworking of disturbing 
material in order to achieve mastery over it. The dream 
is seen as a kind of "psychic holding exercise" with a 
view to regaining some measure of emotional equilibrium. 
Piaget: Childrens' Dreams 
Piaget (1953) considered dreams in the context of the 
processes of childhood, and believed that conscious 
thinking was pre-dated by a more primitive form of 
thinking which occurred "through the articulation of 
imagery". He saw this as the process which occurs in 
dreaming ie. an active but primitive process. He also 
believed that children are often unaware of things 
because they simply take them for granted. He argued that 
childrens' assumptions are unconscious because they are 
so familiar that they elude awareness. Interestingly, 
16 
Symington (1986) refers to a similar process in 
psychotherapy, stating that often the deepest clinical 
observations are the ones that have "stared you in the 
face" from the first meeting with the patient, but which 
may take a long time for the therapist to notice. 
Winnicott: Dreams as "Transitional Becoming" 
Similarly, Winnicott (1951) in his clinical use of 
dreams, always looked for that element which contained 
the "transitional" ie. an ambiguous quality or an 
ambiguity in the state of existence: one moment part of 
the self, and at another, a part of the central figure in 
the world beyond the self (such as the mother's breast 
during feeding). As such, Winnicott argued, the dream 
represents a state of constant "becoming", similar to 
Khan's (1972) idea of the "dream space", which can also 
be used transitionally in this way. 
IIL 
Meltzer: Dreams and the Primacy of Feeling 
Meltzer (1984) took the view that every dream is an 
attempt to solve an emotional conflict and that the 
process of dreaming, "the generative theatre of meaning", 
enables internal and external objects to take on new 
emotional significance which can then be utilised in the 
dreamer's current life situation. 
This has important implications for the therapist, as 
Meltzer believes that the "occupational hazard" of dream 
analysis is the "exposure to radioactive material". In 
other words, the "charged" material of the dream, and its 
ability to evoke projective identifications, can result 
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in the therapist's fear of being invaded, taken over or 
confused by the patient. Meltzer, like Bion (1967), saw 
dreamwork as concerned with how to translate painful 
emotional experience which is often shame-generative, 
into some symbolic form so that it can be reflected on 
and communicated to others, thereby acknowledging the 
primacy of feeling over thought. 
Fairbairn: The "Symbolic Narrative" in Dreams 
Fairbairn (1952) believed that, in therapy, the dream 
functions as a "symbolic narrative" which reflects on the 
individual's psychic state, and most importantly, on the 
state of his or her "internal objects". In the analytic 
literature, objects are nearly always people, parts of 
people, or symbols of one or the other. An "internal 
object" is an object-representation which has acquired 
the significance of an external object ie. it is an image 
occurring in phantasy which is reacted to as "real". As 
such, the dream becomes a "dramatisation" of situations 
existing in the person's inner reality and the dramatis 
personae are drawn from parts of the dreamer's own self 
and/or internalised objects. As such, according to 
Fairbairn, dreams reflect not only a current self in 
relation to the therapist, but also show part- and 
whole- object experiences from the patient's most archaic 
developmental levels. On this view, the dream directly 
illustrates, in symbolic form, the unfolding dynamics of 
the interactive psychotherapeutic process. 
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Kohut: Self-State Dreams 
Kohut Is "Self-Psychology" (1971,1977) provides a 
theoretical framework which postulates the organisation 
of the "bipolar self" in the midst of change, and in 
relation to its "self-object" experiences ie. important 
experiences with significant and internalised others 
(Kohut 1971,1977, referred to in Section B, Chapter 5). 
Kohut describes two types of dream: "those expressing 
verbalizable latent contents (ie. drives, wishes, 
conflicts and attempted conflict solutions), and those 
attempting, with the aid of verbalizable dream-imagery, 
to bind the nonverbal tensions of traumatic states". The 
latter, which Kohut referred to as "self-state dreams", 
attempt to "deal with the psychological danger by 
covering nameless processes with nameable visual imagery" 
(p. 108). 
In this type of dream, an exploration of the patient's 
"associative elaborations" provides clues to the fact 
that "the healthy sectors of the patient's psyche are 
reacting with anxiety to a disturbing change in the 
condition of the self" (p. 109). This could range from 
manic stimulation to a depressive drop in self-esteem, as 
experienced in shame, or even to a threat of total 
disintegration. Such "self-state dreams" are not 
dissimilar to the dreams of childhood, or those 
experienced in traumatic neuroses. The state of the self 
is observed by an observing sector of the self, and that 
observation is represented in the dream. 
Tolpin: Selfself-object Dreams 
According to Tolpin (1983), Kohut's writings contain 
other types of dream about the trials of the self and its 
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experiences with self-objects, although he maintains 
Kohut did not provide them with a name or function. 
Tolpin refers to such dreams as "selfself-object dreams", 
indicating the crucial role of the relationship of the 
self to the self-object, regardless of how archaic or 
mature the (dream) self is found to be. 
Such dreams cannot be understood from their "manifest" 
content alone, but only from a combination of present-day 
associations, the "day-residue", and an understanding of 
the patient's transference, dynamics, personality and 
defensive tendencies, "grasped empathically together. " 
Tolpin (1983) argues that there are "mixed" dreams, whose 
interpretation is derived from an understanding of the 
self-state elements, as well as the more concealed 
symbolic components. Kohut (1971) referred to these as 
"transitional" forms of dreams, in which aspects of the 
"archaic self" are present, possibly as a total setting 
or background atmosphere of the dream, while other 
elements represent varieties of "structural conflict". In 
all these dreams are found the usual psychological 
devices of dreamwork: symbolisation, condensation, 
displacement and_ secondary revision. However, the 
interesting forces are not seen as the structural ones 
of id, ego and superego (as in the Freudian view) but in 
the "vicissitudes of the self" in the midst of change. 
To place the dream described above within a self- 
psychological framework, one can see it as an interesting 
example of a "mixed dream", containing elements of both 
"self-state" and "selfself-object" associative 
experiences. 
As a "self-state" dream it expresses ambivalence, because 
the ideal self is represented as the observed flamenco 
dancer, and also as "the other woman" of the "day- 
residue". It graphically portrays both the desired-yet- 
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envied self, the dilemma being that the ideal self 
produces envy and the wish to spoil in the dreamer, which 
is shame-generating. It also provides an example of a 
structural conflict between the ego and the id. It 
describes a "crystallization point" around which a 
depleted "self-state" takes a specific visualisable form. 
Interestingly, as a "self self 
-object" dream, it portrays 
the state of the self in its struggle to maintain an 
emerging (but fragile) sense of confidence and 
independence. It shows a particular configuration of 
self-development and represents the patient's use of an 
idealising transference with the therapist. In a display 
of oscillating self-confidence, the dancer is both her 
ideal self and the envied "other woman". It is true that, 
during the therapy, Kate did develop a degree of self- 
reliance and increasing self-esteem. However, 
historically, once given the attention she craved, she 
had never been sure she really wanted it, and this led to 
her ambivalence about being the "desired object" and of 
being "centre-stage". Therefore, the dream leads not just 
to an understanding of the patient's current self-state, 
but also to an understanding of her current selfself- 
object transference and, beyond that, to its origins in 
her early childhood relationship with her mother 
(Section B, Chapter 6 refers). 
Therefore, as well as being a "self-state" dream, it is 
also a dream about "self self -object" experiences and 
about the overall functioning of the self at a particular 
moment in time. In self-psychological terms, the dream's 
organisation can be seen as representing the fluctuating 
state of the dreamer's emotional world, in its quest 
for 
resolution and harmony, and the re-owning of shameful 
affect, such as envy. 
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Therefore, the self-psychological perspective emphasises 
the importance of a "holistic" approach to understanding 
dreams, involving an overall "empathic grasp" of the 
dreamer's current life-situation, childhood experiences, 
and everchanging emotional associations, before it can 
be understood or interpreted. 
Dreams: Evaluation of Therapeutic Differences 
In the view of Fosshage and Loew (1978), dreamwork is a 
technique which is as productive as transference 
interpretation, and as essential, if the aim is to 
maintain an equal relationship, and they see it as 
providing an "objective third term" which is equally 
available to patient and to analyst. By providing a 
spontaneous check from compliance to the "wise and 
powerful analyst", they argue that dreamwork can play an 
important role in countering an unrecognised or 
unrelieved transference, whilst minimising the effects 
of repression, and hence shame-generating material. 
In summary, although differences emerge in the emphases 
which various theorists and practitioners place on the 
value of dreamwork in psychotherapeutic practice, it has 
clearly been modified and extended since Freud's (1900) 
original exposition on dreams. According to theorists 
such as Garma (1974), the dream is more valuable than any 
other product which the dreamer could invent while awake, 
and he asserts that it is only when deep dream 
interpretations are realised that treatment progresses 
well. 
As such, in contrast to other clinical material, dreams 
are generally seen to provide a direct inroad into 
unconscious, or unrecognised, conflicts in the "here-and- 
j 
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now" and are used as a therapeutic tool by practitioners 
across a wide range of theoretical orientations. 
It is of note that many Freudians themselves disagree as 
to the significance and usefulness of dream material in 
therapy. While many Freudian analysts (Altman, 1969; 
Garma 1974; Greenson 1970) continue, in the tradition of 
Freud, to regard the dream as different from other 
clinical material (in that it provides ready access to 
the workings of the unconscious), other Freudians argue 
that a dream is no different from, and clinically no more 
important than, any other piece of verbal or nonverbal 
behaviour. 
According to Freud's topographical model, dreams were 
seen as the "uncontaminated product" of the unconscious 
and were highly esteemed in the primary therapeutic task 
of "making the unconscious conscious". Later, in his 
structural model, Freud shifted the therapeutic focus 
from making the unconscious conscious to "intersystemic 
conflict" and to the analysis of defence-mechanisms. Such 
conflicts (either conscious or unconscious) are, on this 
view, readily accessible in any of the patient's 
behaviours, including dreams: hence dreams are seen as 
neither more nor less important than any other piece of 
clinical material. 
Within the Jungian approach, the dream is valued for its 
healing and balancing function because of its power to 
confront 
- 
and reveal 
- 
important aspects of the Self 
that are not heeded when awake. The dream serves as 
"director" of the therapeutic process and so has an 
equalising effect on patient and therapist alike, 
indicating what needs to be focused on and what changes 
need to be made. 
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In Jungian therapy, "dream journals" are part of routine 
treatment procedure because of the clinical significance 
ascribed to the dream. It is here that the approaches of 
Jung and Perls converge, for Perls saw the dream as 
containing the "missing part" of the self and as 
providing an "existential message", whereas for Jung it 
was a "message from the soul". But in spite of the 
centrality of dreams for both theorists, neither dwell on 
them exclusively, or as extensively as Freud, but take 
into account the significance of the dream in relation to 
the totality of the dreamer's current life situation and 
existing emotional associations. 
Klein, whilst accepting the importance of dreamwork in 
the Freudian sense of "unravelling meaning", modified and 
extended its use to include the concept of "phantasy" 
(the "ph" denoting it as an unconscious process), which 
became so central to her therapeutic work. Within the 
Kleinian framework, the dream is seen as a catalyst to 
the process of understanding the transference, and its 
emphasis is very much on the "here-and-now". As such, it 
is not seen as the primary therapeutic vehicle, but as a 
useful adjunct to therapy. 
Within the self-psychological approach of Kohut (1971, 
1977), the organisation of the "bipolar" or changing self 
is the orienting principle in therapy, and dreamwork is 
but one part of a far more complex, all-embracing process 
in which the totality of the patient's world is taken 
into account and explored. 
A Critical Evaluation of Dreams in Therapy 
One important issue in evaluating the use of dreams in 
therapy is that of dream interpretation, which has 
remained a neglected technique in most contemporary 
counselling and psychotherapies (see Means et al, 1986). 
24 
Firstly, because the process of dream interpretation has 
been considered a complex and somewhat mysterious art; 
secondly, because it has often been linked to particular 
theoretical orientations, and methods of interpretation 
are infrequently applied outside of these. The use of 
dreams in therapy was, for many years, thought to be the 
prerogative of psychoanalysts, or psychodynamically 
oriented therapists, since dream material was seen as a 
product of the unconscious mind and was thus, by 
definition, not readily available for inspection. Even 
some therapists trained in a psychodynamic perspective, 
although seeing dreams as valuable, often felt they had 
insufficient training to interpret them. 
Those belonging to other orientations often avoid dream 
material: cognitive and cognitive-behavioural therapists 
for example, often leave dreams alone, although in 
treating chronic nightmare sufferers, they will use 
techniques such as imagery rehearsal to help reduce or 
eliminate them (see Krakow et al, 1996). In the treatment 
of a patient with night terrors, Friedman (1993) believed 
it was the replaying to the patient of a recorded video 
of her taken during the terror that finally extinguished 
it. 
Excepting Gestalt therapists, who are trained to use 
dream material, many practitioners working in a 
humanistic, experiential way with "here-and-now" material 
have not wished to interpret dreams. As a consequence, 
only those patients in analysis and Gestalt therapy have 
been encouraged to present dream material in the 
sessions. 
Haskell (1986) argued that one reason dream data have not 
been considered scientifically significant is that they 
are viewed as sensory and visual phenomena, and are seen 
as perceptual rather than cognitive events. Also, dreams 
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are considered to be irrational and bizarre, 
ie. lacking 
. 
in logic and reason. This may help explain why, until 
recently, cognitive psychology has largely 
ignored 
dreams, although it does not expla}n why information- 
processing models of psychology have done so. Haskell 
also argues that, as a result of the Freudian legacy, 
dreams are often seen as "pathological phenomena" and 
relegated to the status of "interpretive" case-studies 
which cannot be methodologically controlled. This 
reinforces the view that dream data are unreliable and 
therefore invalid as cognitive data. Waking thoughts and 
feelings are viewed as qualitatively different from 
dreams, so the latter are seen to have little to 
contribute to cognitive psychology. Webb and Cartwright 
(1978) believe that the status of dream research is such 
because dreams are unobservable by others and cannot be 
studied by the intersubjective methods proper to 
scientific study. Also, the working conditions under 
which dream data are collected are difficult: 
experimenters must gather data at night while 
participants are asleep, and expensive sleep laboratory 
equipment is needed. Thus, most studies have had few 
participants and most have not been replicated. Moreover, 
the nature of dreams makes it difficult to conduct some 
kinds of studies: nightmares, for example, do not seem to 
occur under sleep laboratory conditions. Therefore, there 
are many reasons why the study of dreams and dreaming has 
not been accepted into the mainstream of academic 
research. It is of interest that neither Roth and Fonagy 
(1996) nor Bergin and Garfield (1994), in their recent 
reviews of psychotherapy outcome research, refer to the 
therapeutic use of dreams. 
A further important consideration is that of patients' 
dream beliefs, as these will significantly influence how 
(or if) dreams are used in therapy. In an ongoing study 
by Parker et al. (1999) an exploration was made of 
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beliefs about dreams by means of a questionnaire that was 
circulated to 300 participants. Against the prediction 
that Freudian beliefs such as "dreams are the products of 
the unconscious mind" would predominate, it was the 
information-processing (or cognitive) model of dreams 
that was the most popular. Other beliefs were 
parapsychological ("spirits visit me during the night") 
or neuro-physiological (eating wrong foods and/or random 
firing of neurons in the brain). These four models can be 
conceptualised as follows: analytic (based on 
intrapsychic conflict ie. Freud's structural model of the 
mind: treatment, interpretive therapy); information- 
processing (based on the computer model of the mind: 
treatment, problem-solving/increased self-awareness); 
parapsychological (based on spiritual beliefs: needs 
treatment only if malevolent, such as exorcism); neuro- 
physiological (based on random firing of synapses: 
treatment, medication). 
The information-processing or "computer" model of dreams 
postulated by Evans (1983) suggested that, in dreams, 
the day's events and experiences are organised and 
integrated with other memories and stored in longer-term 
memory. Evans' computer theory has common ground with 
some other psychological theories of dreaming, since 
Evans considers dreams important for the problem-solving 
and creative functions. 
One major neuro-physiological theory of dreams, called 
the activation-synthesis hypothesis (Hobson & McCarley, 
1977), suggests that purely physiological processes cause 
dreams. They argue that, in REM sleep, the brain 
generates random signals which the cortex attempts to 
make sense of, in the same way that it tries to make 
sense of memory input during waking hours. Critics of 
this theory have suggested that, although a description 
of the dreaming process may give an account of the 
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brain's activity, it does not explain the psychological 
reason for the process. Also, a purely physiological 
explanation of dreaming does not account for the creative 
functions of dreams that have been documented by many 
writers, poets and artists. Another unanswered question 
is, if dreams are caused by the random firing of 
neurones, why "dream logic" appears to follow such 
consistent rules. Additionally, this theory cannot 
account for repeated or recurring dreams which are widely 
reported in the literature, especially those related to 
trauma. As yet, the links have not been made to connect 
the neuro-physiological evidence with psychological 
theories, and the question of why we dream still remains 
unanswered. 
It is true that, whatever one's dream beliefs, some 
people remember dreams better than others. Clearly, no- 
one remembers all (or even most of) their dreams and 
people who claim to remember all their dreams are 
mistaken. With an effort, selected dreams can be 
remembered and recall improved with practice. The dreams 
that patients take to their analysts, for example, are 
only a selected sample and psychoanalytic theories cannot 
provide a comprehensive theory for the totality of 
dreaming, although may be valid for some dreams. Studies 
of sleep show that those who do not remember their 
dreams, or even claim never to have dreamt, spend a fifth 
or more of their sleep in dream activity; if woken during 
periods of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, they are 
usually able to describe dreams (Berger, 1969). Those who 
do not may show characteristics of alexithymia (Kalucy et 
al, 1976). It is striking how often people in therapy 
start remembering dreams for the first time and it is 
well-known that Jungian patients will present Jungian 
dreams to their therapist, and Freudian patients will 
bring Freudian dreams. 
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Rycroft (1979) emphasises the creative and imaginative 
aspects of dreaming, rather than just the conflictual and 
neurotic, and regards dreaming as the mode of 
communication of the non-dominant cerebral hemisphere. 
To summarise, all of us, if we choose, can make sense of 
our dreams in a way that is helpful and meaningful. We 
should all be able to incorporate our dream material 
into our waking lives, both to increase self-awareness 
and extend creativity. How much dreams are made use of in 
the consulting-room however, are very much a negotiated 
choice between patient and therapist. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the existence of such diversity in the 
literature relating to the role of dreamwork and its 
place in therapeutic theory and practice, suggests that 
it is generally seen as of significant clinical relevance 
regardless of practitioner orientation, although it is 
important that patients' beliefs about dreams be taken 
into account and respected by the therapist. The ability 
to work with a dream hinges not on the therapist's 
particular knowledge of dream symbolism, but rather on 
therapeutic skill in detecting the various ways in which 
the dreamer awake evades the message from the dreamer 
asleep. From this vantage-point, the concept of dreamwork 
can mäke a significant and far-reaching contribution to 
psychotherapeutic practice especially when working with 
the shame-prone patient. It is in this group that shame- 
generative material may often be denied or repressed, but 
may emerge in disguised form in the dream material. 
In conclusion, it is clearly the psychoanalytic emphasis 
on the role of the unconscious and the mechanisms of 
repression and distortion in dreamwork, as espoused by 
the psychoanalytic therapists, that is most relevant to 
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Lewis' (1971) concept of "bypassed" or unconscious shame 
and the avoidance of painful affect. 
According to Hobson (1985): 
"the dream 
... 
carries a multiplicity of meaning. It is an event which denotes progress within the 
therapeutic encounter, changes taking place over 
time within the dreamer's internal object 
relationship, and the state of transference and 
countertransference. It may also represent itself 
and its place within the work of the session" (p. 
3). 
su 
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